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Introduction
William Smith repeatedly battered Lauralee Lorenson, the
mother of his child, when they lived together in Cedar Falls, Iowa.
He beat her, choked her, and threatened to kill her if she tried to
break off their relationship.
One of these incidents led to a
misdemeanor conviction for assault, but Smith never served any jail
time.'
After the misdemeanor conviction, Smith acquired a gun and
shot Lorenson in the back. Lorenson did not cooperate with local
prosecutors when they attempted to file charges against Smith for the
shooting. 2 Without her cooperation, there was little possibility that a
prosecution under Iowa law would result in any significant sentence.
It appeared that Smith, like so many other batterers, would escape
with impunity.
Enter the federal government. Smith had violated the newly
enacted Lautenberg Amendment when he purchased a firearm after a
misdemeanor conviction for domestic violence. This law, codified at
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), prohibits the possession of a firearm by a
convicted domestic abuser.' The federal authorities did not need to
rely on any assistance from Lorenson to obtain a conviction of Smith
under the Lautenberg Amendment; his possession of the gun was
beyond dispute. Evidence of the shooting could be introduced in the
sentencing hearing with a lower standard of proof than a trial to
provide the basis for an enhanced sentence under the U.S. Sentencing

1. These facts are drawn from the Memorandum in Support of United States'
Resistance to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 288, United States v. Smith, 964 F. Supp.
286 (N.D. Iowa 1997).
2. Id. at 14. It is well documented that victims of domestic violence sometimes recant
or refuse to cooperate after filing complaints against their assailants. Angela Corsilles,
No-Drop Policies in the Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases: Guaranteeto Action or
Dangerous Solution?, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 853, 857 (1994) ("In many jurisdictions,
prosecutors routinely drop domestic violence cases because the victim requests it, refuses
to testify, recants, or fails to appear in court. In these situations, prosecutors dispose of
approximately fifty to eighty percent of cases by dropping the charges."); see also Cheryl
Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence
Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1883-84 (1996) (describing complexity of victim's
role in abusive relationship). Victims of domestic violence may refuse to cooperate for a
number of reasons, including financial concerns, fear of retaliation, low self-esteem, and
sympathy for the assailant. Thomas L. Kirsch II,
Problems in Domestic Violence: Should
Victims Be Forced to Participate in the Prosecution of Their Abusers?, 7 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 383, 392-98 (2001).
3. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2002).
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Guidelines. 4 Thus, the Lautenberg Amendment made the difference
between a dangerous abuser walking free or serving a four-year
sentence in federal prison.5
Moreover, the media coverage of the Smith case sent a signal
throughout the local community that convicted batterers could face a
federal prison sentence if they possessed firearms.
This new
awareness likely led some batterers to give up their guns or avoid
acquiring guns. Perhaps other shootings were averted due to the
removal of firearms from households with a history of domestic
violence. This ancillary effect of the Smith prosecution demonstrated
the greatest promise of the Lautenberg Amendment as a tool not
simply to punish batterers who possess guns, but to dissuade other
batterers from possessing guns in the first place.
As the Smith case illustrates, the need to disarm batterers is
urgent.
In 1999 approximately 790,000 violent assaults were
committed against intimate partners in the United States.' In fifteen7
percent of the cases, the assailants used weapons against the victims.
As a general matter, a firearm increases the likelihood that an
episode of domestic violence will cause the death of the victim.' One
study of family and intimate assaults in Atlanta found that these
assaults were twelve times more likely to result in death if a firearm
was present." The authors concluded that many batterers who kill
"with a firearm would be unable or unwilling to exert the greater
physical or psychological effort required to kill with another, typically
4. At

a federal

sentencing

hearing, most facts

need only be

proven by a

preponderance of the evidence, rather than beyond a reasonable doubt. Commentary to
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6AI.3, cmt. background (2002) [hereinafter

U.S.S.G.]. When a prohibited person uses a firearm to commit a violent offense, a number
of enhancements are available under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1.
5. Smith received a prison sentence of fifty-one months, to be followed by a threeyear term of supervised release. United States v. Smith, 171 F.3d 617, 619 (8th Cir. 1999).
6. CALLIE MARIE RENNISON, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE AND AGE OF
VICTIM, 1993-99, CRIME DATA BRIEF, REPORT NO. NCJ-187635, BUREAU OF JUST.
STAT., OFFICE OF JUST. PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST. (2003), available at
http'//www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pubalp2.htm. For purposes of this study, the term "intimate

partner" includes current and former spouses, as well as current and former
boy/girlfriends. Id.
7. Id. The type of weapon was not specified in this study.
8. Speaking in support of the Lautenberg Amendment, Senator Frank Lautenberg

stated that, "Itlhere is no question that the presence of a gun dramatically increases the
likelihood that domestic violence will escalate into murder." 142 CONG. REC. S1122
(daily ed. Sept. 25, 1996). Senator Patty Murray said that "the gun is the key ingredient
most likely to turn a domestic violence incident into a homicide."
142 CONG. REC.
S10,379 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996). Senator Diane Feinstein characterized batterers with
guns as "ticking time bombs," adding that "it is only a matter of time before the violence
gets out of hand, and the gun results in tragedy." id.
9. Linda E. Saltzman et al., Weapon Involvement and Injury Outcomes in Family and
Intimate Assaults, 267 J. AM. MEI. ASS'N 3043, 3046 (1992).
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available weapon.""'
According to a 1997 study that analyzed
homicide cases in which women were killed by intimate
acquaintances, such murders were 14.6 times more likely to occur in a
household with a history of domestic violence, and 7.2 times more
likely to occur in a household where firearms were present."
The danger posed by domestic abusers with firearms was
underscored in October 2002, when police arrested John Allen
Muhammad as one of the prime suspects in the most notorious
criminal case of the year: a series of sniper attacks that left ten
victims dead and three injured in the Washington, D.C. area. At the
time of these shootings, Muhammad was subject to a restraining
order obtained by his wife. In fact, it appears that the firearm he used
in the shooting spree had been acquired shortly after the restraining
order was entered 2
The strong evidence of a link between domestic abuse and gunrelated violence has led Congress to enact two statutes prohibiting
10. Id. at 3045.
11. James E. Bailey et al., Risk Factors for Violent Death of Women in the Home, 157
ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 777 (1997). Dan Eggen, Domestic Abusers Bought Guns,
WASH. POST, June 26, 2002, at A8. The nexus between firearms and domestic homicides
is well established. Id. Of the 15,000 annual homicides in the U.S., nearly ten percent
involve the killing of an intimate partner. Id. Almost all of these victims are women.
Most of them are killed with firearms. According to data collected by the FBI for the year
2000, fifty percent of female homicide victims were killed with a firearm. FED. BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION, 2000 SUPPLEMENTARY HOMICIDE REPORT (this statistic does not
take account of homicide cases in which the weapon was unknown). The FBI found that
more than two-thirds of these victims had been murdered by family members or intimate
acquaintances. Id.; see also Deny Guns to Abusers, U.S.A. TODAY, July 13, 1994, at 12A.
(stating that firearms figure in more than 40% of all family killings). The rate of firearm
homicides committed by men against women is higher in the United States than in other
high-income nations: a recent study found that although the United States represents only
thirty-two percent of the female population among the twenty-five high-income nations,
the United States accounts for eighty-four percent of all female victims of firearm
homicides in these nations. David Hemenway et al., Firearm Availability and Female
Homicide Victimization Rates Among 25 Populous High-Income Countries, 57 J. AM.
MED. WOMEN'S ASS'N 100 (2002), Even when gun-related domestic violence does not
result in death, the harm can be significant. For example, children who observed incidents
of domestic violence involving the use or threatened use of a firearm exhibited higher
levels of behavior problems than did other children. Ernest N. Jouriles et al., Knives,
Guns, and Interparent Violence: Relations with Child Behavior Problems, 12 J. FAM.
PSYCHOL. 178, 190 (1998).
12. A federal complaint indicated that the restraining order was entered in March
2000, and Muhammad acquired the firearm in May 2000. Complaint, United States v.
Muhammad, No. 02-5614 (W.D. Wash., Oct. 23, 2002); see also Carol Morello et al., Pair
Seized in Sniper Attacks; Gun in Car Tied to 11 Shootings, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 2002, at
AOL. When police arrested Muhammad on October 24, 2002, the charge for which he was
initially detained was not murder, but simply a violation of 18 U.S.C § 922(g)(8), the
statute which prohibits possession of firearms by domestic abusers subject to a restraining
order. Id.; see generally 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2002).

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 54

domestic abusers from possessing firearms. The first such statute is
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), enacted in 1994.'" This statute prohibits the
possession of a firearm by a person who is subject to a restraining
order meeting certain requirements.'4 The second statute that denies
guns to batterers is 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), enacted in 1996." This
statute prohibits the possession of a firearm by a person who has been
convicted of a misdemeanor crime involving domestic violence.16 A
violation of either section 922(g)(8) or section 922(g)(9) is punishable
by a prison term of up to ten years and a fine of up to $250,000.'"
Federal prosecutors have charged relatively few cases under

sections 922(g)(8) and 922(g)(9). In July 2002, the Executive Office
for United States Attorneys ("EOUSA") released information
detailing the utilization of these statutes by federal prosecutors.' In

13. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8).
14. Four requirements must be met for the restraining order to result in a firearms
disability. First, the defendant/respondent mpst have received actual notice and had an
opportunity to participate in the hearing that led to the issuance of the restraining order.
Id. §§ 922(g)(8)(A), 922(g)(8)(B). Second, the plaintiff/petitioner must be an intimate
partner of the defendant/respondent-that is, the parties must be spouses, ex-spouses,
parents of the same child, or present or former co-habitants. Id. § 922(g)(8)(B). Third,
the order in question must restrain defendant/respondent from one of the following acts:
a) harassing, stalking, or threatening the intimate partner, child of the
defendant/respondent, or child of the defendant/respondent's intimate partner; or b)
engaging in other conduct that would place the intimate partner in reasonable fear of
bodily injury to the partner or child. Id. §§ 922(g)(8)(B), 922(g)(8)(C). Fourth, the order
must include a finding that the defendant/respondent is a credible threat to the physical
safety of the intimate partner or child, and must explicitly prohibit the use, attempted use,
or threatened use of physical force against the intimate partner or child that would
reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury. Id. § 922(g)(8)(C).
15. Id. § 922(g)(9).
16. Several requirements must be met before a misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence will result in a firearms disability. First, the offense will not qualify unless it has,
as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly
weapon, committed by a current or former spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim, by a
person with whom the victim shares a child in common, by a person who is cohabiting with
or has cohabited with the victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian, or by a person similarly
situated to a spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim. Id. § 921(a)(33)(A). Further, the
misdemeanor conviction will not qualify unless the defendant was represented by counsel,
or knowingly and intelligently waived the right to counsel. Id. § 921(a)(33)(B)(i)(1).
Similarly, the offense will not qualify if the person was entitled to a jury trial and the case
not tried by a jury unless the person knowingly and intelligently waived the right to a jury
trial. Id. § 921 (a)(33)(B)(i)(lI).
17. Id. § 924(a)(2).
18. The report by EOUSA was prepared at the request of this author and was faxed to
this author on July 24, 2002. The statistics in the report are derived from data submitted
regularly by the ninety-four United States Attorneys' offices. The report includes all cases
in which section 922(g)(8) and section 922(g)(9) were charged, even if these were not the
lead charges. It is important to note that prior to 1999, the United States Attorneys' case
management system did not include complete statutory citations for all subsections of 18
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1995, the first year when section 922(g)(8) took effect, no
prosecutions were filed under that statute. " In 1996, three cases were
filed under section 922(g)(8); in 1997, thirteen cases were filed; in
1998, twelve cases were filed; in 1999, thirty-six cases were filed; in
2000, fifty-five cases were filed; and in 2001, sixty-eight cases were
filed.20 EOUSA's report predicted that by the end of 2002, a total of
fifty-eight cases would be filed under section 922(g)(8).2 ' These
statistics represent approximately one percent of the 6,000 cases filed
by federal prosecutors each year against defendants who illegally
possess firearms. 22 Put another way, the ninety-four U.S. Attorneys'
offices have failed to generate an annual average of one case per
district since section 922(g)(8) was enacted in 1994. The infrequency
of charges under section 922(g)(8) cannot be attributed to a lack of
defendants eligible for prosecution: Judge Posner of the Seventh
Circuit estimated that approximately 40,000 people violate section
922(g)(8) each year, and he complained that the federal government
only prosecutes a "minuscule" number of potential cases under this

statue. 3

U.S.C. § 922. Thus, the reported totals for prosecutions under sections 922(g)(8) and
922(g)(9) in the years prior to 1999 may not be complete.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASE PROCESSING, 2000:
WITH TRENDS 1982-2000, REPORT No. NCJ-189737, OFFICE OF JUST. PROGRAMS, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUST., 10 (2001), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pubalp2.htm
[hereinafter CRIMINAL CASE PROCESSING, 2000]. Table A7 of this report indicates that
6,037 weapons prosecutions were filed in 2000. Id. at 10 30. This statistic only includes
cases in which the weapons charge was the most serious charge, so it likely underestimates
the total number of prosecutions. Most of the weapons cases brought by federal
prosecutors arise from possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of section
922(g)(1). There are several other firearms disabilities under section 922(g) that account
for the rest of the 6,000 cases per year. The list of prohibited persons includes fugitives,
drug users, mental patients, illegal aliens, and veterans who have been dishonorably
discharged. 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(2)-(6)(2002). From 1992 to 1999, the total number of
defendants charged under the federal firearms laws ranged from a high of 7,621 (in1992)
to a low of 5,993 (in 1997). Press Release, Bureau of Justice Statistics, More Than 200,000
Firearms Applications Rejected in 1999, Defendants Charged with Federal Firearms
Offenses Increased from 1998 to 1999 (June 4, 2000) availableat http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/
bjs/pub/press/ffobcfpr.htm.
23. United States v. Wilson, 159 F.3d 280, 294 (7th Cir. 1998) (Posner, J.,
dissenting).
Judge Posner offered this basis for his estimate:
[18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)] was enacted in 1994 and the number of prosecutions for
violating has been minuscule (perhaps fewer than 10, though I have not been
able to discover the exact number, which is not a reported statistic) in relation to
the probable number of violations. I estimate that every year the law has been in
effect almost one hundred thousand restraining orders against domestic violence
have been issued. Since 40 percent of U.S. households own guns, there can be
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The number of prosecutions filed under section 92 2 (g)(9) is
slightly higher but is also far below its potential. In 1996, only one
prosecution was filed under section 922(g)(9).24 In 1997, ten cases
were filed; in 1998, sixteen cases were filed; in 1999, sixty-eight cases
were filed; in 2000, 159 cases were filed; and in 2001, 125 cases were
filed. 25 EOUSA's report predicted that 162 cases would be filed
under section 922(g)(9) in the year 2002.26
In other words,
prosecutions under this statute make up just two to three percent of
the total prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) for illegal possession
of firearms. The low rate of prosecution under section 92 2(g)(9) is
alarming given early predictions that one million potential defendants
would meet the requirements for prosecution under this statute.27
Recent evidence shows that enforcement problems persist under
section 922(g)(9). In July 2002, the General Accounting Office
documented that at least 3,000 persons subject to the gun ban under
section 922(g)(9) were able to acquire new guns from federally
licensed dealers between 1998 and 2001.26 Thus, for every one person
prosecuted under section 922(g)(9), ten more bought new guns in so
conspicuous a manner that their purchases could be documented by
federal investigators. Surely a much higher number of domestic
abusers are circumventing the gun ban with purchases at gun shows
and on the black market.
Why are section 922(g)(8) and section 922(g)(9) underutilized by
federal prosecutors and law enforcement agencies? 29 There are a
number of possible explanations,3 ' but this Article will focus on a

very little doubt that a large percentage of those orders were issued against gun
owners.
Id. (internal citations omitted; emphasis in original); see also United States v. Spruill, 61 F.
Supp. 2d 587, 589 (W.D.Tex. 1999) (section 922(g)(8) is "rarely enforced"), rev'd, 292 F.3d
207 (5th Cir. 2002).
24. See EOUSA Report, supra note 18.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. James Bovard, Disarming Those Who Need Guns Most, WALL ST. J., Dec. 23,
1996, at A12.
28. Dan Eggen, Domestic Abusers Bought Guns, WASH. POST, June 26, 2002, at A8.
29. While some advocates for domestic violence victims might be disappointed by the
number of prosecutions under these statutes, it is important to commend the attorneys in
the U.S. Department of Justice who have led the nationwide effort to facilitate such
prosecutions. These attorneys have done an outstanding job training prosecutors and law
enforcement agents regarding section 922(g)(8) and section 922(g)(9).
30. In addition to the factors listed in the accompanying text, it is possible that the low
prosecution rates can be attributed to other considerations: 1) a lack of enthusiasm among
some prosecutors and law enforcement agents for laws that appear to limit gun rights; 2) a
lack of resources for enforcement of section 922(g)(8) and section 922(g)(9) given the
overriding concern for combating terrorism after the tragedy of September 11, 2001; and
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short list of factors that hinder the effective enforcement of section
922(g)(8) and section 922(g)(9). First, the statutes themselves are
flawed. For example, section 922(g)(8) prohibits the possession of a
firearm by a batterer who is subject to a restraining order, but only if
the restraining order was issued after a hearing of which the batterer
received notice and at which the batterer had an opportunity to
participate. The purpose of this exception is to ensure that an
accused abuser will be given a fair chance to contest the allegations
before he loses his gun rights. Yet this provision overlooks the reality
that many local jurisdictions issue restraining orders on an emergency
basis without requiring the presence of the respondent. The ex parte
procedure is designed to protect the petitioner from reprisals by the
batterer. It is ironic that these cases, in which the petitioner's safety is
in the greatest jeopardy, lie outside the scope of the gun ban under
section 922(g)(8). The statute also appears to exempt stipulated
restraining orders that the judge has approved without a hearing."
The statute includes many formalistic requirements for restraining
orders that do not mesh with current state practices. Further, section
922(g)(8) is inapplicable to police officers and military personnel who
are subject to restraining orders for domestic violence.
The gun ban for convicted abusers, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), is
riddled with similar exceptions that limit its effectiveness. The "use
of force" requirement for predicate misdemeanors apparently does
not include the threatened use of force, such as a threat to kill one's
ex-wife. "3 The "domestic relationship" requirement does not extend
to cases of elder abuse.34 Other definitional problems could render
the gun ban useless in states with assault statutes that do not closely
track the federal language. 3
Moreover, the requirements for
3) a lack of understanding among local law enforcement agencies regarding the eligibility
of certain offenders for federal prosecution under these statutes.
31. The Fifth Circuit recently ruled that such orders do not result in a firearms
disability. Spruill, 292 F.3d at 217-18. In the Spruill case, the Fifth Circuit cited its earlier
ruling in United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 211 n.2 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S.
Ct. 2362 (2002), that an ex parte restraining order could not furnish the basis for a firearms
disability under section 922(g)(8) because no hearing was held. Id.
32. By contrast, there is no exception for law enforcement and military personnel
under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). It seems odd indeed that a twenty-year-old misdemeanor
conviction for domestic violence could disqualify a police officer from carrying a gun, but
not a currently pending restraining order based on a finding that he poses a risk of
violence to his ex-girlfriend.
33. 18 U.S.C. § 921 (a)(33)(A)(2002).
34. Id.
35. Id. For example, confusion has arisen as to whether the predicate offense must
include, as an element, the domestic relationship between the assailant and the victim.
Some circuits have resolved this question in favor of the government, finding that the
relational requirement need not be an element of the predicate offense. United States v.
Barnes, 295 F.3d 1354, 1368 (D.C. Cir. 2002); United States v. Chavez, 204 F.3d 1305,
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predicate offenses under section 922(g)(9) exclude indictments,
uncounseled pleas, and pleas in which the defendant did not
knowingly waive his right to a jury trial,3" exclusions that are not
necessitated by the Constitution and that substantially limit the scope
of the gun ban.
Enforcement of section 922(g)(8) and section 922(g)(9) has also
been constrained by several factors other than the language of the
statutes themselves. For example, the Brady law,37 which establishes
a system of background checks for purchasers of firearms, does not
allow sufficient time for law enforcement agencies to check whether
purchasers have a history of domestic violence. One last factor that
explains prosecutors' reluctance to utilize section 922(g)(8) and
section 922(g)(9) is the lack of sentencing guidelines tailored for these
statutes. Defendants convicted under these statutes typically receive
lower sentences than defendants convicted under the other federal
gun laws. Prosecutors with scarce resources may be deterred from
filing charges under section 922(g)(8) or section 922(g)(9) if they
realize that such charges will not result in any significant prison time:"
This Article argues that the effective enforcement of section

922(g)(8) and section 922(g)(9) will require revision of these statutes,
the Brady law,

and the applicable sentencing guidelines. 9

The

1313-14 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v. Meade, 175 F.3d 215, 218-19 (1st Cir. 1999);
United States v. Smith, 171 F.3d 617, 620 (8th Cir. 1999). The majority of circuits have not
yet resolved this question. In some jurisdictions, the U.S. Attorney's Office appears to be
troubled by the language of 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A) and has been reluctant to file
charges based on predicate offenses that lack a "domestic relationship" element. Federal
prosecutors in the District of Oregon even appeared before the Oregon Legislature,
urging that the state's assault statute be modified to include a domestic relationship
element in order to eliminate any doubt about the enforceability of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9)
in the District of Oregon. Summary of Hearing Before the Oregon House Interim
Judiciary Committee, November 19, 1997, available at http://www.leg.state.or.us/
comm/Summ4Feb.html. If the courts determine that the predicate offense must include
the relational requirement as an element, the enforcement of the gun ban will be very
difficult.
36. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(2002).
37. Id. § 922(t).
38. The prison sentence in United States v. Smith, 171 F.3d 617,619 (8th Cir. 1999), was
unusually high because the defendant used the gun to commit a crime of violence. Most
cases brought under section 922(g)(9) involve passive possession of a gun, so the offense
level under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 will be much lower than in the Smith case.
39. While other scholarship has addressed the federal statutes that deny guns to
domestic abusers, most of these other pieces have focused on the constitutionality of
section 922(g)(8) and section 922(g)(9). E.g., Ashley G. Pressler, Guns and Intimate
Violence: A Constitutional Analysis of the Lautenberg Amendment, 13 ST. JOHN'S J.
LEGAL COMMENT. 705 (1999); Kerri Fredheim, Comment, Closing the Loopholes in
Domestic Violence Laws: The Constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), 19 PACE L. REV.
445 (1999); Nelson Lund, The Ends of Second Amendment Jurisprudence: Firearms
Disabilities and Domestic Violence Restraining Orders, 4 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 157 (1999);
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Article will proceed in three analytic steps. First, I will examine the
background of section 922(g)(8) and section 922(g)(9): I will analyze
their legislative history, their provisions, and their constitutionality.
Second, I will focus on the practical hindrances that have limited the
effectiveness of these statutes. Third, I will suggest reforms that will
improve enforcement of the gun ban for domestic abusers.

I. Federal Statutes Prohibiting Domestic Abusers from
Possessing Firearms
A.

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)-Gun Ban While Restraining Order Is in Effect

(1) Provisionsof Section 922(g)(8)

The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 199440
added a new provision to the list of firearms disabilities under 18
U.S.C. § 922(g). 4' This provision, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8),
prohibits the possession of a firearm or ammunition by any person
who is subject to a court order that
(A) was issued after a hearing of which such person received actual
notice, and at which such person had an opportunity to participate;
(B) restrains such person from harassing, stalking, or threatening
an intimate partner of such person or child of such intimate partner
or person, or engaging in other conduct that would place an
Eric A. Pullen, Guns, Domestic Violence, Interstate Commerce, and the Lautenberg
Amendment: "[Slimply Because Congress May Conclude That a ParticularActivity
Substantially Affects Interstate Commerce Does Not Necessarily Make It So," 39 S. TEX. L.
REV. 1029 (1998); Melanie L. Mecka, Seizing the Ammunition from Domestic Violence:
Prohibitingthe Ownership of Firearms by Abusers, 29 Rutgers L.J. 607 (1998). Now that
the constitutionality of the statutes has been clearly established, it is important to take the
next analytical step and evaluate the need for reforms that will improve the enforceability
of the gun ban.
40. The relevant portions of this statute are set forth in Title XI, § 110401, Pub. L. No.
103-322, 18 Stat. 1796. President Clinton signed this legislation on September 13, 1994.
Holly Idelson & David Masci, Crime Bill Provisions, CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3526 (Dec.
10, 1994).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Previous legislation had created firearms disabilities for felons
(18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)), fugitives (section 922(g)(2)), drug users (section 922(g)(3)), the
insane (section 922(g)(4)), illegal aliens (section 922(g)(5)), veterans who were
dishonorably discharged from the Armed Forces (section 922(g)(6)), former U.S. citizens
who have renounced their citizenship (section 922(g)(7)), defendants who have been
indicted for felony offenses but not yet tried (section 922(n)), and juveniles (sections
922(b) and 922(x)). Other provisions of section 922 criminalize the possession of certain
types of weapons and paraphernalia, such as machine guns (section 922(o)),
semiautomatic assault weapons (section 922(v)), large capacity ammunition feeding
devices (section 922(w)), stolen firearms (section 922(i)), firearms with obliterated serial
numbers (section 922(k)), and firearms that are not detectable by airport x-ray machines
(section 922(p)).
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intimate partner in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner
or child; and
(C)(i) includes a finding that such person represents a credible
threat to the physical safety of such intimate partner or child; or
(ii) by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against such intimate partner or
child that would reasonably be expe6ted to cause bodily injury.
A related provision in 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(8) uses virtually identical
language to criminalize the act of selling or otherwise disposing of a
firearm by giving it to a person who is subject to such a restraining
order."
The term "intimate partner" is defined in section 921(a)(32),
which was added contemporaneously with sections 922(d)(8) and
922(g)(8). "'[JI]ntimate partner' means, with respect to a person, the
spouse of the person, a former spouse of the person, an individual
who is a parent of a child of the person, and
43 an individual who
cohabitates or has cohabitated with the person.,
Notably, all the firearms prohibitions in 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1)
through 922(g)(8) are subject to certain limitations. First, these
prohibitions only apply to firearms and ammunition that have
traveled in interstate commerce.44 Second, these prohibitions do not
apply to police, military personnel, and other government employees
who use firearms and ammunition in connection with their official
duties.

'5

A violation of section 922(g)(8) is punishable by a prison term of
up to ten years.46 In most cases, there is no mandatory minimum

42. Id.§ 922(d)(8).

43. Id. § 921(a)(32).
44. Under section 922(g), it is illegal "to ship or transport in interstate or foreign
commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive
any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign

commerce."

The language referring to "commerce" and to "interstate commerce"

functions as a jurisdictional predicate. It is typically satisfied by proof that the firearm or

ammunition or components thereof were manufactured outside the state in which the
illegal possession took place. E.g., United States v. Nathan, 202 F.3d 230, 234 (4th Cir.
2000) (noting that the jurisdictional element in section 922(g) is satisfied where gun has
been manufactured in one state and then possessed by the defendant in another), cert.
denied, 529 U.S. 1123 (2000).

45. 18 U.S.C. § 925(a)(1) (2002):
The provisions of this chapter, except for sections 922(d)(9) and 922(g)(9) and
provisions relating to firearms subject to the prohibitions of section 922(p), shall
not apply with respect to the transportation, shipment, receipt, possession, or

importation of any firearm or ammunition imported for, sold or shipped to, or
issued for the use of, the United States or any department or agency thereof or
any State or any department, agency, or political subdivision thereof.
46. Id.. § 924(a)(2).
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sentence.47 Within the statutory sentencing parameters of zero to ten

years, the defendant's sentence is determined by the United States
Sentencing Guidelines." Typically defendants who are convicted of
violating section 922(g)(8) receive sentences that are far below the
ten-year maximum. Among the 188 defendants convicted under
section 922(g)(8) since 1995, only 21.3% were sentenced to a prison

term exceeding five years. Most received sentences of two years or
less, and 14.4% received no prison sentence at all.4 9 These sentences

are far lower than the average sentence for federal weapons
prosecutions, which is approximately eight years."' A defendant
convicted under section 922(g)(8) is subject to a fine of up to
$250,000,"1 although in reality fines are rarely imposed.
47. Id.
This statute provides for sentencing enhancements under certain
circumstances. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) provides that a defendant who violates
any provision of section 922(g) after three prior felonies involving "serious drug offenses"
or "violent felonies," as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2), shall be imprisoned not less than
fifteen years. Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), if a defendant uses, carries, or possesses a firearm
to further a "crime of violence" or "drug trafficking crime," as defined in sections
924(c)(2) and 924(c)(3), the defendant is subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of at
least five years to run consecutively with the sentence imposed under section 924(a)(1) for
possessing the firearm as a prohibited person.
48. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 (2002) is the specific sentencing guideline for defendants
convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). A number of guideline adjustments may be
available for cases prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). E.g., U.S.S.G. §§ 2K2.1(b)(5)
(use of firearm in connection with felon), 2K2.1(b)(6) (cross reference to other
guidelines).
49. See EOUSA Report, supra note 18. The statistics in the report cover the period
from January 1995 through March 2002. According to these statistics, of the 188
defendants who were convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), 21.3% received prison
sentences exceeding sixty months, 12.8% received sentences of thirty-seven to sixty
months, 11.7% received sentences of twenty-five to thirty-six months, 20.2% received
sentences of thirteen to twenty-four months, 19.7% received sentences of one to twelve
months, and 14.4% received no prison sentence. Id. It is important to note that these
statistics include prosecutions in which the section 922(g)(8) charge is only one of several
charges. Id. The statistics report the total sentence received by the defendant, not simply
the portion of the sentence attributable to the section 922(g)(8) charge. Id. Under the
federal sentencing rules, the judge calculates separate offense levels for each aspect of the
defendant's misconduct (e.g., drug offenses and gun offenses are grouped separately), and
then combines these offense levels to determine the total sentence. U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4.
When gun and drug charges are grouped, the drug charges normally account for the lion's
share of the sentence. Thus the EUOSA's statistics probably overstate the sentences that
are attributable section 922(g)(8). Among those defendants sentenced to sixty-one
months or more, it is likely that the bulk of the sentence is attributable to offenses other
than the violation of section 922(g)(8).
50. CRIMINAL CASE PROCESSING, 2000, supra note 22. Table 6 of this report
indicates that in the most recent year for which data are available (the period October 1,
1999 through September 30, 2000), the mean sentence in federal weapons prosecutions
was 92.2 months. Id. The mean sentence in all federal prosecutions during this period was
56.8 months. Id.
51. 18 U.S.C. § 3571 (2002).
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(2) Legislative History of Section 922(g)(8)

The gun ban under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) traces its origins to
three bills that were introduced in the fall of 1993. The first of these
bills was introduced by Senator Paul Wellstone, and the second was
introduced by Representative Robert Torricelli."2 Senator Wellstone
and Representative Torricelli were working closely together, and

their proposals were identical. They sought to prohibit the possession
of a firearm by a batterer subject to a restraining order and also to
prohibit the possession of a firearm by any person who had been
convicted of a domestic violence misdemeanor. " They offered these

proposals as amendments to the Omnibus Crime Bill that was under
consideration in each chamber. 4
Senator John Chafee proposed a third version of the gun ban.55
His bill would have prohibited gun possession while a restraining
order was pending but would not have created a gun ban for
misdemeanants." Senate Republicans such as Bob Dole and Orrin
52. Senator Wellstone introduced this bill, S. 1570, on October 20, 1993. S.1570, 103d
Cong. (1993). Representative Robert Torricelli introduced a companion bill, H.R. 3301, at
the same time in the House. H.R. 3301, 103d Cong. (1993). Press Release, Office of
Senator Paul Wellstone (May 19, 1994) (1994 WL 14179879); Press Release, Office of
Representative Robert Torricelli (May 19, 1994) (1994 WL 14179910); 139 CONG. REC.
S15,500 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1993) (statement of Sen. Wellstone); 139 CONG. REC. S14,011
(daily ed. Oct. 20,1993) (statement of Sen. Wellstone).
53. S.1570 and H.R. 3301 would have extended the gun ban under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)
to any person who:
(8)(A) has been convicted in any court of the United States of an offense that(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force against a spouse, former spouse, domestic partner, child, or former
child of the person; or
(ii) by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against a
spouse, domestic partner, child, or former child of the person may be used in
the course of committing the offense; or
(B) is required, pursuant to an order issued by a court of the United States in a
case involving the use, attempted us, or threatened use of physical force against a
person described in subparagraph (A), to maintain a minimum distance from the
person so described.
139 CONG. REC. S14,011 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1993).
54. At this time, the Omnibus Crime Bill was assigned the number S.1607. 139 CONG.
REC. S15,638 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1-993).
55. This proposal was introduced on November 10, 1993, as amendment 1169 to the
Omnibus Crime Bill, S.1607. 139 CONG. REC. S15,638 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1993).
56. Senator Chafee proposed to prohibit possession of a firearm by any person
(A) who is subject to an order, issued by a Federal or State court after a hearing
about which that person received actual notice and at which that person had the
opportunity to participate, restraining that person from harassing, stalking,
threatening, or engaging in other such conduct that would place another person
in fear of bodily injury or the effect of which conduct would be to place a
reasonable person in fear of bodily injury; and
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Hatch backed the Chafee proposal,57 while Senate Democrats such as
Joseph Biden supported the Wellstone/Torricelli version." In the

end, the Senate approved both the Wellstone amendment 9 and the
Chafee Amendment,6 ' leaving the conference committee to sort out
any conflicting provisions.61 The Crime Bill itself was approved by the
Senate on November 19, 1993.2
The House was less enthusiastic about the gun ban for domestic
abusers. Representative Torricelli's proposal encountered resistance
from Representative Jack Brooks of Texas, the Chairman of the
House Judiciary Committee, 3 and from the National Rifle

Association. 64 When the House passed its version of the Omnibus
Crime Bill

on April 21,

1994,65

Representative

Torricelli's

amendment was included but in a weakened form.66 The House had
(B) whom the court issuing the order finds under this subsection to represent a
credible threat to the physical safety of that other person.
139 CONG. REC. S15,638 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1993); 139 CONG. REC. SI 5,620 (daily ed.
Nov. 10, 1993).
57. 139 CONG. REC. S15,638 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1993) (statement of Sen. Dole).
58. Id.
59. This amendment was approved by a voice vote on November 10, 1993. Holly
Idelson, Congress Responds to Violence; Tackles Guns, Criminals, 51 CONG. Q. WKLY.
REP. 3127 (Nov. 13, 1993).
60. This amendment was approved by a voice vote on November 19, 1993. 139 CONG.
REC. S16,288 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1993) (statement of Sen. Chafee).
61. The Wellstone and Chafee amendments were compared in a press release from
Senator Wellstone's office. Press Release, Office of Senator Wellstone, (May 19,
1994)(1994 WL 14179879 *2).
62. The bill passed by a vote of 95-4. Holly Idelson, Anti-Crime Bills Compared, 52
CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1147 (May 7, 1994).
63. Ellen J. Silberman, Backers Fear for Proposal to Keep Guns from Abusers,
RECORD (Northern N.J.), June 29, 1994, at A12 ("The chairman of the House Judiciary
Committee, Rep. Jack Brooks, D-Texas, is a longtime opponent of gun control
measures.").
64. The NRA was openly hostile toward Representative Torricelli and his bill. NRA
spokesman Joe Phillips said, "Bob Torricelli is an idiot for suggesting he has the only
solution to this problem." Neal Thompson, Denying Guns to Spouse Abusers Torricelli
Girds to Battle NRA, RECORD (Northern N.J.), Dec. 3, 1993, at B1. The NRA took the
position that the gun ban should be limited to felonies, and that advocates for battered
women should strive to reclassify domestic violence offenses as felonies, rather than to
create a new gun ban based on misdemeanors. Silberman, supra note 63. For his part,
Representative Torricelli said that NRA lobbyists "have defended those who have beaten
their spouses and children." RECORD (Northern N.J.), Dec. 3, 1993, at B1, available at
1993 WL 7916684.
65. The bill passed by a vote of 285-141. Idelson, supra note 62.
66. Guns and Family Abusers, WASH. POST, June 25, 1994, at A20. Representative
Torricelli was critical of the House's revised version. Press Release, Office of
Representative Torricelli (May 19, 1994)(1994 WL 14179910 *2) ("Unfortunately, the
House has passed a watered-down version of this legislation .... [lI]t is critical that our
colleagues in the conference committee correct the House version to provide full
protections."); Letter from Representative Torricelli to Representative Brooks (June 27,
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deleted the gun ban for misdemeanants. The House had also changed
much of the other language in Representative Torricelli's proposal."
The Crime Bill proceeded to the conference committee in the
summer of 1994.6' The conferees faced a difficult task. Many
provisions of the Crime Bill such as the proposed ban on assault
weapons, and the proposed civil remedy in the Violence Against
Women Act attracted far more attention than the gun ban for
domestic abusers.6 ' The conference committee was embroiled in
1994) (1994 WL 14180473 *2) ("Unfortunately, the House crime bill contains a weakened
version [of the gun ban] which would only prohibit possession by some of those who are
subject to a court restraining order."). Senator Wellstone urged the conferees not to
adopt the "severely weakened version of the Act" that was passed by the House. Press
Release, Office of Senator Paul Wellstone (May 19, 1994)(1994 WL 14179879). In a floor
statement, Senator Wellstone vented his frustration that "Ift]his amendment was severely
weakened on the House side."
140 CONG. REC. S7884 (daily ed. June 29, 1994)
(statement of Sen. Wellstone).
Representative Torricelli also favored the Senate's
stronger version, although he tempered his enthusiasm by offering this comment:
"[a]dmitting the Senate has a better provision is a bit like cheering for the Russians in the
Cold War, or for the Cowboys in the Super Bowl."
Press Release, Office of
Representative Robert Torricelli (May 19, 1994) (1994 WL 14179910).
67. The revised version of Representative Torricelli's bill appeared as section 1625 of
the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of' 1994 (then known as H.R. 4092),
which was printed in the Congressional Record on April 14, 1994. 140 CONG. REC.
H2,260 (1994). This version of the bill included the same definition of "intimate partner"
that appeared in the final version signed into law. (Previous versions of the bill did not
define or even refer to the term "intimate partner.") The revised House version also
offered a new formulation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), prohibiting firearm possession by any
person
who is subject to a court order that(A) was issued after a hearing of which such person received actual or
constructive notice, and at which such person had an opportunity to
participate;
(B) restrains such person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate
partner of such person or child of such intimate partner or person, or
engaging in other conduct that would place an intimate partner in
reasonable fear of bodily injury; and
(C)(i) includes a finding that such person represents a credible threat to the
physical safety of such intimate partner or child; or
(ii) by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use
of physical force against such intimate partner or child that would
reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury.
Id.
68. 1I.
69. Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., The Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against
Women Act: A Defense, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 7 (2000) ("The civil rights remedy was
among the most closely considered provisions of the Violence Against Women Act.");
Julie Goldscheid, United States v. Morrison and the Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence
Against Women Act: A Civil Rights Law Struck Down in the Name of Federalism, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 109, 114 (2000) ("The civil rights remedy was the subject of much
debate before its ultimate enactment."); Michael Ross, House OKs Crime Bill, Keeps
Assault Gun Ban, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1994, at Al (The proposed ban on assault
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controversy," and its first report was scrapped altogether.'
In a
second effort to pass the Crime Bill, the conferees reached a

compromise that saved some of the bill's more controversial
provisions but sided with the conservative House version of the gun
ban for domestic abusers.72

The House approved the conference

report on August 21, 1994, and the Senate approved it four days
later.73 President Clinton signed the Crime Bill into law on
September 13, 1994. 7"

weapons provoked "tenacious opposition by the National Rifle Association and other gun
lobbying groups.").
70. Sally Goldfarb, The Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act.
Legislative History, Policy Implications & Litigation Strategy, 4 J.L. & POL'Y 391, 394
(1995) ("[T]he civil rights provision, having attracted a great deal of controversy, squeaked
through the Conference Committee by only one vote."); Victoria F. Nourse, Where
Violence, Relationship,and Equality Meet: The Violence Against Women Act's Civil Rights
Remedy, 11 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 35-36 (1996) (explaining that House conferees were
apprehensive about VAWA's civil rights remedy); Carolyn P. Weiss, Title III of the
Violence Against Women Act: Constitutionally Safe and Sound, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 723,
733 (1997) (The civil rights remedy "was the most controversial provision of the
VAWA."). The proposed ban on assault weapons was so controversial that fifty pro-NRA
Democrats, including House Judiciary Chairman Jack Brooks, teamed up with
Republicans in opposing the measure. Ross, supra note 69.
71. The pro-NRA coalition in the House, outraged by the ban on assault weapons,
succeeded in blocking consideration of the first conference report on a narrow procedural
vote. Ross, supra note 69.
72. Holly Idelson, $33 Billion Crime Measure Heads to Last Hurdles, 52 CONG. Q.
WKLY. REP. 2137 (July 30, 1994). According to Senator Wellstone, the House conferees
"stonewall[ed]" when he sought their approval of the Wellstone/Torricelli language. 140
CONG. REC. S7884 (daily ed. June 29, 1994) (statement of Sen. Wellstone). The
conference committee basically adopted the revised House language in the April 14, 1994
bill, with a few revisions. The conference report tightened some of the language of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) beyond what the House had required. For example, in section
922(g)(8)(A), the conferees deleted the House language that had allowed "constructive
notice" to respondents in restraining order proceedings. In section 922(g)(8)(B), the
conferees inserted language modifying the term "reasonable fear of bodily injury" to
clarify that this language only covers injury to the "intimate partner or child." On the
other hand, the conferees somewhat loosened the requirements of section 922(g)(8)(C).
The revised House version had insisted that all restraining orders include "a finding that
[the respondent] represents a credible threat to the physical safety of such intimate
partner"; the conferees added the words "or child" to the end of this phrase, and also
added an alternative provision so that a restraining order would qualify if it "explicitly
prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against such intimate
partner or child that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury." Compare
section 1625 of H.R. 4092, 140 CONG. REC. H2260 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 1994), with Title XI,
§ 110401, Public Law No. 103-322,18 Stat. 1796 (enacted September 13, 1994).
73. The conference report was approved in the House by a vote of 235-195, and in the
Senate by a vote of 61-38. Nourse, supra note 70, at 36.; Holly Idelson & David Masci,
Crime Bill Provisions,52 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3526 (Dec. 10, 1994).
74. Idelson & Masci, supra note 73.
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Because the three bills that became 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) were
introduced on the floor, rather than in a committee, there was no
opportunity to hold hearings on these proposals. The intent of
Congress must be gleaned primarily from floor statements by the
sponsors of the bills.75 To the extent that such expressions of intent

are available, three themes are strongly evident. First, the sponsors
stressed the great dangers posed by firearms in the hands of domestic
abusers.76 Second, the sponsors expressed their intent to disarm every
75. It is well settled that the statements of a bill's primary sponsors are an
authoritative guide to statutory construction. N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512,
526-27 (1982) ("Senator Bayh's remarks, as those of the sponsor of the language
ultimately enacted, are an authoritative guide to the statute's construction."); Lewis v.
United States, 445 U.S. 55, 63 (1980) ("Inasmuch as Senator Long was the sponsor and
floor manager of the bill, his statements are entitled to weight."); Fed. Energy Admin. v.
Algonquin, SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 564 (1976) ("As a statement of one of the legislation's
sponsors, this explanation deserves to be accorded substantial weight in interpreting the
statute."). Indeed, every circuit has held that the statements of a bill's primary sponsor are
an important expression of legislative intent. See, e.g., CIA Petrolera Caribe v. ARCO
Caribbean, Inc., 754 F.2d 404, 425 (1st Cir. 1985) ("[R]emarks on the floor by the bill's
sponsor ... are entitled to substantial weight."); Lieberman v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 771
F.2d 32, 39 (2d Cir. 1985) (sponsors' statements deserve substantial weight); SmithKline
Corp. v. Staats, 668 F.2d 201, 210 (3d Cir. 1981) ("[A] sponsor's statement of purpose
generally is regarded as a persuasive indicator of congressional intent."); Radowich v.
United States Attorney, Dist. of Maryland, 658 F.2d 957, 962 (4th Cir. 1981) (author's
comments on meaning of statutory language are entitled to substantial weight); Rowinsky
v. Bryan Indiana Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1014 n.19 (5th Cir. 1996) (sponsor's comments
are "authoritative"); Browder v. Tipton, 630 F.2d 1149, 1151-52 (6th Cir. 1980) ("Because
Edmunds was the Senate manager of the bill, we afford his statements great weight."); In
re Grand Jury Materials, 659 F.2d 800, 806 (7th Cir. 1981) (sponsor's statements should be
accorded substantial weight); Hodgson v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 614 F.2d 601, 613 (8th
Cir. 1980) ("It is the sponsors that we look to when the meaning of the statutory words is
in doubt.") (citation omitted); Kalvinskas v. California Inst. Tech., 96 F.3d 1305, 1309 (9th
Cir. 1996) ("[R]elevant statements by sponsors" should be given substantial weight);
United States v. Boling, 947 F.2d 1461, 1463 n.l (10th Cir. 1991) (Sponsor's "views as to
the intent and meaning [of a statute] would seem to have special significance."), overruled
on other grounds, United States v. Rockwell, 984 F.2d 1112 (10th Cir. 1993); Curse v.
United States Dept. of Labor, 843 F.2d 456, 462 n.18 (11th Cir. 1988) (statement of
legislator who worked on statute is "helpful in clarifying legislative intent"); St. Louis Fuel
& Supply Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 890 F.2d 446, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
("Because Eckhardt and Javits sponsored the provisions, moreover, their comments carry
'substantial weight."').
76. 140 CONG. REC. S7884 (daily ed. June 29, 1994) (statement of Sen. Wellstone) ("I
have said it once. I have said it twice. I have said it 10 times. All too often the only
difference between a battered woman and a dead woman is the presence of a gun."); Press
Release, Office of Senator Wellstone (June 28, 1994)(1994 WL 14180478 *2) ("More than
4,000 women are killed each year at the hands of their batterers. An estimated 150,000
incidents of domestic violence involve a weapon. A recent study in the New England
Journal of Medicine found that [if there is a gun present in the house, a woman who has]
been physically abused in a previous family fight [is] almost five times more likely to be
murdered or involved in a fatal shooting."); Press Release, Office of Representative
Torricelli (May 19, 1994)(1994 WL 14179910 *2) ("[fifyou are under threat from domestic
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person against whom a domestic violence restraining order is
pending, without extensive inquiry into the precise basis for each
restraining order." Third, the sponsors relayed their concern that,
under present law, the possibility of disarming batterers depended too
much on the discretion of individual judges and prosecutors; a
uniformly enforced gun ban was necessary to protect battered women
and children."
Certain less conspicuous aspects of this legislative history are
noteworthy for purposes of this Article. For example, the origin of
the notice and hearing requirements in section 922(g)(8) merits close
scrutiny. The notice requirement was absent from the bills offered by

violence and your chances of being under such a threat are increasing then it's likely that
the person threatening you will use a gun."); 139 CONG. REC. S16,288 (daily ed. Nov. 19,
1993) (statement of Sen. Chafee) ("There have been far, far too many dreadful cases in
which innocent people and usually they are women have been wounded or killed by a
former boyfriend or girlfriend, partner, or other intimate using a gun despite the fact that
attacker was subject to a restraining order."); see also H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 103-711, at 391
(1994), quoted in United States v. Baker, 197 F.3d 211, 216 (6th Cir. 1999) ("Congress
finds with respect to this provision [section 922(g)(8)] that domestic violence is the leading
cause of injury to women in the United States between the ages of 15 and 44; firearms are
used by the abuser in 7% of domestic violence incidents and produces [sic] an adverse
effect on interstate commerce; and individuals with a history of domestic abuse should not
have easy access to firearms.").
77. 140 CONG. REC. S7884 (daily ed. June 29, 1994) (statement of Sen. Wellstone)
(Proposal "would prohibit anyone who has a restrainingorder issued against them [from]
owning or possessing a gun.") (emphasis added); 139 CONG. REC. S16,288 (daily ed. Nov.
19, 1993) (statement of Sen. Chafee) ("There simply is no rational reason whatsoever to
allow persons who have been deemed a clear and present danger to another person,
usually a woman, to have a gun. None at all."); Id. at *15 ("Restraining orders are issued
for the express reason that a woman sincerely believes and a court agrees that she is in
imminent danger of being harmed, attacked or killed. It therefore is nothing short of
insanity for Federal law to allow such dangerous persons to possess a gun."); 139 CONG.
REC. S15,500 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1993) (statement of Sen. Wellstone) ("[I]f someone has
not been responsible enough so that he, or sometimes it could be she, has a record of
violence against a spouse or a child, then we have no responsibility whatsoever to enable
that person to go out and buy a gun or, for that matter, own a gun."); WASH. POST, Nov. 6,
1993, at A24 (quoting Representative Torricelli's statement that, "The bill would make it
clear that if you are not responsible enough to keep from doing harm to your spouse or
your children, then society does not deem you responsible enough to own a gun.").
78. 140 CONG. REC. S7884 (daily ed. June 29, 1994) (statement of Sen. Wellstone)
(decrying the evils of charge bargaining, whereby batterers avoid the felony gun ban by
pleading to misdemeanor assault charges in many jurisdictions); Press Release, Office of
Representative Torricelli (May 19, 1994) (1994 WL 14179910 *2)(complaining that the
current ability of police to disarm abusers was inconsistent because "most states do not
consider domestic violence to be a felony.
): 139 CONG. REC. S16,288 (daily ed. Nov.
19, 1993) (statement of Sen. Chafee) (citing need for more "definite protection" under the
law); see 140 CONG. REC. 87,393 (daily ed. June 22, 1994) (statement of Sen. Wellstone)
("[I]f you have committed an act of violence against your spouse or child, whatever your
gender is, you should not be able to own a firearm.").
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Then it was
Senator Wellstone and Representative Torricelli"
introduced in April 1994 in the House, where critics of the gun ban
had their strongest influence. The revised House version insisted on
"a hearing of which such person received actual or constructive
notice, and at which such person had an opportunity to participate.""
When critics of the gun ban exacted further concessions in the
conference committee during the summer of 1994, they deleted the
words "or constructive," further limiting the flexibility of the notice
requirement."8
It also bears mentioning that the requirement of express findings
in the restraining order was inserted by critics, not by not the original
proponents of the legislation." The House Judiciary Committee
inserted this requirement in the House bill in April 1994 despite
objections by Representative Torricelli." The new requirement of
explicit findings in the restraining order was one of the shortcomings
that Senator Wellstone complained of when he stated that "the
modification made to the Domestic Violence Firearm Prevention
bill narrowed it so that very few perpetrators
provision in the House
8 4
covered.
be
would

79. At this time the Omnibus Crime Bill was assigned the number S. 1607. 130 CONG.
REC. S15,638 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1993).
80. See sources cited supra note 69. Senator Wellstone and Representative Torricelli
felt the notice and hearing requirements would greatly weaken the legislation. See Press
Release, Office of Representative Torricelli (May 19, 1994) (1994 WL 14179910 *2)
(complaining that, due to the notice requirement inserted by the House, the gun ban "only
applies to individuals who have the opportunity to appear before the court .... "); Press
Release, Office of Senator Wellstone (May 19, 1994) (1994 WL 14179879 *3) (protesting
the insertion of the notice and hearing requirements in the Wellstone/Torricelli bill, and
insisting that "the modification made to the Domestic Violence Firearm Prevention
provision in the House bill narrowed it so that very few perpetrators would be covered").
81. See sources cited supra note 73.
82. United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 215 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting that the
original Wellstone bill "clearly contemplates a firearms disability without ... an express
judicial finding of future dangerousness."), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2362 (2002).
83. Press Release, Office of Representative Torricelli (May 19, 1994) (1994 WL
14179910 *2) (criticizing the authors of the "watered-down version of this legislation"
passed in the House); Letter from Representative Torricelli to Representative Brooks
(June 27, 1994) (1994 WL 14180473 *2) ("Unfortunately, the House crime bill contains a
weakened version [of the gun ban] which would only prohibit possession by some of those
who are subject to a court restraining order.").
84. Press Release, Office of Senator Wellstone (May 19, 1994) (1994 WL 14179879
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(3) ConstitutionalChallenges to Section 922(g)(8)

Shortly after 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) took effect, it drew many
constitutional challenges."
The earliest challenges invoked the
Commerce Clause. Defendants argued that Congress exceeded its
power to regulate interstate commerce when it created a nationwide
firearms disability for batterers. This argument has been rejected by
every court that has heard it. Courts have ruled that the inclusion of
a jurisdictional predicate in section 922(g) guarantees a sufficient
nexus with interstate commerce. 6 No prosecution can proceed under
18 U.S.C. § 922(g) unless the government shows that the gun or one
of its component parts has crossed state lines.8 ' While the Supreme
Court has breathed life into the Commerce Clause with its rulings in
United States v. Lopez 8 and

United States v. Morrison, 9 these

decisions are not controlling because they addressed statutes that
lacked a jurisdictional element.
As an alternative constitutional argument, some defendants have
claimed that section 922(g)(8) violates their due process rights
because they never received notice of the gun ban until they were
85. The constitutional challenges will be discussed only briefly here, because the
primary purpose of this article is to explore problems with the enforcement of the gun ban
once it was found to be constitutional.
86. Under section 922(g), it is illegal "to ship or transport in interstate or foreign
commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition: or to receive
any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign
commerce." No defendant can be prosecuted under this statute unless he possessed "in
and affecting commerce ... a firearm [or] ammunition."
Citing this jurisdictional
predicate, every court considering the issue has upheld section 922(g)(9) as a lawful
exercise of the commerce power. See e.g., United States v. Henry, 288 F.3d 657, 664 (5th
Cir. 2002) (rejecting challenge to section 922(g)(8) under Commerce Clause); Emerson,
270 F.3d at 217; United States v. Napier, 233 F.3d 394, 401-02 (6th Cir. 2000); United
States v. Jones, 231 F.3d 508, 514-15 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Baker, 197 F.3d 211,
215 (6th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1197 (2000); United States v. Bostic, 168 F.3d
718, 723 (4th Cir. 1999); United States v. Cunningham, 161 F.3d 1343, 1346 (11th Cir.
1998); United States v. Wilson, 159 F.3d 280, 285-87 (7th Cir. 1998), United States v.
Pierson, 139 F.3d 501, 502-03 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Bayles, 151 F. Supp. 2d
1318, 1321 (D. Utah 2000); United States v. Visnich, 109 F. Supp. 2d 757, 759-62 (N.D.
Ohio 2000); United States v. Bunnell, 106 F. Supp. 2d 60, 66 (D. Maine 2000), affd, 280
F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 2002); United States v. Myers, No. 98-2560, 1999 WL 475571, at *1 (8th
Cir. June 29, 1999).
87. This is usually demonstrated through proof that the gun or a component part was
manufactured in a different state. E.g., Pierson, 139 F.3d at 503-04 (proof of out-of-state
manufacture was sufficient to show nexus with interstate commerce in prosecution under
section 922(g)(8)).
88. 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down Gun Free School Zone Act, 18 U.S.C. §
922(q)(1)(A), as improper exercise of Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce).
89. 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down civil remedy provision in Violence Against
Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981, because Congress exceeded its authority under the
Commerce Clause).
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arrested for violating this law. Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit
embraced this argument in his dissenting opinion in United States v.
Wilson, arguing that the federal government had "set a trap" for the
defendant when it enacted a new malum prohibitum statute without
taking proper steps to ensure the public received notice.1 A few

courts have adopted Judge Posner's interpretation on this issue," but
most courts have rejected constitutional challenges to section
922(g)(8) based on insufficient notice. These courts have held that
the pendency of a restraining order should put a reasonable person

on inquiry notice about the risk that his gun rights might be subject to
regulation. 2

90. Wilson, 159 F.3d at 293-96 (Posner, J., dissenting).
91. E.g., United States v. Ficke, 58 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (D. Neb. 1999); United States v.
Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 598, 613 (N.D. Tex. 1999), rev'd, 270 F.3d 203, 261 (5th Cir. 2001),
cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2362 (2002).
92. United States v. Henry, 288 F.3d 657, 660 (5th Cir. 2002) ("[T]he necessary mens
rea [for a violation of section 922(g)(8)] does not require knowledge that one is violating
the law but merely of the legally relevant facts.") cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 224 (2002); United
States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 216 (5th Cir. 2001) (rejecting due process argument by
defendant who claimed he had not received notice of gun ban under section 922(g)(8))
cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2362 (2002); United States v. Napier, 233 F.3d 394, 399 (6th Cir.
2000) ("His status alone, as one subject to a domestic violence order, was sufficient to
preclude him from claiming a lack of fair warning with respect to the requirements of §
922(g)(8)."); United States v. Kafka, 222 F.3d 1129, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000) (restraining
order transformed the defendant's otherwise "innocent" possession of a firearm); United
States v. Reddick, 203 F.3d 767, 769-71 (10th Cir. 2000) ("We agree with every circuit
court that has considered due process challenges to § 922(g)(8) and conclude that due
process does not require actual knowledge of the federal statute."); United States v.
Baker, 197 F.3d 211, 220 (6th Cir. 1999) ("The fact that Baker had been made subject to a
domestic violence protection order provided him with notice that his conduct was subject
to increased government scrutiny. Because it is not reasonable for someone in his position
to expect to possess dangerous weapons free from extensive regulation, Baker cannot
successfully claim a lack of fair warning with respect to the requirements of § 922(g)(8).")
cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1197 (2000); United States v. Meade, 175 F.3d 215, 225 (1st Cir. 1999)
(holding that individuals subject to restraining orders "would not be sanguine about the
legal consequences of possessing a firearm."); United States v. Bostic, 168 F.3d 718, 722
(4th Cir. 1999) ("Like a felon, a person [subject to domestic violence protective order]
cannot reasonably expect to be free from regulation when possessing a firearm."); United
States v. Wilson, 159 F.3d 280, 293 (7th Cir. 1998) (defendant can "knowingly" violate
section 922(g)(8) without knowing that his conduct is illegal); United States v. Bayles, 151
F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1321 n.1 (D. Utah 2000) (In prosecution under section 922(g)(8),
"ignorance of the law is no excuse."); United States v. Visnich, 65 F. Supp. 2d 669, 673
(N.D. Ohio 1999) ("[W]here an individual is subject to a domestic violence restraining
order, he or she must be aware of the consequences of possessing firearms and
ammunition."); United States v. Henson, 55 F. Supp. 2d 528, 530 (S.D. W.Va. 1999)
(defendant cannot defeat prosecution under section 922(g)(8) by claiming ignorance of the
law); United States v. Hopper, No. 00-5289, 2001 WL 1671083, at *2 (6th Cir. Dec. 28,
2001) (upholding conviction under section 922(g)(8) even though defendant did not
receive notice that restraining order precluded him from possessing firearms).
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Other defendants have attacked section 922(g)(8)

as an

unconstitutional infringement on their right to bear arms.

Courts

have generally responded to these Second Amendment challenges by
characterizing the right to bear arms as a collective right and by

refusing to find a violation of this right unless the defendant can
demonstrate that his loss of gun rights somehow affects the readiness
of a well regulated militia. 9

In United States v. Emerson, the Fifth

Circuit ruled that individuals do have a Second Amendment right to
bear arms, but determined that section 922(g)(8) is a permissible
imposition on this right.94

93. Whether this interpretation has merit is a highly controversial topic that lies
beyond the scope of the present article. It appears that most courts have construed the
right to bear arms as a collective right, and have declined to strike down the federal
firearms prohibitions as infringements on Second Amendment rights. E.g., Napier, 233
F.3d at 402-03 (rejecting Second Amendment challenge where defendant could not "show
that § 922(g)(8) has some impact on the collective right of the militia"); Bayles, 151 F.
Supp. 2d at 1320-21 (rejecting Second Amendment challenge to section 922(g)(8));
Visnich, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 671-72; Henson, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 529-30; United States v. Boyd,
52 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1237 (D. Kan. 1999), affd, 211 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2000); see Lewis v.
United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65 n.8 (1980) (citing, with approval, other opinions holding that
section 922(g) does not violate Second Amendment); United States v. Baer, 235 F.3d 561,
564 (10th Cir. 2000) (rejecting Second Amendment challenge to section 922(g)(1), noting
that "the circuits have consistently upheld the constitutionality of federal weapons
regulations like [this one] absent evidence that they in any way affect the maintenance of a
well regulated militia."); United States v. Stepney, No. CR 01-0344, 2002 WL 1460258, at
**1-2 (N.D. Cal. July 1,2002) (denying CJA reimbursement to appointed defense counsel
who filed "specious" brief challenging section 922(o) under Second Amendment).
94. 270 F.3d 203, 261 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2362 (2002). The district
court in Emerson had attacked section 922(g)(8) vehemently:
It is absurd that a boilerplate state court divorce order can collaterally and
automatically extinguish a law-abiding citizen's Second Amendment rights,
particularly when neither the judge issuing the order, nor the parties nor their
attorneys are aware of the federal criminal penalties arising from firearm
possession after entry of the restraining order. That such a routine civil order has
such extensive consequences totally attenuated from divorce proceedings makes
the statute unconstitutional. There must be a limit to government regulation on
lawful firearm possession. This statute exceeds that limit, and therefore it is
unconstitutional.
United States v. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 598, 611 (N.D. Tex. 1999). See Oskar M. P6rez,
United States v. Emerson: The Decision That Will Potentially Force the Supreme Court to
Finally Decide Whether the Second Amendment Protectsthe State or the People, 48 LoY. L.
REV. 367 (2002); William C. Plouffe, Jr., A Federal Court Holds the Second Amendment is
an Individual Right: Jeffersonian Utopia or Apocalypse Now?, 30 U. MEM. L. REV. 55
(1999); Nelson Lund, The Ends of Second Amendment Jurisprudence: Firearms
Disabilitiesand Domestic Violence Restraining Orders,4 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 157 (1999);
Scott A. Henderson, United States v. Emerson: The Second Amendment as an Individual
Right-Time to Settle the Issue?, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 177 (1999).
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Additional constitutional challenges to section 922(g)(8) have
invoked the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 9 the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, 9
and the Tenth Amendment's reservation of certain powers for the
states.79 None of these arguments has prevailed.
B.

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9)-Gun Ban After Misdemeanor Crime of
Domestic Violence

(1) Provisionsof Section 922(g)(9)
Section 922(g)(9) of Title 18 (often known as the "Lautenberg
Amendment") creates a firearms disability for any person who has
been convicted of "a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence."98
The Lautenberg Amendment also criminalizes the act of selling or
otherwise disposing of a firearm by giving it to a person who has been
convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence
Only
convictions-not mere indictments-for a misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence can result in a firearms disability under section
922(g)(9)." ° Like 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), section 922(g)(9) has a

95. In United States v. Baker, 197 F.3d 211, 216 (6th Cir. 1999), the Sixth Circuit
determined that section 922(g)(8) affects neither a fundamental right nor a suspect class,
so the court utilized a "rational basis" standard in reviewing this statute. The court found
that denial of firearms to domestic abusers under restraining orders is rationally related to
a legitimate governmental interest of reducing gun-related violence. United States v.
Bunnell, 106 F. Supp. 2d 60, 66 (D. Maine 2000) (summarily rejecting equal protection
challenge to section 922(g)(8)).
96. Baker, 197 F.3d at 217 (punishment for violation of section 922(g)(8) is not
"grossly disproportionate to the crime committed," as required to show a violation of the
Eighth Amendment).
97. United States v. Myers, No. 98-2560, 1999 WL 475571, at *1(8th Cir. June 29,
1999) (Tenth Amendment challenge to section 922(g)(8) must fail once court has
concluded that this statute is a valid exercise of Congress's commerce powers); Meade, 175
F.3d at 224; Bostic, 168 F.3d at 723-24; Wilson, 159 F.3d at 287-88; Visnich, 109 F. Supp. 2d
at 762-63; United States v. Bunnell, 106 F. Supp. 2d 60, 66 (D. Maine 2000); Visnich, 65 F.
Supp. 2d at 672.
98. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2002). Section 922(g)(9) provides in pertinent part: "It
shall be unlawful for any person..., who has been convicted in any court of a
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence .... to ship or transport in interstate or foreign
commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition ....
." Id. Of
course, there was no need to create such a gun ban for felony crimes of domestic violence,
because all felons are already subject to the long-standing gun ban under 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(1).
99. Id. § 922(d)(9).
100. By contrast, in the context of felony offenses, either a conviction or an indictment
will result in a firearms disability. Id. §§ 922(g)(1), 922(n).
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jurisdictional predicate: the government must prove that the firearm
or ammunition in question has traveled in interstate commerce.""
The term "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" is defined
in 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(33)(A):
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" means an offense that(i)is a misdemeanor under Federal or State law; and
(ii)has, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force, or the
threatened use of a deadly weapon, committed by a current or former
spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim, by a person with whom the victim
shares a child in common, by a person who is cohabiting with or has
cohabited with the victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian, or by a person
similarly situated to a spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim."'

In addition to these definitional requirements for the predicate

offense, section
requirements:

922(a)(33)(B)(i)

also

imposes

procedural

A person shall not be considered to have been convicted of such an
offense for purposes of this chapter, unless (I)the person was represented by counsel in the case, or
knowingly and intelligently waived the right to counsel in the
case; and
(II)in the case of a prosecution for an offense described in this
paragraph for which a person was entitled to a jury trial in the
jurisdiction in which the case was tried, either
(aa)the case was tried by a jury, or
(bb)the person knowingly and intelligently waived the
right to have the case tried by a jury, by guilty plea or
otherwise. °3
The statute does not allocate the burden of proof on these procedural

requirements, and the case law has not settled the issue."
101. Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), it is illegal for a convicted domestic violence
misdemeanant "to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or
affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition
which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce."
102. Id. § 922(a)(33)(A).
103. Id. § 921(a)(33)(B)(i).
104. See, e.g., United States v. Akins [hereinafter Akins 1],
243 F.3d 1199, 1202 (9th Cir.
2001), amended and superseded on denial of reh'g by United States v. Akins [herineafter
Akins Il], 276 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 2002). The Ninth Circuit in Akins I initially took the
position that the burden fell on the government:
By defining the federal offense to require a knowing and intelligent waiver of the
right to counsel in the underlying domestic violence conviction, Congress made
knowing and intelligent waiver an element of the § 922(g)(9) offense. The
government thus has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt a
knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel in the predicate offense.
Akins 1, 243 F.3d at 1202. However, all of this language was deleted when the Ninth
Circuit amended its opinion in Akins IL 276 F.3d at 1144-46. The only other court to
reach this question in a published opinion is the district court in United States v. Bethurum.
213 F. Supp. 2d 679, 687-88 (N.D. Tex. 2002). There, the court held that the government
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The Lautenberg Amendment includes other language allowing
an exception to the gun ban for defendants whose civil rights were
forfeited as a result of the misdemeanor conviction and then restored
at a later time. For purposes of the Lautenberg Amendment, the
forfeiture and restoration of civil rights will be evaluated under state
law, not federal law.""5 A defendant seeking to invoke the exception

for restoration of civil rights bears the burden of proof on this issue. "
A defendant who appeals a conviction for a misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence is still subject to the gun ban until the conviction is
vacated.1"
One unique provision of the Lautenberg Amendment extends its
coverage to military and law enforcement personnel, who are

exempted from all the other gun bans under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1)922(g)(8)."
These personnel are subject to the same criminal
penalties that apply to ordinary citizens who possess firearms after a
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.
A violation of the Lautenberg Amendment is punishable by a

'
Ito
prison term of up to ten years and a fine of up to $250,000.

Among the 371 defendants convicted under section 922(g) since 1996,
fewer than fifteen percent were sentenced to a prison term exceeding
five years. Most were sentenced to a term of two years or less, and
bears the burden of proof on the counsel requirement and the jury trial requirement under
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(i). Id.
105. Under 18 U.S.C. § 921 (a)(33)(B)(ii)(2002):
A person shall not be considered to have been convicted of such an offense for
purposes of this chapter if the conviction has been expunged or set aside, or is an
offense for which the person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored
(if the law of the applicable jurisdiction provides for the loss of civil rights under
such an offense) unless the pardon, expungement, or restoration of civil rights
expressly provides that the person may not ship, transport, possess, or receive
firearms.
E.g., United States v. Wegrzyn, 305 F.3d 593, 595-96 (6th Cir. 2002) (interplay of
Michigan's restoration statute and 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) required vacatur of
conviction under Lautenberg Amendment where defendant had successfully completed
probation for misdemeanor crime of domestic violence).
106. Bethurum, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 686.
107. United States v. Blosser, No. 02-40074-01, 2002 WL 31261170, at *3 (D. Kan. Oct.
4, 2002).
108. 18 U.S.C. § 925(a)(1)(2002) provides:
[T]he provisions of this chapter, except for sections 922(d)(9) and 922(g)(9) and
provisions relating to firearms subject to the prohibitions of section 922(p), shall
not apply with respect to the transportation, shipment, receipt, possession, or
importation of any firearm or ammunition imported for, sold or shipped to, or
issued for the use of, the United States or any department or agency thereof or
any State or any department, agency, or political subdivision thereof.
The italicized language was added by the Lautenberg Amendment.
109. Id. § 924(a)(2).
110. Id. § 3571.
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nineteen percent received no prison sentence at all.'
These
sentences were far below the eight-year average in federal weapons
cases during fiscal year 2000.
(2) Legislative History of Section 922(g)(9)

Though named after Senator Lautenberg, the Lautenberg
Amendment owes its origins to the work of Senator Wellstone and
Representative Torricelli in 1993 and 1994. They had proposed a gun
ban for two categories of domestic abusers: 1) those subject to
restraining orders, and 2) those who had been convicted of

misdemeanor offenses involving domestic violence." 2 As noted
previously, the second component of the Wellstone/Torricelli bill
perished in the House Judiciary Committee and in the conference
committee on the 1994 Crime Bill."3
In the next Congress, Senator Frank Lautenberg picked up
where Senator Wellstone and Representative Torricelli had left off.
On March 21, 1996, Senator Lautenberg introduced S. 1632, "a bill to
prohibit persons convicted of a crime involving domestic violence
from owning or possessing firearms."' 14 As originally introduced, the
bill was fairly straightforward.
It prohibited the possession of
firearms by any person who had committed a "crime involving
domestic violence," whether the charged offense was a felony or
misdemeanor."5 The bill created a disability not only for defendants
who had been convicted of such an offense, but also for defendants
111. See EOUSA Report, supra note 18. According to these statistics, of the 371
defendants who were convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), 14.6% received prison
sentences exceeding sixty months, 16.7% received sentences of thirty-seven to sixty
months, 11.1% received sentences of twenty-five to thirty-six months, 22.6% received
sentences of thirteen to twenty-four months, 15.4% received sentences of one to twelve
months, and 19.4 % received no prison sentence. Id. As noted previously, it is important
to bear in mind that these statistics include prosecutions in which the section 922(g)(9)
charge is only one of several charges, so it is likely that the statistics overstate the
sentences attributable solely to section 922(g)(9).
112. See 139 CONG. REc. 515, 638 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1993) (at this time the Omnibus
Crime Bill was assigned the number S. 1607).
113. See supra notes 64-75 and accompanying text.
114. 142 CONG. REC. S2646 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
115. This bill included the following definition of the predicate offense:
The term "crime involving domestic violence" means a felony or misdemeanor
crime of violence, regardless of length, term, or manner of punishment,
committed by a current or former spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim, by a
person with whom the victim shares a child in common, by a person who is
cohabitating with or has cohabitated with the victim as a spouse, parent, or
guardian, or a by a person similarly situated to a spouse, parent, or guardian of
the victim under the domestic or family violence laws of the jurisdiction in which
such felony or misdemeanor was committed.
142 CONG. REC. S2646-02 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
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who had been indicted and were awaiting trial.' 6 The bill did not
include any language requiring that certain "elements" be present in
Like other
the state statutes defining the predicate offense.
provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the original version of the
Lautenberg Amendment did not create a new overlay of procedural
safeguards for the underlying case. The bill did not even discuss a
defendant's right to counsel or right to a jury trial in the predicate
misdemeanor proceeding.
Over the next six months, the Lautenberg Amendment
underwent significant revisions. The first round of changes came in
June 1996, when Senator Lautenberg sought approval to add his
amendment to the Interstate Stalking Punishment and Prevention
Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson, a Texas
Act, H.R. 2980." '
Republican, was shepherding H.R. 2980 in the Senate. She and her
Republican colleagues let Senator Lautenberg know in no uncertain
terms that they felt his amendment was inappropriate for the stalking
bill." ' When Senator Lautenberg persisted, they demanded two
significant changes in the Lautenberg Amendment as a condition for
incorporating it into the stalking bill. First, they insisted that Senator
Lautenberg drop the language creating a firearms disability based
solely on an indictment for a misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence.' 9 Second, the Republicans inserted a requirement that no
predicate would qualify under the Lautenberg Amendment unless the
defendant had been represented by counsel in the misdemeanor
proceeding or had knowingly and intelligently waived his right to
counsel. 2 The Senate approved the Lautenberg Amendment by a
voice vote on July 25, 1996.2 Although the Senate passed the antistalking bill the same day,' the House failed to act on it, apparently

116. Id.
117. 142 CONG. REC. S8831 (daily ed. July 25, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
118. Senator Lautenberg complained in a floor statement that the Republicans had
threatened to hold up President Clinton's judicial appointments if Senator Lautenberg did
not relent with his amendment. 142 CONG. REC. S9458 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1996) (statement

of Sen. Lautenberg).
119. 142 CONG. REC. S8831 (daily ed. July 25, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
120. Both of these changes were reflected in the version of the bill that appeared in the
Congressional Record on July 25, 1996. 142 CONG. REC. S8922 (daily ed. July 25, 1996).
121. 142 CONG. REC. S8829 (daily ed. July 25, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
In a floor statement on August 2, 1996, Senator Lautenberg offered the following account

of the compromise that took place in July:
Finally, on July 25, after agreeing to several changes at the request of my

Republican colleagues, my legislation passed the Senate by a voice vote. The
compromise, Mr. President, that was worked out was supported by even the most
ardent progun Members of this body.
142 CONG. REC. S9459 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
122. 142 CONG. REC. S8831 (daily ed. July 25,1996).
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because some representatives were opposed to the Lautenberg
Amendment.'23
Senator Lautenberg then sought another vehicle for his bill. On
September 12, 1996, Senator Lautenberg offered his bill as an
amendment to the Treasury, Postal Service, and General
Appropriations Act. 12 The amendment was approved by a voice vote
of 97-2.2" The Treasury-Postal appropriation bill was withdrawn and
subsumed within the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act,
H.R. 4278, which also included the Lautenberg Amendment.'26
Despite his success in winning the support of Republican
senators, Lautenberg knew that a showdown was coming with the
House Republicans.' 7 After all, the House Republicans had defeated
this same proposal when Senator Wellstone and Representative
Torricelli first offered it in 1994, and the House Republicans had
thwarted the proposal again when it was attached to the stalking bill
in the summer of 1996. Now, the House Republicans were proposing
sweeping changes to the Lautenberg Amendment as a price for their
approval. 118
They proposed, inter alia, limiting the ban to
misdemeanants who had been entitled to a jury trial, limiting the ban
to misdemeanants who were notified of the law at the time of their
conviction, and limiting the ban to misdemeanants who had abused
their intimate partners (as opposed to their children).'23
123. 142 CONG. REC. S9458 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg). In
a floor statement on September 12, 1996, Senator Lautenberg commented that the House
had rejected the anti-stalking bill because it included the Lautenberg Amendment.
"Unfortunately, when [the anti-stalking bill] got to the House of Representatives they,
despite a commitment of support, let it be known that they will not let this 'no guns for
domestic abuser' amendment survive." 142 CONG. REC. S10,377 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996)

(statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
124. 142 CONG. REC. S10,377 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
125. 142 CONG. REC. S10,379 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996).
126. 142 CONG. REC, S11,872 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996).

127. Senator Lautenberg was aware that his greatest challenge lay in persuading the
House conferees, who had thwarted the gun ban for domestic violence misdemeanants
that the Senate had passed back in 1994. "There is no reason why wife beaters and child
abusers should have guns, and only the most progun extremists could possibly disagree
with that. Unfortunately, these same extremists seem to have veto rights in the House of
Representatives." 142 CONG. REC. S9459 (daily ed. August 2, 1996) (statement of Sen.

Lautenberg).
128. In a floor statement on September 25, 1996, Senator Lautenberg said, "t was told
last night that, behind closed doors, the Republican leadership has decided to entirely gut

this legislation and say that someone who beats his wife and beats his child ought to be
able to own a gun." 142 CONG. REC. Sll,226 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Lautenberg). Lautenberg feared a "complete cave-in to the most radical fringe of the gun
lobby," which was trying to "emasculat[e] this legislation." Id.
129. These proposals were summarized in a floor statement by Senator Lautenberg on
September 30, 1996. 142 CONG. REC. S11,877 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen.

Lautenberg).

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 54

In order to fend off these major changes, which he felt would
"gut" his bill, 3 Senator Lautenberg agreed to other changes that he

deemed to be less significant. He reached a compromise with the
Republican negotiators in the early morning hours on September 28,
1996, '3 the very day when the House voted on the bill.

Senator

Lautenberg accepted eleventh-hour amendments that, according to
Lautenberg, had been authored by "enemies of the ban-lawmakers
who oppose any curbs on guns." '
The first of the revisions incorporated a new "use of force"
requirement. As Lautenberg would later recount, "Some argued that

the term 'crime of violence' [in the original bill] was too broad, and
could be interpreted to include an act such as cutting up a credit card

with a pair of scissors. Although this concern seemed far-fetched to
me, I did agree to a new definition."'33 The Republican negotiators
proposed, and Senator Lautenberg accepted, a version of the "use of
force" requirement that was more restrictive than the typical
definition in the federal gun laws.'34 The legislative history lacks any
explanation for this departure from established definitions.
The second revision on September 28 was a toned-down version
of the jury trial requirement that Republicans had sought. Senator
Lautenberg downplayed the importance of this concession.
[W]e agreed to include in the final agreement a provision that has
no real substantive effect, but that may help to assure some people
that nobody will lose their ability to possess a gun because of a
flawed trial.... The language protects from the ban anyone who
has been entitled to a jury trial, but who did not receive such a jury
trial, or who did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to a
jury trial. 3
Senator Lautenberg also agreed to leave in the counsel
requirement that Senate Republicans had inserted back in July when

130. Id.
131. 142 CONG. REC. SII,877 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg)
("The language in the final agreement was worked out early Saturday morning,
September 28, through further negotiations with the Republican leadership.").
132. Guy Gugliotta, Gum Ban Exemption Ricochets in the Struggle, WASH. POST, June
10, 1997, at A15.
133. 142 CONG. REC. S11,877 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
134. The new "use of force" requirement in the Lautenberg Amendment required that
the predicate offense must involve "the use or attempted use of force, or the threatened
use of a deadly weapon." Typically in the U.S. Code, this requirement is defined more
broadly to include "the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force." Compare
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) (narrow definition in Lautenberg Amendment) with 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (broader definition); 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (broader definition); 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e) (broader definition). Senator Wellstone had used the broader definition in his
original proposal of a gun ban for convicted domestic abusers. See supra, note 54.
135. 142 CONG. REC. SI 1,877 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
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he sought their consent to amend the stalking bill. 3 ' Under this
requirement, a predicate offense would not cause a firearms disability
unless the defendant had been represented by counsel or had
knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel.'37 The

legislative history lacks any discussion of this requirement, and
apparently Senator Lautenberg was not concerned that the counsel
requirement lacked any precedent in the federal gun laws. 9
Finally-and apparently without Senator Lautenberg's prior
approval-Republican Representative Bob Barr arranged for the
Lautenberg Amendment to include language that would subject

police officers and military personnel to the new gun ban. 3 9 Senator
Lautenberg later recounted that this change was made to the bill after

Senator Lautenberg had gone to sleep in the early morning hours of

September 28, 1996.' 40 Senator Lautenberg did not object to the

revision when he woke up the next day, but he speculated that
Representative Barr had inserted it as a "poison pill" to make the bill

less attractive to fellow Republicans and decrease the likelihood of its
passage. 141
Notwithstanding Representative Barr's last-minute amendment,
the House approved the conference report on September 28, 1996, by
a vote of 370-37 .' The Senate passed the bill on September 30, 1996,
by a vote of 84-15.'14 The President signed the bill into law on
September 30, 1996.'"

136. In a floor statement on September 12, 1996, Senator Lautenberg recounted that he
was only able to incorporate his bill into the Anti-Stalking Bill after he struck a deal with
critics including Senator Trent Lott, Senator Larry Craig, and Senator Kay Bailey
Hutchinson. 142 CONG. REC. S10,377 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Lautenberg); see 142 CONG. REC. S9628 (daily ed. Sept. Aug. 2, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Lautenberg) ("[Flinally, on July 25, after agreeing to several changes at the request of my
Republican colleagues, my legislation passed the Senate by voice vote."). The counsel
requirement was one such change.
137. 142 CONG. REC. S8922 (daily ed. July 25,1996).
138. See discussion infra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
139. Naftali Bendavid, A PoliticalGunfight, 19 LEGAL TIMES 42, March 3, 1997, at 19.
Representative Barr denied that he had authored this change, but most other observers
have attributed it to him. E.g., id.; Gugliotta, supra note 132; Press Release, Office of
Senator Lautenberg (Jan. 8,1997) (1997 WL 4428604, at *1).
140. Gugliotta, supra note 132.
141. Bendavid, supra note 139; Press Release, Office of Senator Lautenberg, Statement
Opposing Repeal of Domestic Violence Gun Ban Law (Jan. 8,1997) (1997 WL 4428604)
("Gun ban opponents, at the last minute, insisted on inserting into the law a provision that
exempts covered offenders from a provision of the Gun Control Act that generally
excludes government entities from the Act.").
142. 142 CONG. REC. H12,110 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1996).
143. 142 CONG. REC. Sl1,936 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996).
144. CONG. Q. NEWS, Oct. 1, 1996.
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The final version of the law was poorly drafted and internally
inconsistent. The D.C. Circuit recently complained that "section
921(a)(33)(A) is not a paradigm of precise draftsmanship." 4' 5 For
example, section 921(a)(33)(A)'s definition of "misdemeanor crime
of domestic violence" refers to a "subparagraph (C)" that Congress
had actually deleted from the bill.'46
In the proceedings that led to the passage of the Lautenberg
Amendment, expressions of legislative intent were few and far
between. To the extent that legislative intent can be discerned from
these sources, a number of important themes emerge. First, Congress
perceived an urgent need to disarm batterers.'47 Second, Congress
145. United States v. Barnes, 295 F.3d 1354, 1356 (D.C. Cir. 2002); see also id. at 1361
("Needless to say, if the Congress had more precisely articulated its intention, our task
would have been easier" in construing the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 921 (a)(33)(A).).
146. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A) (2002). Section 921(a)(33)(A) begins with the language,
"Except as provided in subparagraph (C)," but subparagraph (C) was deleted in the final
version of the statute.
147. Senator Lautenberg's floor statements provide insight into the policy concerns that
led Congress to pass the Lautenberg Amendment. He explained that, "we proposed that
no wife beater, no child abuser ...ought to be able to have a gun, because we learned one
thing-that the difference between a murdered wife and a battered wife is often the
presence of a gun." 142 CONG. REC. S11,363 (daily ed. Sept. 26, t996) (statement of Sen.
Lautenberg). Senator Lautenberg noted that approximately two million cases of domestic
abuse are reported each year, and that approximately 150,000 of these cases involve a
firearm. Id. Senator Lautenberg discussed the fatal consequences of gun possession by
batterers:
There is no question that the presence of a gun dramatically increases the
likelihood that domestic violence will escalate into murder. According to one
study, for example, in households with a history of battering, the presence of a
gun increases the likelihood that a woman will be killed threefold [sic].
142 CONG. REC. S11,227 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
"Every year thousands of women and children die at the hands of a family member, and
sixty-five percent of the time those murderers use that gun." 142 CONG. REC. S9459
(daily ed. Aug. 2, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg). Senator Lautenberg stated that
"for many battered women and abused children, whether their abuser gets access to a gun
will be nothing short of a matter of life and death." 142 CONG. REC. S11,878 (daily ed.
Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg). If abusers are permitted to retain their
guns, "[tlhe end result, without any question, would be more shootings, more injuries, and
more death." 142 CONG. REC. S11,226 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Lautenberg).
Other sponsors of the Lautenberg Amendment echoed the statements made by Senator
Lautenberg. Several sponsors emphasized the urgent need to deny firearms to batterers.
Senator Murray stated that:
[W]e know from the research that nearly 65 percent of all murder victims known
to have been killed by intimates were shot to death. We have seen that firearmsassociated family and intimate assaults are 12 times more likely to be fatal than
those not associated with firearms. A California study showed when a domestic
violence incident is fatal, 68 percent of the time, the homicide was done with a
firearm... [T]he gun is the key ingredient most likely to turn a domestic violence
incident into a homicide.
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expressed its intent that the new gun ban be applied broadly,'49 a fact
that should be significant for statutory construction by the courts.'49
142 CONG. REC. S10,379 (daily ed. Sept 12, 1996) (statement of Sen. Murray). Senator
Feinstein stated that, "many perpetrators of severe and recurring domestic violence are
still permitted to possess a gun. Mr. President, these people are like ticking time bombs.
It is only a matter of time before the violence gets out of hand, and the gun results in
tragedy." 142 CONG. REC. S10,380 (daily ed. Sept 12, 1996) (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
Representative Torricelli, the primary sponsor of the House analog to the Lautenberg
Amendment, stated in a press release on September 19, 1996, that "[it] is critical to the
health and well-being of countless American women and children that we move promptly
to disarm wife beaters and child abusers." Press Release, Office of Robert Torricelli,
Lautenberg & Torricelli Urge Gingrich to Include Domestic Violence Gun Ban in
Continuing Resolution (Sept. 19, 1996)(1996 WL 11125168, at *2).
148. Senator Lautenberg stated that his bill "establishes a policy of zero tolerance when
it comes to guns and domestic violence." 142 CONG. REC. S8831 (daily ed. July 25, 1996)
(statement of Sen. Lautenberg). In a press release on September 12, 1996, Senator
Lautenberg emphasized that "[w]e need to ensure that every innocent child or terrorized
woman enjoys the fullest protection of the law." Press Release, Office of Sen. Lautenberg,
Lautenberg Offers Amendment to Treawy Postal Service Appropriations Bill That Takes
Guns Out of the Hands of Wife Beaters & Child Abusers (Sept. 12, 1996)(1996 WL
11124929). Senator Lautenberg indicated that any person who has committed an act of
domestic violence, in any form, should forfeit the right to possess a firearm: "In my view,
anyone who attempts or threatens violence against a loved one has demonstrated that he
or she poses an unacceptable risk, and should be prohibited from possessing firearms." 142
CONG. REC. SI1,877 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg). That
Senator Lautenberg intended a broad construction of the statute is clear in the following
statement:
We hope that the enforcement of the law will be as rigid as the law very simply
defines it If you beat your wife, if you beat your child, if you abuse your family
and you are convicted, even of a misdemeanor, you have no right to possess a
gun. That is the way it ought to be.
142 CONG. REC. S11,878 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
Senator Lautenberg believed that broad application of the statute was crucial because
"[t]here is no margin of error when it comes to domestic abuse and guns." 142 CONG.
REC. S10,378 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg). "The lives of
thousands of women and children are at stake." 142 CONG. REC. S9628 (daily ed. Aug. 2,
1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
Others in Congress stressed that the law should be construed broadly. Senator Kerry
stated that "guns absolutely must be forbidden for those who abuse their spouses." 142
CONG. REC. S12,141 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kerry). Representative
Woolsey made this categorical statement: "It is simple: Wife-beaters, child abusers, and
other domestic violence offenders should not have access to a gun. Period." 142 CONG.
REC. H8100 (daily ed. July 23, 1996) (statement of Rep. Woolsey). No less an authority
than House Speaker Newt Gingrich stated that "I'm very much in favor of stopping people
who engage in violence against their spouses from having guns." Interview by Meet the
Press with Newt Gingrich (Sept. 15, 1996).
149. The Supreme Court has held that where Congress manifests its intent for a
firearms statute to be construed broadly, the courts should heed that directive. In the
leading case, Scarborough v. United States, the Supreme Court decided that section 922(g)
should be construed broadly because the legislative history "while brief, further supports
the view that Congress sought to rule broadly-to keep guns out of the hands of those who
have demonstrated that 'they cannot be trusted to possess a firearm without becoming a
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Third, Congress intended for the new law to be applied uniformly to
reach any conviction for an act involving domestic violence, '5
notwithstanding the vagaries of state statutory definitions.'

threat to society."' 431 U.S. 563, 572 (1977) (citation omitted) (giving expansive
interpretation to interstate commerce requirement); accord Dickerson v. New Banner
Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 112-13 (1983) (citing Congress' intent "to rule broadly" and
refusing to exempt deferred judgments from the coverage of section 922(g)); Lewis v.
United States, 445 U.S. 55, 63 (1980) (citing same rationale in refusing to limit section
922(g) to counseled convictions).
150. Senator Lautenberg also sought to ensure that his new law would be applied
uniformly to reach any conviction for an act involving domestic violence, notwithstanding
the vagaries of state statutory definitions. Senator Lautenberg made clear that his bill
targeted "[d]omestic violence, no matter how it is labeled .... 142 CONG. REC. S10,378
(daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg). Senator Lautenberg said that
variation among the states' laws should not hinder the enforcement of the federal firearms
ban. For example, Senator Lautenberg did not want the applicability of the statute to
depend on whether the defendant had been convicted by a jury, because "[s]tates vary
considerably with respect to the types of crimes for which a jury trial is required." 142
CONG. REC. Sl1,226 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg). Senator
Lautenberg also was concerned that variation in states' plea bargaining practices should
not determine whether an offense involving domestic violence would qualify under the
definition in his statute. 142 CONG. REC. S10,377 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996) (statement of
Sen. Lautenberg). Senator Lautenberg intended for his bill to apply uniformly even
though "in many places today, domestic violence is not taken as seriously as other forms of
criminal behavior." 142 CONG. REC. S10,378 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Lautenberg). Many sponsors agreed with Senator Lautenberg that the application of the
new law should not be thwarted by variation among states' statutory definitions of
domestic violence and assault. As Senator Feinstein stated, "[t]his amendment looks to
the type of crime, rather than the classification of the conviction." 142 CONG. REC.
S10,380 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996) (statement of Sen. Feinstein). Senator Dodd indicated
that the law would "prevent anyone convicted of any kind of domestic violence from
owning a gun." 142 CONG. REC. S12,341 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1996) (statement of Sen. Dodd)
(emphasis added). Senator Feinstein, Senator Wellstone, and Representative Schroeder
all noted the variation in states' charging practices, which necessitated a generic federal
definition of the predicate offense so that batterers would uniformly be denied the right to
possess firearms. 142 CONG. REC. H10,434 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1996) (statement of Rep.
Schroeder); 142 CONG. REC. S10,380 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Feinstein); 142 CONG. REC. S10,378 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Wellstone).
151. The Supreme Court has proven sympathetic to this concern in other contexts. See
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 590 (1990) ("It seems to us to be implausible that
Congress intended the meaning of 'burglary' for purposes of § 924(e) to depend on the
definition adopted by the state of conviction."); Dickerson, 460 U.S. at 119-20 (1983)
(absent a plain indication to the contrary by Congress, federal laws are not to be construed
so that their application is dependent on state law, "because the application of federal
legislation is nationwide and at times the federal program would be impaired if state law
were to control"); United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 411 (1957) ("[t]n the absence of a
plain indication of an intent to incorporate diverse state laws into a federal criminal
statute, the meaning of the federal statute should not be dependent on state law.").
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(3) Constitutional Challengesto Section 922(g)(9)

Criminal defendants and police organizations have raised several
challenges to the constitutionality of section 922(g)(9), all of which
have ultimately failed. 5 2 The most commonly raised argument is that
Congress exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause when it
enacted the Lautenberg Amendment. Courts have ruled that the
inclusion of a jurisdictional predicate in section 922(g) guarantees a
sufficient nexus with interstate commerce.153
Some challenges have asserted that section 922(g)(9) violates the
Due Process Clause because the statute does not require the
government to prove that defendants knew their possession of
firearms was illegal. However, the Supreme Court has made clear
that "the term 'knowingly' merely requires proof of knowledge of the
facts that constitute the offense," not of their illegality._ 4 It is
axiomatic that ignorance of the law is no excuse.155 Lower courts have
152. Shortly after enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), Senator Lautenberg asked the
Congressional Research Service to prepare a memorandum evaluating whether the statute
would be struck down by the courts. The analysts responded, "there is little question that
the new ban is constitutional." Press Release, Office of Senator Lautenberg, Statement
Opposing Repeal of Domestic Violence Gun Ban Law (Jan. 8, 1997) (1997 WL 4428604,
at *1); Memorandum from American Law Division of Congressional Research Service, to
Senator Frank Lautenberg (December 6, 1996) (on file with author). This analysis turned
out to be prescient. Only one constitutional challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) has proven
successful, and that success was short-lived. Fraternal Order of Police v. United States,
152 F.3d 998 (D.C. Cir. 1998), vacated on rehearing, 173 F.3d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
[hereinafter FOP I].
153. See e.g., United States v. Hemmings, 258 F.3d 587, 594-95 (7th Cir. 2001) (rejecting
Commerce Clause challenge to section 922(g)(9)); United States v. Santiago, 238 F.3d 213,
216 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. Lewis, 236 F.3d 948, 950 (8th Cir. 2001); United States
v. Organ, 230 F.3d 1356 (4th Cir. 2000) (per curiam); United States v. Boyd, 211 F.3d 1279
(10th Cir. 2000); Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 704-05 (7th Cir. 1999),
cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1116 (2000); United States v. Myers, 187 F.3d 644 (8th Cir. 1999)
(same); Fraternal Order of Police v. United States, 173 F.3d 898, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
[hereinafter FOP II]; United States v. Rivera, No. 00-3127, 2001 WL 1610054, at *1 (D.C.
Cir. Nov. 21, 2001); United States v. Ball, No. 00-4582, 2001 WL 324624, at *1 (4th Cir.
Apr. 4,2001); United States v. Costigan, No. 00-2457, 2001 WL 535734, at *3 (1st Cir. Mar.
26, 2001); United States v. Brown, No. 00-4369, 2001 WL 285210, at *1 (4th Cir. Mar. 23,
2001).
154. Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184,193 (1998).
155. Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991) ("[I]gnorance of the law or a
mistake of law is no defense to criminal prosecution."). The Supreme Court has carved
out a narrow exception to this principle in Lambert v. California. 355 U.S. 225, 228-30
(1957). That decision reviewed a Los Angeles ordinance creating a new criminal penalty
for any felon who remained in the city limits for over five days without registering with a
law enforcement agency. Id. The Supreme Court reversed a defendant's conviction under
the ordinance because the city had not proven the defendant received notice that her
"wholly passive" conduct could constitute a crime. Id. at 228. While defendants charged
under section 922(g)(9) have claimed that their predicament is analogous to the situation
in Lambert, courts evaluating such claims have ruled that the defendants' conviction for a
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followed this principle and have rejected due process challenges to
section 922(g)(9) based on a defendant's lack of notice that his
possession of a firearm is illegal.'56
Other defendants challenging the Lautenberg Amendment have
claimed that it is unconstitutionally vague. These defendants have
identified three areas of vagueness in the statute: 1) ambiguity as to
which acts meet the "use of force" requirement; 2) ambiguity as to
what sorts of relationships fall within the "domestic relationship"
requirement; and 3) ambiguity as to whether the relationship between
the victim and the assailant must be an element of the predicate
offense. Courts considering these challenges have been mindful of
the strict test for invalidating a statute on grounds of vagueness" 7 and
have uniformly rejected such challenges. '
violent crime should have put them on notice that the government could impose limits on
their gun rights. United States v. Barnes, 295 F.3d 1354, 1367 (D.C. Cir. 2002) ("Having
been convicted of a violent crime, Barnes had reason to know that the government could
regulate his possession of firearms and thus he cannot avail himself of the limited Lambert
exception."); United States v. Denis, 297 F.3d 25, 29-30 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding that
defendant's conviction for misdemeanor crime of domestic violence should have put him
on "inquiry notice" about possible illegality of gun possession); United States v. Hancock,
231 F.3d 557, 564 (9th Cir. 2000) ("[Bly commit[ting] the domestic violence offense, [the
defendant] removed himself from the class of ordinary and innocent citizens who would
expect no special restrictions on the possession of a firearm.") (citations omitted); United
States v. Hutzell, 217 F.3d 966, 968 (8th Cir. 2000) ("[A]n individual's domestic violence
conviction should itself put that person on notice that subsequent possession of a gun
might well be subject to regulation."); United States v. Mitchell, 209 F.3d 319, 323 (4th Cir.
2000) ("[Defendant's] conduct in assaulting his wife-the act that led to his misdemeanor
domestic violence conviction-put [him] on sufficient notice."); United States v. Beavers,
206 F.3d 706, 710 (6th Cir. 2000) ("[W]e conclude that Beavers's conviction on a domestic
violence offense sufficiently placed him on notice that the government might regulate his
ability to own or possess a firearm."). Courts have also offered a second reason for
rejecting Lambert challenges to section 922(g)(9): possession of a firearm is "active
conduct," as opposed to the "wholly passive conduct" at issue in the Lambert case. Denis,
297 F.3d at 29 (possession of firearm is "active conduct" for purposes of Lambert analysis);
Hancock, 231 F.3d at 564.
156. See e.g., Barnes, 295 F.3d at 1366-67 (holding government need not prove, as
element of offense under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), that defendant knew his possession of
firearm was illegal); Denis, 297 F.3d at 29-30; Ball, 2001 WL 324624, at *1; Hancock, 231
F.3d at 561-62; Organ, 230 F.3d at 1356; Hutzell, 217 F.3d at 968; United States v.
Scarberry, 215 F.3d 1328 (6th Cir. 2000); Boyd, 211 F.3d at 1279; Mitchell, 209 F.3d at 32223; Beavers, 206 F.3d at 708-09; United States v. Bostic, 168 F.3d 718, 722-23 (4th Cir.
1999), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1029 (1999); United States v. Meade, 175 F.3d 215, 226 n.5 (tst
Cir. 1999).
157. To decide a vagueness challenge, the court must assess whether the statute "either
forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." United States v.
Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997). "The person challenging the statute as void for
vagueness has a weighty burden of proof and must overcome a strong presumption of
constitutionality."
IA NORMAN J SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 21.16 at 142 (5th ed. 1993). "Since words, by their nature, are imprecise
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Defendants and police organizations have also attacked the
Lautenberg Amendment under the Equal Protection Clause. Many
of these challenges have focused on the provision of section
921(a)(33)(B)(ii) that creates an exemption from the gun ban for a
convicted misdemeanant who "has been pardoned or has had civil
rights restored (if the law of the applicable jurisdiction provides for
the loss of civil rights under such an offense)." In most states,
conviction for a misdemeanor offense does not entail the loss of civil
rights, so misdemeanants in these states cannot avail themselves of
the exemption under section 921(a)(33)(B)(ii). Some defendants
have claimed that this asymmetry violates their right to equal
protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. "9 Courts
have evaluated such claims under the rational basis test, because
domestic violence misdemeanants are not a suspect class and because
the right to possess firearms has not been deemed a "fundamental
right."'' "'
Using this lenient standard, courts have found that
Congress's decision to incorporate state law governing forfeiture of
civil rights was rational even though it led to disparity among the
states in the application of the gun ban.'6' The finding of a rational
instruments, even laws that easily survive vagueness challenges may have gray areas at the
margins." United States v. Nason, 269 F.3d 10, 22 (1st Cir. 2001).
158. Barnes, 295 F.3d at 1366 (rejecting argument that "there is no way for a person to
know.., whether the relational requirement is an element of the predicate crime"; also
rejecting claim that list of required relationships is vague); Nason, 269 F.3d at 22 (rejecting
argument that "use of force" requirement is vague); Meade, 175 F.3d at 222 (holding that
section 921 (g)(9) "contains no ambiguity either as to the persons to whom the prohibitions
apply or as to what conduct is proscribed"); United States v. Smith, 171 F.3d 617, 623 (8th
Cir. 1999) ("18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33) is unambiguous."); United States v. Thomson, 134 F.
Supp. 2d 1227, 1229-30 (D. Utah 2001) ("[T]his court concludes that a person of ordinary
intelligence could easily understand what conduct is prohibited by this statute and to
whom it applies."); Costigan, 2001 WL 525734, at **1-2 (rejecting claim that term
"cohabiting" in section 921(a)(33)(A) is vague); Brown, 2002 WL 31242235 at *2 (section
921 (a)(33) not void for vagueness).
159. A few defendants have presented an alternative theory, claiming that the violation
of the Equal Protection Clause arises from the differential treatment of domestic violence
misdemeanants and other misdemeanants. Courts have quickly disposed of this argument.
"Congress could legitimately believe that the problem of domestic violence is sufficiently
serious to deserve separate treatment, and it could also reasonably believe that persons
convicted of a domestic-violence offense are likely to commit such an offense again. Thus,
it is entirely rational to keep firearms out of the hands of such persons." United States v.
Lewis, 236 F.3d 948, 949 (8th Cir. 2001); accord United States v. Lewitzke, 176 F.3d 1022,
1025 (7th Cir. 1999).
160. See e.g., Barnes, 295 F.3d at 1368 (using rational basis test to evaluate equal
protection challenge to Lautenberg Amendment); Hancock, 231 F.3d at 566; Gillespie v.
City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 709 (7th Cir. 1999); FOP 11, 173 F.3d at 903. The D.C.
Circuit initially agreed with this argument before reversing itself on rehearing. FOP 1, 152
F.3d at 1002-03.
161. Barnes, 295 F.3d at 1368 (holding that Congress acted rationally in relying on
varying state requirements for restoration of civil rights); Smith, 171 F.3d at (Congress did
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basis was buttressed by Congress's inclusion of other means for
restoring gun rights under section 921(a)(33)(B)(ii), such as
expungement and pardon, which do not vary among the states to such
a great degree.'

2

Still other constitutional challenges to section 92 2 (g)(9 ) have

invoked the Ex Post Facto Clause. Specifically, these claims have
hypothesized that section 922(g)(9) imposes improper ex post facto

punishment when it is applied to predicates predating the enactment
of the statute or when it is used to prosecute possession of a firearm
that the defendant acquired before the enactment of the statute. No
published opinion has adopted this reasoning in a prosecution under
section 922(g)(9). The courts have emphasized that section 922(g)(9)

punishes possession of a firearm by a domestic violence
misdemeanant after the statute took effect on September 30, 1996.163
not act irrationally when it looked to state law to define the restoration exception.); see
also Hancock, 231 F.3d at 567 ("Congress reasonably could conclude that felons who had
been through a state's restoration process and had regained their civil rights (without any
restriction on their possession of firearms) were more fit to own firearms than domesticviolence misdemeanants who had not had their convictions expunged or been pardoned.
Reasonable people might argue whether that distinction is good public policy; but it is not
irrational.").
162. Barnes, 295 F.3d at 1368 (ruling that availability of other remedies under section
921(a)(33)(B)(ii) supports finding of rational basis); Hancock, 231 F.3d at 567
("Defendant had, and has, several adequate legal mechanisms at his disposal for regaining
his right to possess firearms: pardon, expungement, and setting aside of convictions.
'Restoration of civil rights' is not one of those mechanisms, as it might be for some felons.
But that minor distinction between felons and misdemeanants is not sufficient to
constitute a violation of equal protection."): Smith, 171 F.3d at 626 (Lautenberg
Amendment did not violate equal protection because it offered other means for
misdemeanants to regain their right to possess firearms.).
163. United States v. Denis, 297 F.3d 25, 32 (1st Cir. 2002) ("[Tlhe conduct for which
Denis is punishable under § 922(g)(9) is not the conviction for domestic assault in 1996,
but the possession of a firearm in 2000); United States v. Hemmings, 258 F.3d 587, 594-95
(7th Cir. 2001) (section 922(g)(9) is not an ex post facto law); United States v. Mitchell, 209
F.3d 319, 322 (4th Cir. 2000) ("It is immaterial [to the analysis under the Ex Post Facto
Clause] that Mitchell's firearm purchase and domestic violence conviction occurred prior
to § 922(g)(9)'s enactment because the conduct prohibited by § 922(g)(9) is the possession
of a firearm.") (emphasis in original); United States v. Boyd, 52 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1236-37
(D. Kan. 1999) ("This court, as have all others deciding such a challenge, [has] concluded
that... the illegal act in § 922(g)(9) is the possession of the firearm, not the misdemeanor
domestic violence conviction."); United States v. Rivera, No. 00-3127, 2001 WL 1610054,
at *1 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 21, 2001) (rejecting ex post facto challenge to prosecution under
section 922(g)(9) because defendant "does not show either that the law applied to events
occurring before its enactment, or that it increased the punishment for prior conduct.")
(citations omitted); United States v. Ball, No. 00-4582, 2001 WL 324624, at *1 (4th Cir.
Apr. 4, 2001) (no ex post facto problem where predicate misdemeanor conviction occurred
before enactment of section 922(g)(9)); see Cox v. Hart, 260 U.S. 427, 435 (1922) (holding
that a law is not unconstitutionally retroactive merely because it "draws upon antecedent
facts for its operation").
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Courts

have

summarily disposed

challenges to section 922(g)(9).

of other constitutional

Among these arguments are claims

that section 922(g)(9) constitutes a "bill of attainder,"'' 64 claims that
section 922(g)(9) violates the Second Amendment,' 61 claims that
section 922(g)(9) violates the Eighth Amendment by imposing cruel
and unusual punishment for the predicate misdemeanor offense, 66

claims that section 922(g)(9) violates the Tenth Amendment by

usurping powers reserved for the states,'6 7 and claims that section
922(g)(9) violates the so-called "Domestic
Violence Clause" in
68
Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution.'

164. A bill of attainder is "a law that legislatively determines guilt and inflicts
punishment upon an individual without provision of the protections of a judicial trial."
Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 468 (1977). It is improper to characterize
section 922(g)(9) as a bill of attainder because the statute does not determine guilt solely
on the basis of the prior conviction. Moreover, the statute does not deprive the defendant
of his right to trial by jury. Hemmings, 258 F.3d at 594-95 (rejecting argument that section
922(g)(9) is bill of attainder).
165. Gardner v. Vespia, 252 F.3d 500,503 (1st Cir. 2001) (upholding summary judgment
in favor of police chief sued by plaintiff who could not buy gun due to misdemeanor crime
of domestic violence; the plaintiff had claimed that this denial infringed his Second
Amendment rights, but the First Circuit held that "the Second Amendment does not
confer an absolute right to bear arms"). Lewis, 236 F.3d at 950 (rejecting Second
Amendment challenge to section 922(g)(9),); United States v. Chavez, 204 F.3d 1305, 1313
n.5 (11th Cir. 2000) (if convicted under section 922(g)(9), "Chavez might not have any
claim under the Second Amendment since he has not shown his gun possession is
reasonably related to a state-run militia."); Gillespie, 185 F.3d at 711 (declining to
invalidate section 922(g)(9) under Second Amendment because the plaintiff "does not
argue (and we do not believe under any plausible set of facts that he could) that the
viability and efficacy of state militias will be undermined by prohibiting those convicted of
perpetrating domestic violence from possessing weapons in or affecting interstate
commerce."); United States v. Finnell, No. 00-4928, 2001 WL 1464305, at *1 (4th Cir. Nov.
19, 2001) (section 922(g)(9) does not violate the Second Amendment).
166. See Lewis, 236 F.3d at 950 (rejecting Eighth Amendment challenge to section
922(g)(9), because "punishment is not based solely on status as a convict, but also on
voluntary act of possession of a firearm") (citing United States v. Jester, 139 F.3d 1168,
1170-71 (7th Cir. 1998)).
167. Hemmings, 258 F.3d at 594 (declining to find section 922(g)(9) unconstitutional
under Tenth Amendment); Lewis, 236 F.3d at 950; Meade, 175 F.3d at 224; FOP I, 173
F.3d at 906-07.
168. U.S. Const. art. IV. Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution reads as follows:
"The United States shall guarantee to every state in this union a republican form of
government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and on application of the
legislature, or the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened) against domestic
violence." Any attempt to invoke this provision in defending a prosecution under 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) is clearly specious. See e.g., United States v. Smith, 171 F.3d 617, 626
(8th Cir. 1999) ("Suffice it to say that when that Clause speaks of 'domestic violence' it
means insurrection, riots, and other forms of civil disorder. It has no application to the
Congress's powers to regulate the possession of handguns under the Commerce Clause.").
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III. Impediments to Effective Enforcement of These Statutes
Since the enactment of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(8) and 922(g)(9),
most of the published opinions discussing these statutes have focused
on their constitutionality. Comparatively little attention has centered
on the enforceability of sections 922(g)(8) and 922(g)(9). Now that
the constitutionality of these statutes is settled, it is time to consider
whether they create an effective regulatory framework for disarming
domestic abusers.
A.

Flaws in Language of Section 922(g)(8)

(1) Notice and Hearing Requirements

A restraining order does not cause a firearms disability under 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(A) unless that order "was issued after a hearing of
which [the respondent] received actual notice, and at which such
Though this
person had an opportunity to participate."'69
requirement appears reasonable on its face, it actually creates
enforcement problems because a large number of restraining orders
in domestic violence cases are issued on an ex parte basis.
In all fifty states, a judge may issue a temporary restraining order
("TRO") without any involvement by the respondent if the petitioner
demonstrates an urgent need for the order. 7 '
The ex parte TRO remains in force until the court holds a full
hearing (i.e., a hearing of which the respondent receives actual notice,
169. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(A)(2002). In many respects, the hearing requirement
appears to be perfunctory. The hearing itself need not be a hearing on the merits; for
example, a hearing at which respondent's counsel asks for a continuance would be
considered sufficient to begin the gun ban under section 922(g)(8). United States v. Calor,
172 F. Supp. 2d 900, 905 (E.D. Ky. 2001) ("The fact that Calor's counsel only made a
'limited appearance' and convinced the court to grant an extension of time does not alter
the fact that a hearing occurred and the Defendant had an 'opportunity to participate."').
The enforceability of the gun ban does not depend on whether the respondent's attorney
rendered effective assistance of counsel at the hearing on the restraining order. See
United States v. Falzone, No. 3: 97-CR-142, 1998 WL 351471, at *1-2 (D. Conn. June 2,
1998) (gun ban commenced at hearing even though respondent claimed he "had only
seconds" to speak with his attorney before the hearing, and respondent claimed he was
"afforded no chance to give input" regarding his attorney's handling of the hearing). Nor
is it even necessary that the respondent was represented by counsel at the hearing. United
States v. Wilson, 159 F.3d 280, 290 (7th Cir. 1998) (hearing was sufficient to begin gun ban
under section 922(g)(8) even though respondent proceeded pro se). If a respondent
receives notice of the hearing, but decides not to attend, the gun ban can nonetheless
commence at the time of the hearing. United States v. Bunnell, 106 F. Supp. 2d 60, 66 (D.
Maine 2000) (section 922(g)(8) does not necessarily require attendance of respondent, but
does require notice and opportunity to attend).
170. CLAIRE DALTON AND ELIZABETH SCHNEIDER. BATTERED WOMEN AND THE

LAW 519-20 (2001).
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and at which the respondent has an opportunity to participate). In
most states, the judge must schedule a full hearing on the restraining
order within two to four weeks after the ex parte TRO was issued.''

An ex parte TRO can be renewed if the petitioner has been unable to
serve the respondent with notice of the full hearing.1 2 In some states,

171. In Alaska, an ex parte TRO expires twenty days after issuance if no hearing is held.
ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.110 (Michie 2002). In Arkansas, this period is thirty days. ARK.
CODE ANN. § 9-15-206 (Michie 2002). In California, this period is twenty days, or if good
cause is shown, twenty-five days. CAL. FAM. CODE § 546 (Deering 2002). In Colorado,

this period is fourteen days. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14-102 (2002). In Connecticut, this
period is fourteen days. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-15 (West 2001). In Delaware, this
period is ten days. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1043 (2002). In the District of Columbia,

this period is fourteen days. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1004 (2002). In Florida, this period is
fifteen days. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30 (West 2002). In Idaho, this period is fourteen
days. IDAHO CODE § 39-6308 (Michie 2002). In Illinois, this period is twenty-one days.
235 ILL COMP. STAT. 5/3-110 (2002). In Iowa, this period is fifteen days. IOWA CODE §
236.4 (2002). In Kentucky, this period is fourteen days, but it can be extended by an
additional fourteen days. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403 (Michie 2002). In Louisiana, this
period is twenty days. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2135 (West 2002). In Maine, this period
is twenty-one days. ME. REV. STAT. TIT. 19, § 4006 (West 2002). In Maryland, this period
is seven days, but the court may extend the period to up to thirty days. MD. CODE ANN.,
Fam. Law § 4-505 (2002). In Massachusetts, this period is ten days. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
209A, § 4 (2002). In Mississippi, this period is ten days, but can be continued by an extra
twenty days. MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-11 (2002). In Montana, this period is twenty days.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-121 (2002). In New Jersey, this period is ten days. N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:25-29 (West 2002). In New Mexico, this period is ten days. N.M. STAT. ANN. §
40-13-4 (Michie 2002). In North Carolina, this period is ten days. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B2 (2002). In North Dakota, this period is fourteen days. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-02
(2002). In Oklahoma, this period is fifteen days. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.4 (West
2003). In Rhode Island, this period is twenty-one days. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-4 (2002).
In South Dakota, this period is thirty days. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-10-7 (Michie 2002).
In Tennessee, this period is fifteen days. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-605 (2002). In Texas,
this period is twenty days, but it may be renewed for additional twenty day periods. TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 83.002 (Vernon 2002). In Utah, this period is twenty days. UTAH
CODE ANN. § 30-6-4.3 (2002). In Vermont, this period is ten days. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 1104 (2002). In Virginia, this period is fifteen days. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-253.1
(Michie 2002). In Washington, this period is either fourteen days or twenty-four days,
depending on the method of service that the petitioner selects. WASH. REV. CODE §
26.50.070 (2002). In West Virginia, this period is ten days. W. VA. CODE § 48-27-403
(2002). Many states have procedures for renewing ex parte orders if the respondent
cannot be served. See, e.g., sources cited infra note 172.
172. See e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.740 (Michie 2002) (ex parte restraining order
lapses after fourteen days, but can be renewed one or more times for fourteen additional
days if petitioner has not been able to serve respondent despite best efforts); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, § 60.4 (West 2003) (ex parte restraining order lasts for fifteen days, but can be
renewed for additional fifteen-day periods if respondent can't be served for full hearing);
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 83.002 (Vernon 2002) (ex parte order expires in twenty days. but
"may be extended for additional twenty day periods").
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the ex parte TRO can remain in effect for a long period without any
requirement of renewal. "'
Despite the widespread use of ex parte TROs, these orders do

not cause a firearms disability under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(A). Only
one federal court of appeals has considered the applicability of the
gun ban to ex parte TROs. In United States v. Spruill, the Fifth Circuit
determined that such orders "are clearly not within § 922(g)(8)(A)."' 74
Indeed, the original sponsors of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) feared that the
inclusion of the notice and hearing requirement in this statute would

greaty reduce the number of domestic abusers subject to the gun
ban.
Congress has created grave dangers for victims of domestic
violence by denying them protection from armed abusers during the
initial two- to four-week period after they obtain ex parte TROs.
173. In Alabama, the ex parte order remains in effect until the hearing on the final
order, and there is no time limit within which that hearing must be scheduled. ALA.
CODE § 30-5-7 (2002). In Arizona, the ex parte order remains in effect for one year unless
the respondent requests and wins a full hearing on the order during that one-year period.
ARIz. REV. STAT. § 13-3602 (2002). In Georgia, the ex parte order is effective for up to
six months without a full hearing. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-4 (2002). In Hawaii, the ex
parte order remains in effect for up to ninety days. HAW. REV. STAT. § 604-10.5 (2002).
In Indiana, the ex parte order remains in effect for up to two years. IND. CODE § 34-26-5-9
(2002). In Kansas, the ex parte order remains in effect for a fixed period not to exceed one
year. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3107 (2001). In Michigan, the ex parte order remains in
effect indefinitely until the respondent schedules and wins a full hearing on the order.
MICH. CMp.LAWS § 600.2950 (2002). In Minnesota, the ex parte order remains in effect
for up to one year or until the respondent requests and prevails in a full hearing
(whichever comes first). MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01 (West 2002). In Missouri, the ex
parte order is valid for up to one year. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.040 (West 2001). In
Nebraska, the ex parte order continues in force for up to one year unless the respondent
sets a hearing and can show cause whey the order should not remain in effect. NEB. REV.
STAT. § 42-925 (2002). In New Hampshire, the ex parte order is enforceable for up to one
year. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:4 (2002). In Oregon, the ex parte order continues in
force until the respondent schedules and wins a full hearing on the order. OR. REV. STAT.
§ 107.718 (2001). In Pennsylvania, the ex parte order remains in effect indefinitely until
the court modifies or terminates the order. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6107 (2002). In South
Carolina, the ex parte order remains in force for up to one year. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-470 (Law. Co-op. 2002).
174. 292 F.3d 207, 217 n.13 (5th Cir. 2002); accord United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d
203, 211 n.2 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 2362 (2002).
175. Press Release, Office of Representative Torricelli, Torricelli Statement on
Domestic Violence Firearm Prevention Act (May 19, 1994)(1994 WL 14179910, at *2)
(complaining that, due to the notice requirement inserted by the House, the gun ban "only
applies to individuals who have ... the opportunity to appear before the court."); Press
Release, Office of Senator Wellstone, Wellstone to Crime Bill Conferees: Support Strong
Provision to Take Guns Out of the Hands of Abusers (May 19, 1994)(1994 WL 14179879,
at *3) (protesting the insertion of the notice and hearing requirements in the
Wellstone/Torricelli bill, and insisting that "[tihe modification made to the Domestic
Violence Firearm Prevention provision in the House bill narrowed it so that very few
perpetrators would be covered.").
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Research has shown that the risk of domestic violence escalates
shortly after the victim attempts to separate from the abuser.
Professor Martha Mahoney coined the phrase "separation assault" to
describe the tendency of batterers to commit retaliatory abuse
immediately after their victims attempt to escape the relationship
(e.g., through obtaining a restraining order).'76 Rita Smith and
Pamela Coukos, leaders of the National Coalition Against Domestic
Violence, have also cautioned that a petition for a restraining order
can "fuel violent retaliation" by the respondent.'
Anecdotal
evidence of such reprisals is abundant.'
Of course, even a 100-foot
stay-away order cannot protect a battered woman from an abuser
with a gun, as Senator John Chafee observed: "[A] gun can be fired
from far away, with some anonymity, and without much visual
warning."'79

While the first month after the issuance of the ex parte TRO is
the most dangerous month, the problems created by 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(8)(A) may persist for a much longer period. For example,
when petitioners are unable to serve respondents with notice of the
full hearing, they must continually renew their ex parte TROs before
they can obtain longer-term orders that would qualify for the federal

gun ban. 8 ' Moreover, some jurisdictions such as Oregon have
established innovative procedures that allow for the ex parte orders to
ripen automatically into longer-term orders unless the respondent
takes the initiative to schedule a hearing.'8 ' Depending on the
particular circumstances of each case, these longer-term orders might
176. Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of
Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 71-76 (1991).
177. Rita Smith is the Executive Director of the National Coalition Against Domestic
Violence ("NCADV"), and Pamela Coukos is NCADV's Public Policy Director.
178. Some of these stories emerged during the 1994 debate over the proposal to create
a firearms disability while a restraining order is in effect. Senator Chafee relayed a story
of a Chicago woman who was shot dead by her former boyfriend one day before she was
due in court on a hearing to extend a restraining order against him. 139 CONG. REC.
S16,293 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1993) (statement of Sen. Chafee). Columnist Anna Quindlen
told the story of a woman who "was shot to death by her husband a week after she got a
temporary restraining order against him." Anna Quindlen, Crime Bill Contains Provisions
That May Save Women's Lives, CHICAGO TRIB., May 30, 1994, at *2, available at 1994 WL
6511101.
179. 139 CONG. REC. S16,293 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1993) (statement of Sen. Chafee).
Other weapons such as a knife would require that "the attacker actually approach the
victim, which may mean the intended victim has a chance to recognize the attacker and
react," or which may permit others around the victim to assist her if they recognize that
the assailant is violating the restraining order. Id.
180. See sources cited supra note 173.
181. OR. REV. ST. 107.718 (2001); see DALTON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 170, at 51920 (describing Oregon's statute); see also, supra note 171 for examples of other states with
self-finalizing ex parte orders in domestic violence cases.
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never pass muster under section 922(g)(8)(A).'12 Yet victims'
advocates in these states-faced with a Hobson's choice of lobbying
to roll back their progressive state laws or foregoing the protection of
the federal gun ban-will naturally choose the latter course.""
Inconsistent enforcement of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) will be the result,
frustrating the intent of Congress that this law apply uniformly in all
the states."
Perhaps the most significant problem caused by the notice and
hearing requirement under section 922(g)(8)(A) is not the exclusion
of ex parte orders, but rather the exclusion of stipulated orders. Due
to the increasing use of mediation in family law disputes," many
couples have stipulated to restraining orders without scheduling a
hearing of any sort.' 6 Because these cases do not present the
respondent with an opportunity to participate in a hearing, it is
arguable that the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(A) may not
be satisfied.' 7 Ironically, the cases in which abuse is most egregious
are the least likely to go to a hearing, so the enforcement of section

182. According to the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Spruill, 292 F.3d 219-20 (5th Cir.
2002), the notice and hearing requirements of section 922(g)(8)(A) cannot be satisfied
merely by giving the respondent the option of scheduling a hearing. Only when a hearing
is actually scheduled, and the respondent receives notices and an opportunity to
participate, will section 922(g)(8)(A) be satisfied.
183. Regarding Points of Conflict Between Oregon and Federal Domestic Violence
Laws: Before Oregon House Interim Judiciary Comm., 69th Leg. Assem. (Or. 1997)
(submitted written testimony of Maureen McKnight submitted Nov. 19, 1997) (arguing
that Oregon's unique procedures for issuing restraining orders should not be abandoned
altogether in order to match federal requirements). As an alternative to such wholesale
changes, Oregon has enacted a statute providing that, if an eligible protective order is
entered, the court "shall also include in the order, when appropriate, terms and findings
sufficient under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(d)(8) and (g)(8) to affect the respondent's ability to
posses firearms and ammunition" if the respondent was provided with the requisite notice
and opportunity to be heard. OR. REV. STAT. § 30.866(10)(2001). In other words, rather
than modify Oregon's procedures to fit the requirements for the federal gun ban, this
statute directs judges to make a record whenever their normal procedures happen to
satisfy the federal requirements.
184. See sources cited supra note 151.
185. See e.g., Laurel Wheeler, Mandatory Family Mediation & Domestic Violence, 26 S.
ILL. U. L.J. 559, 559-63 (2002); Karla Fischer et al., Procedural Justice Implications of
ADR in Specialized Contexts: The Culture of Battering & the Role of Mediation in
Domestic Violence Cases, 46 SMU L. REV. 2117, 2141-56 (1993).
186. Amy Haddix, Unseen Victims: Acknowledging the Effects of Domestic Violence on
Children Through Statutory Termination of Parental Rights, 84 CAL. L. REV. 757, 805
(1996) ("Respondents frequently stipulate to the entry of the order.").
187. Spruill, 292 F.3d at 221 (finding that, for purposes of gun ban under 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(8), notice and hearing requirements were not met by stipulated restraining order
without hearing). By contrast, if a respondent stipulates to a restraining order at a
hearing, there is no difficulty applying section 922(g)(8). See United States v. Wilson, 159
F.3d 280, 290 (7th Cir. 1998) (respondent did not object to order).

March 2003]

DISARMING BATTERERS

922(g)(8) may be limited to "borderline" cases in which the parties
insist on a hearing.
The omission of ex parte and stipulated orders from the coverage
of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) is perplexing when considered within the
overall context of the federal firearms laws. The Supreme Court has
made clear that federal firearms prohibitions are intended to be a
"sweeping prophylaxis, ' and the legislative history of section
922(g)(8) indicates that Congress intended to take a similar approach
in disarming batterers.' 98 Congress has determined that the right of
firearm ownership can be regulated when there exists a strong
likelihood of danger to the public-even in the absence of procedural
safeguards"" such as the notice and hearing requirement in 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(8)(A). For example, a felony indictment causes a firearms
disability, even though the defendant has not yet been given an
opportunity to tell his side of the story at trial. 9' A defendant's status
as a drug user can lead to a firearms disability, even though he has not
been "convicted" or otherwise designated a drug user by any court
before this disability takes effect. 9 Under the felon-in-possession
statute, the defendant is subject to the gun ban even if he shows that
the underlying felony conviction was unconstitutional.' 93
The
application of strict procedural protections in misdemeanor domestic
violence proceedings seems incongruous alongside these less exacting
standards for the other firearms disabilities under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).
(2) FormalisticRequirements for Restraining Orders
In addition to the notice and hearing requirements, a restraining
order must meet certain formalistic requirements set forth in 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(C). This subsection provides that the gun ban will
not apply unless the restraining order
(i) includes a finding that [the respondent] represents a credible
threat to the physical safety of such intimate partner or child; or
(ii) by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against such intimate partner or
child that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury. 4

188. Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 63 (1980).
189. See sources cited supra, note 149.

190. Lewis, 445 U.S. at 63 ("There is no indication of any intent to require the
Government to prove the validity of the predicate conviction.").
191. 18 U.S.C. § 922(n)(2002).
192. Id. § 922(g)(3).
193. Lewis, 445 U.S. at 63 (holding that procedural flaws in the underlying felony case

are not an obstacle to enforcement of the felon-in-possession law, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)).
194. 18 U.S.C. § 9 22(g)(8)(C).
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Like the notice and hearing requirements, this language was absent
from the Wellstone/Torricelli bill"5 and was inserted without their
consent when the House redrafted the bill.'9
In evaluating this requirement, the first question that arises is
why Congress might perceive a need to narrow the list of potential
defendants in such a manner. Recall that all of the requirements in
Subsections (A), (B), and (C) in section 922(g)(8) must be satisfied in
every prosecution under this statute. Subsection (B) requires that the
restraining order in question will not qualify for the gun ban unless it
"restrains [the respondent] from harassing, stalking, or threatening an
intimate partner of such person or child of such intimate partner or
person, or engaging in other conduct that would place an intimate
partner in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner or child."
Having determined that these alarming circumstances are present,
why is it necessary to impose additional requirements to test whether
Surely, the fulfillment of
the defendant is truly dangerous?
Subsection (B)'s requirements will guarantee that all defendants
covered by 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) are at least as dangerous as some of
the other "prohibited persons" subject to section 922(g), such as
marijuana smokers (section 922(g)(3)), aliens (section 922(g)(5)), and
non-violent felons like tax cheats and embezzlers (section 922(g)(1)).
Further, the temporary duration of the gun ban under section
922(g)(8) should assuage concerns that the list of stalkers, harassers,
and batterers subject to section 922(g)(8)(B) might somehow be
overinclusive if it were not further limited by section 922(g)(8)(C).
The strict formalistic requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(C)
are markedly different from the requirements of state laws that create
a gun ban for batterers subject to restraining orders. Several states
such as California have passed laws that prohibit the possession of a
firearm by any person subject to a restraining order in a domestic
abuse case. 97 Very few of these statutes require-as the federal
statute does-that the restraining order state the respondent poses a
credible threat, or that the order require the respondent to refrain
from committing certain crimes. Indeed, this latter requirement
would be redundant with the states' criminal laws: why would a
restraining order prohibit that which is already illegal?
It is likely that section 922(g)(8)(C)'s formalistic requirements
have adversely affected the enforcement of the federal gun ban.
195. See supra note 54.
196. See supra notes 55-65 and accompanying text.
197. E.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 12021 (Deering 2002); DEL. CODE ANN. § 1448(a) (2002);
FLA. STAT. 790.233 (2002); HAW. REV. STAT. § 134-7 (Michie 2002); 430 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 65/8 (2002); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 455(d)(2) (2002); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
209a, § 3B (Law. Co-op. 2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-269.8 (2002); VA. CODE ANN. §
18.2-308.1:4 (Michie 2002); Wis. STAT. § 941.29 (2001).
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Many courts that issue restraining orders may lack the time and
resources to create the thorough record required by section
922(g)(8)(C). Restraining orders are issued by some of the busiest
judges in America, many of whom conduct hearings on these orders
over the phone. Judge Posner estimated that at least 100,000
restraining orders are issued each year,'98 and this figure seems quite
conservative. It seems inappropriate to require that such a huge
volume of cases be managed differently in order to facilitate a much
smaller number of prosecutions under the federal gun statutes. Some
states such as Maine have amended their procedures for issuing
restraining orders in order to comply with the requirements of section
922(g)(8)(C) 9 9 Other states such as Oregon considered and rejected
bills that would enact such reforms.'' In particular, controversy has
arisen over the proposal to create forms for state judges that allow
them the option of checking boxes indicating that the conditions
required by 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(C) are present. Some critics
believe that judges could selectively circumvent the federal gun ban
simply by refraining from checking a box on the form when they
sympathize with a particular defendant. In sum, no reform short of
revising 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) itself is likely to achieve the uniformity
in enforcement that the sponsors of this legislation were seeking."
(3) Exception for Government Personnel
Pursuant to the "official use exception," 111 the gun ban under 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) does not apply to police officers, military
personnel, and other government employees who use firearms in
connection with their official duties. Thus, a police officer can be
subject to a restraining order based on domestic abuse and still carry
a firearm at work. On the other hand, the Lautenberg Amendment,
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), does not grant any special exception for
government employees who have committed misdemeanor crimes of
domestic violence-no matter how long ago these offenses

198. Bovard, supra note 27.
199. In 1997, victims' advocates in Maine proposed a bill, H.R. 1264, to adapt the state's
requirements for restraining orders to fit the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(C).
This proposal was adopted as an amendment to MAINE REV. STAT. tit. 15, § 393 and
MAINE REV. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 4007 (Deering 2001).

200. Hearings on H.B. 2302 Before Oregon House Interim Judiciary Comm., 69th Leg.
Assem. (Or. 1997) (Nov. 19, 1997) (regarding proposal to amend Oregon's procedure for
issuing restraining orders in order to facilitate federal prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(8)). Instead, Oregon has adopted a statute that requires judges to make a record
whenever their customary practices happen to match the federal requirements. OR. REV.
STAT. § 30.866 (2001).
201. See sources cited supra note 151.
202. 18 U.S.C. § 925(a)(1) (2002).
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occurred.""
The inconsistent application of the "official use
exception" has been challenged as violating the Equal Protection
Clause, and all such challenges have been rejected.
So the only
remaining question is whether-as a policy matter-Congress can be
persuaded to reexamine the asymmetry in the "official use exception"
for domestic abusers.
There are strong arguments that government personnel should
be subject to the same rules as civilians, especially in the context of
domestic violence. The rates of domestic violence among military
and police families appear to be at least as high as the rates among
civilians. Domestic violence on military bases is underreported, but
severe when it occurs.
Police experience higher rates of family
abuse than the general population. One survey of police on the East
Coast found that forty percent of respondents admitted domestic
violence had occurred in their households within the last six months.2 6
The prevalence of domestic violence among police raises concerns
203. 18 U.S.C. § 925(a)(1) provides that,
The provisions of this chapter, except for sections 922(d) (9) and 922(g) (9) and
provisions relating to firearms subject to the prohibitions of section 922(p), shall
not apply with respect to the transportation, shipment, receipt, possession, or
importation of any firearm or ammunition imported for, sold or shipped to, or
issued of the use of, the United States or any department or agency thereof or
any State or any department, agency, or political subdivision thereof.
(emphasis added).
204. See sources cited supra note 156.
205. Alison J. Nathan, At the Intersection of Domestic Violence & Guns: The Public
Interest Exception & the Lautenberg Amendment, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 822, 856-67 (2000)
(collecting sources indicating the high incidence and severity of domestic violence among
military personnel). Senator Chafee told this chilling story when he advocated his
proposed gun ban for batterers subject to restraining orders:
In my State of Rhode Island, all of us were horrified by the shooting death of 30
year-old Marie Willis, of Middletown, earlier this year. Mrs. Willis was living in
South Carolina with her husband, an enlisted man at Myrtle Beach Air Force
Base. She left him and returned to Rhode Island with her six-year-old son after
her husband repeatedly abused her--abuse that included twice choking her in
front of her son, and burning her legs with a propane torch. At the urging of the
Bristol police, Mrs. Willis obtained a restraining order against her husband.
On January 3, Marie Willis flew to Myrtle Beach to testify at a military
evidentiary hearing for a possible court-martial of her husband. At 8:15 a.m. on
January 4, Senior Airman Willis walked into the hearing with a 9-millimeter
pistol and opened fire. Mrs. Willis was hit twice in the head and once in the
chest; she was pronounced dead at the hospital at 11:30 a.m.
139 CONG. REC. S16,293 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1993) (statement of Sen. Chafee).
206. Arlene Levinson, When Law, Love Collide in Violence: Evidence Suggests That
Spousal Abuse Among Police Officers is Not Uncommon and That Departments Often are
Reluctant to Punish Offenders, L.A. TIMES, July 6, 1997, at Al. During the mid-1980s,
Professor Leanor Boulin Johnson of Arizona State University asked 728 officers in two
East Coast police departments whether they had behaved violently toward family
members within the last six months.
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not only about the safety of their families, but also about their zeal in
investigating allegations of domestic abuse by others. For example,
shortly after the gun ban for convicted abusers was enacted in 1996,
the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department determined that only
three of its 8,000 deputies were subject to this ban; critics believed
that the Department was not enforcing the ban in good faith." 7
On the other hand, if the official use exception were completely
abandoned, the burden of the gun ban would be more onerous for
police and soldiers than for civilians. Advocates for policy and
military personnel have argued that their ability to carry firearms is
vital to their careers. Moreover, when they use their weapons in
connection with their official duties, they are under strict control by
their supervisors, and the risks that they will use the weapons against
their intimate partners is slight.""
Even Senator Frank Lautenberg himself admitted the complexity
of the issue: "There are legitimate questions about the effect of [the
gun ban for domestic abusers in] the military, our intelligence
agencies, and whole range of federal agencies, including the
Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Drug Enforcement
Administration, the Customs Service, and other federal agencies, as
well as some police agencies."2 " At the same time, said Senator
Lautenberg, "[i]t is ridiculous to suggest that we need to allow all wife
beaters and child abusers to have guns in order to protect public
safety." 2"
One conclusion is ineluctable: there is nothing intrinsically
different about restraining orders and misdemeanor convictions that
merits excluding the former from the gun ban while including the
latter. Congress should at least revise the "official use exception" so
that it applies to both-or to neither-of the gun bans for domestic
abusers under section 922(g)(8) and section 922(g)(9).

207. Hector Tobar, Three Deputies Go to Court, Regain Right to Carry Guns, L.A.

TIMES, May 1, 1997, at B1.
208. Jessica A. Golden, Examining the Lautenberg Amendment in the Civilian and
Military Contexts: Congressional Overreaching, Statutory Vagueness, Ex Post Facto
Violations, & Implementational Flaws, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 427, 449-51 (2001); Capt.

E. John Gregory, The Lautenberg Amendment: Gun Control in the U.S. Army, ARMY
LAWYER, Oct. 2000, at 3-18.

209. Press Release, Office of Senator Lautenberg, Statement Opposing Repeal of
Domestic Violence Gun Ban Law (Jan. 8,1997) (1997 WL 4428604, at *1).
210. Id.
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Flaws in Language of Section 92 2 (g)(9)

(I) "Use of Force" Requirement for Predicate Offense
Under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii), a predicate offense will not
provide the basis for a prosecution under the Lautenberg
Amendment unless the predicate "has, as an element, the use or
attempted use of physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly
weapon.. .. ,2 Conspicuously absent from this list of qualifying acts is
the threatened use of physical force (other than simply the threatened
use of a deadly weapon).
The exclusion of violent threats from the definition in 18 U.S.C. §
921(a)(33)(A)(ii) is an anomaly in the federal firearms statutes.
Every other firearms statute that defines.crimes of violence includes
the term "threatened use of physical force" in that definition. For
example, section 922(g)(8) includes the words "threatened use of
physical force" in its use of force requirement."' In section 924(c),
the term "crime of violence" includes an offense that "has as an
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force
against the person or property of another. '' 21 3 In section 924(e), the
term "violent felony" includes an offense that "has as an element the
use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the
person of another., 241 Indeed, the generic definition of "crime of
violence" at the beginning of Title 18 also uses the same language. 25
All of these examples-and even Senator Wellstone's 1994 proposal
that served as the model for the Lautenberg Amendment 3'6-include
violent threats within the "use of force" requirement.
Why did Congress break with tradition in framing the "use of
force" provision for the Lautenberg Amendment? One possible
explanation is that the "use of force" requirement was added after
midnight on the eve of the bill's passage in the House of

211. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii)(2002).
212. Id. § 922(g)(8)(C)(ii).
213. Id. § 924(c)(3)(A).
214. Id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i).
215. The term "crime of violence" includes "an offense that has as an element the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of
another .... Id. § 16(a).
216. When Senator Wellstone proposed a gun ban for misdemeanants back in 1993, he
adopted the traditional "use of force" requirement, defining the predicate offense to
include any crime that "has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against a spouse, former spouse, domestic partner, child, or former child of
the person." 139 CONG. REC. S14,012 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1993) (statement of Sen.
Wellstone) (emphasis added).
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Representatives,217 and there was little scrutiny of this eleventh-hour
revision."' The proponents of this particular change had been critics

of the gun ban for domestic abusers.219 They may have inserted this
unusual definition in order to limit the scope of the Lautenberg
Amendment to a narrower class of prospective defendants.
In any event, the narrow "use of force" requirement in the
Lautenberg Amendment has clearly hampered the enforcement of

the statute.

This definition requires the exclusion of domestic

violence predicates that simply involve violent threats. For example,
if a defendant threatens to kill his ex-wife by choking, bludgeoning,
drowning, or suffocation, and is convicted of misdemeanor assault

based on this threat, then that defendant arguably would be free to
possess a firearm under the present wording of the "use of force"
requirement in the Lautenberg Amendment.
Recent cases exemplify the absurd results of this narrow

definition. In United States v. White, the Fifth Circuit considered
whether a conviction for issuing a "terroristic threat" could serve as a
217. According to Senator Lautenberg, the "use of force" requirement was proposed by
the bill's detractors during the early morning hours of September 28, 1996, the very day
when the House acted on the bill:
[Tihe revised language [of the bill] includes a new definition of the crimes for
which the gun ban will be imposed. Under the original version, these were
defined as crimes of violence against certain individuals, essentially family
members. Some argued that the term crime of violence was too broad, and could
be interpreted to include an act such as cutting up a credit card with a pair of
scissors. Although this concern seemed far-fetched to me, I did agree to a new
definition.
142 CONG. REC. S11,877 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg). After
making this statement, Senator Lautenberg suggested the amended language was
consistent with his view that "anyone who attempts or threatens violence against a loved
one has demonstrated that he or she poses an unacceptable risk, and should be prohibited
from possessing firearms." Id. (emphasis added). It is evident from the italicized language
that Senator Lautenberg did not foresee the new "use of force" requirement would
actually foreclose prosecution of the gun ban in cases with predicate offense that merely
involved threats of violence.
218. Id.
219. Id. The "use of force" requirement had never before appeared in Senator
Lautenberg's bill before this language was inserted at the insistence of his critics on
September 28, 1996. The version that the Senate passed on September 12 included the
following definition of the predicate offense:
(33) The term "crime involving domestic violence" means a "felony or
misdemeanor crime of violence, regardless of length, term, or manner of
punishment, committed by a current or former spouse, parent, or guardian of the
victim, by a person with whom the victim shares a child in common, by a person
who is cohabiting with or has cohabited with the victim as a spouse, parent, or
guardian, or by a person similarly situated to a spouse, parent, or guardian of the
victim under the domestic or family violence laws of the jurisdiction in which
such felony or misdemeanor was committed."
142 CONG. REC. S10,377 (daily ed. Sept. 12,1996).
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The conviction
predicate under the Lautenberg Amendment.22
paperwork in the predicate case indicated that the defendant had
threatened to kill his ex-wife.22 ' According to the relevant statute,
Texas Penal Code section 22.07(a)(2), a defendant commits the
offense of issuing a terroristic threat "if he threatens to commit any
offense involving violence to any person or property with intent to...
place the person in fear of imminent serious bodily injury... 222 The
Fifth Circuit reversed the defendant's conviction under the
Lautenberg Amendment because this predicate did not meet the "use
of force" requirement in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A). 23 "Obviously,
section 22.07(a)(2) does not require actual 'use' of physical force, but
only threatened use (of violence). 224
The Eighth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in United States
v. Larson.25 There, the Eighth Circuit evaluated whether a conviction
under one subsection of Minnesota's assault statute would meet the
"use of force" requirement in the Lautenberg Amendment.226 The
subsection at issue provided that a person commits a misdemeanor
assault if he "commits an act with intent to cause fear in another of
immediate bodily harm or death. '227 Since violation of this subsection
would not necessarily entail the use or attempted use of force, or the
threatened use of a deadly weapon, the Eighth Circuit found that the
subsection did not pass muster 22
under the "use of force" requirement
in the Lautenberg Amendment. 8
A second, more complicated, problem has also arisen in the
interpretation of the "use of force" requirement. How should the
federal courts treat assault convictions under state statutes that can be
violated in two ways, only one of which meets the "use of force"
requirement? Three appellate panels have tried to address this
question. Two of them managed to sidestep it by finding that the
statutes could only be violated in ways that involve the "use of
force., 22' But an Eighth Circuit panel confronted the question head220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

258 F.3d 374, 377 (5th Cir. 2001).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
13 Fed. Appx. 439, 2001 WL 766842 *1, (8th Cir. 2001).
Id.
Id.

228. Id.; accord United States v. Smith, 171 F.3d 617, 620 (8th Cir. 1999) (stating, in
dicta, that

a misdemeanor

assault conviction

will suffice

under the

Lautenberg

Amendment so long as the conviction is for assault involving the use of physical force
rather than merely placing the victim in fear of imminent bodily harm).
229. In United States v. Nason, 269 F.3d 10, 15 (1st Cir. 2001), the First Circuit

considered whether the "use of force" requirement under 18 U.S.C. § 921 (a)(33)(A) could
be satisfied by a violation of Maine's general-purpose assault statute, when the paperwork
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on and vacated a conviction under a state assault statute that could be
violated through either violent acts or threats of violence.23 In that
case, the Eighth Circuit held that the government had failed to prove
what subsection had been charged in the predicate case, so it was
possible that the defendant violated the non-qualifying subsection.23'
A significant number of states have multi-faceted assault statutes that
are possibly vulnerable to such a challenge.232 The Lautenberg
from the misdemeanor proceeding did not indicate whether the defendant had been
convicted under the first or second prong. Id. at 11. The First Circuit noted "an
interpretive schism that has divided the district courts" on this issue. hd. (comparing
United States v. Nason, No. 00-CR-37, 2001 WL 123722 (D. Me. Feb. 13, 2001) with
United States v. Southes, No. 00-83, 2001 WL 9863 (D. Me. Jan. 3, 2001)). After
examining a lengthy examination of section 921(a)(33)(A)'s history and context, the First
Circuit concluded that "Congress intended section 922(g)(9) to encompass crimes
characterized by the application of any physical force." Id. at 18 (emphasis in original).
Violation of either prong under Maine's assault statute must necessarily involve some
physical force, however minimal. Id. at 21. Accordingly, any conviction under the Maine
statute met the "use of force" requirement in the Lautenberg Amendment. Id.
In United States v. Smith, the Eighth Circuit considered whether the "use of force"
requirement was satisfied by a violation of an Iowa statute that criminalized both a
traditional battery and "[a~ny act which is intended to cause pain or injury to, or which is
intended to result in physical contact which will be insulting or offensive to another." 171
F.3d 617, 619-21 (8th Cir. 1999). The defendant claimed that his conviction under this
statute could have been under this "non-violent" language, so the conviction didn't meet
the "use of force" requirement in the Lautenberg Amendment. Id. at 619. The Eighth
Circuit rejected the defendant's argument, holding that insulting or offensive contact, "by
necessity, requires physical force to complete." Id. at 621 n.2.
Similarly, in a recent district court case, United States v. Blosser, the court evaluated a
conviction under a municipal code provision that defined battery as either "(1)
Intentionally or recklessly causing bodily harm to another person; or (2) Intentionally
causing physical contact with another person when done in a rude, insulting or angry
manner." No. 02-40074-01-JAR, 2002 WL 31261170, slip op. at *4 (D. Kan. Oct. 4, 2002).
The conviction paperwork did not make clear which of these two provisions applied. Id.
The court found that, even if the second provision applied, the offense would still qualify
as a predicate for the federal gun ban. Id. "Making actual physical contact with another
human being cannot be done without some type of physical force." Id.
230. United States v. Larson, 13 Fed. Appx. 439, 2001 WL 766842 (8th Cir. Jul. 10,
2001).
231. Id. In Larson, the Minnesota assault statute applied to a defendant who "(1)
commits an act with intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily harm or death; or
(2) intentionally inflicts or attempts to inflict bodily harm on another." Id. The Eighth
Circuit found that only the second clause could meet the requirements of the federal gun
ban. Id. at 439-40.
232. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.230 (Michie 2002) (assault); ARIz. REV. STAT. § 131203 (2003) (assault); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 602 (2002) (menacing); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 784.011 (West 2002) (assault); GA. CODE ANN. §16-5-20 (2002) (assault); IDAHO CODE
§ 18-901 (Michie 2002) (assault); ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/12-3.2 (2002) (domestic battery);
IND. CODE § 35-42-2-1.3 (2002) (domestic battery); IOWA CODE § 708.2A (2002)
(domestic abuse assault); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3412a (2001) (domestic battery); MINN.
STAT. § 609.2242 (2002) (domestic assault); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-7 (2002) (assault);
Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.074 (2002) (domestic assault); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-201
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Amendment should be fixed in order to ensure that no state is left
outside the scope of the gun ban.233
(2) "Domestic Relationship" Requirementfor PredicateOffense
Under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A), a "misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence" means an offense that
has, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force, or
the threatened use of a deadly weapon, committed by a current or
former spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim, by a person with
whom the victim shares a child in common, by a person who is
cohabiting with or has cohabited with the victim as a spouse,
parent, or guardian, or by a person similarly situated to a spouse,
parent, or guardian of the victim.'
One problem with the relational requirement is quickly
apparent. The list of qualifying relationships does not include a
situation in which the assailant is the child of the victim. 231 With the

growing incidence of elder abuse, this oversight needs to be corrected.
One recent case shows that the existing language in the "domestic
relationship" requirement cannot easily be stretched to cover
predicates involving elder abuse. In United States v. Skuban, the
defendant was convicted under Nevada's domestic assault statute for
assaulting his mother.236' He later possessed a firearm and was

(2003) (assault); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-310 (2002) (assault); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-3-1
(Michie 2002) (assault); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-101 (2002) (assault); TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 22.01 (Vernon 2002) (assault); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-102 (2002)
(assault); W. VA. CODE § 61-2-28 (2002) (assault).
233. At present, the best strategy for a federal prosecutor responding to such a
challenge is to urge that the court examine the charging papers, conviction paperwork,
jury instructions, and other materials in the underlying case to aid in determining whether
the defendant was convicted under the portion of the state statute that satisfies the "use of
force." See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990) (in determining whether
defendant's prior conviction qualifies as a "violent felony" under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B),
court may consider charging instrument and jury instructions in prior case); United States
v. Palmer, 68 F.3d 52, 56 (2d Cir. 1995) (court may consider defendant's admissions in plea
hearing); United States v. Kaplansky, 42 F.3d 320, 324-25 (6th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (court
can consider charging papers, etc.); United States v. Harris, 964 F.2d 1234, 1235-36 (1st
Cir. 1992) (court may examine plea agreement, transcript of plea hearing, and statements
in presentence report to which defendant did not object); see also United States v. Adams,
91 F.3d 114, 116 (11 th Cir. 1996) (noting that seven circuits allow inquiry beyond charging
papers and jury instructions in cases involving guilty pleas).
234. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A) (2002).
235. By contrast, the gun ban for restraining orders includes a broader definition that
covers both sides of the parent-child relationship. Under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(32), the term
"intimate partner" means "with respect to a person, the spouse of the person, a former
spouse of the person, an individual who is a parent of a child of the person, and an
individual who cohabitates or has cohabitated with the person."
236. 175 F. Supp. 2d 1253,1254 (D. Nev. 2001).
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charged under the Lautenberg Amendment. 7 He moved to dismiss
this charge on the ground that his relationship with his mother did not
qualify under the domestic relationship requirement in 18 U.S.C. §
921(a)(33)(A). 3 '
The district court agreed.
"The relationship
defendant had with his victim, i.e., child-aggressor and parent-victim,
is not specified in the statute."23"9
Another question that has plagued interpretation of 18 U.S.C. §
921(a)(33)(A) is whether the relational requirement must be an
element of the predicate offense. One view is that only the "use of
force" requirement needs to be an element of the predicate offense.
The second view is that the "use of force" requirement and the
"domestic relationship" requirement constitute a single element that
must be present in the predicate offense.24
If this second
interpretation were to prevail, then the gun ban would only apply to
defendants who had been convicted under state statutes including a
relational requirement as well as a use of force requirement. 21 Such
an interpretation would greatly limit the effectiveness of the gun ban
under section 922(g)(9), because most states prosecute domestic
42 2
violence under general assault statutes that lack relational elements.
A defendant advocating the restrictive interpretation of section
921(a)(33)(A) could make several arguments. First, he could raise
the common-sense point that if Congress had intended for general
assault convictions to qualify under section 921(a)(33)(A), the most
logical approach would have been for Congress to remove the
domestic relationship requirement from subpoint (ii) and create a
new subpoint (iii) for this requirement. Such clarity in drafting would
have eliminated any question that the phrase "has, as an element," in
subpoint (ii) applied to the relational element in subpoint (iii). 23 As it
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. The court did not accept the government's invitation to view the list of
relationships in the statutes simply as examples, rather than an exhaustive list. Id. at 125455.
240. See United States v. Barnes, 295 F.3d 1354, 1369 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (Sentelle, C.J.,
dissenting) ("An element might be either simple or complex and remain a single
element.").
241. In Oregon, federal prosecutors were concerned enough about this possibility that
they proposed changes to the state's assault statute in order to ensure it would meet
federal requirements in case the "domestic relationship" requirement were in fact
required to be an element of the predicate offense. The Oregon Legislature did not adopt
this proposal. S.B. 318-A, 70th Leg. Assem, 1999 Reg. Sess.
242. See Barnes, 295 F.3d at 1364 n.12 (according to government's brief, only nineteen
states had laws that would qualify if domestic relationship must be an element of the
predicate misdemeanor offense); United States v. Smith, 964 F. Supp. 286, 293 (N.D. Iowa
1997) (only seventeen states had such laws as of 1997).
243. The D.C. Court of Appeals was not persuaded by this argument in Barnes: "The
fact that the Congress somewhat awkwardly included the 'committed by' phrase in subpart

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 54

now stands, the inclusion of both requirements in a single sentence
following the words "has, as an element," could be construed as an
indication that these two requirements constitute a single element,
which must be present in the state statute defining the predicate
offense."'
As a second strategy, the defendant advancing the restrictive

interpretation could cite the rule of the last antecedent: "Ordinarily,
qualifying phrases are to be applied to the words or phrase
immediately preceding and are not to be construed as extending to

Following this rule,246 the qualifying phrase
others more remote.
that begins with "committed by" (i.e., the domestic relationship
requirement) should be read to modify the phrase that begins with

(ii) (instead of adding a subpart (iii)) is not significant in view of the unnatural reading
that would result if 'committed by' were construed to modify 'use of force."' Id.
(emphasis in original).
244. In other contexts, Congress has used the single word "element" when referring to
a list of requirements in a single sentence. For example, in 18 U.S.C. § 16(a), the term
"crime of violence" is defined as "an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use,
or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another." (emphasis
added). Both of the requirements in this quoted language-I) the use of force
requirement and 2) the requirement that the force be used against another person or her
property-are understood to constitute a single element. On the other hand, there are
many instances in which Congress has used the plural word "elements" when referring to a
series of requirements in a single sentence. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(2)(B) ("[T]he
term 'arson' means an offense that has as its elements maliciously damaging or destroying
any building, inhabited structure, vehicle, vessel, or real property by means of fire or an
explosive.") (emphasis added); 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(2)(C) ("[T]he term 'extortion' means
an offense that has as its elements the extraction of anything of value from another person
by threatening or placing that person in fear of injury to any person or kidnapping of any
person.") (emphasis added); 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(2)(E) ("[T]he term 'kidnapping' means
an offense that has as its elements the abduction, restraining, confining, or carrying away of
another person by force or threat of force.") (emphasis added): 42 U.S.C. § 14071(a)(3)(B)
("[T]he term 'sexually violent offense' means ... an offense that has as its elements
engaging in physical contact with another person with intent to commit aggravated sexual
abuse or sexual abuse.") (emphasis added).
245. United States v. Pritchett, 470 F.2d 455, 459 & n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1972); see In re
Paschen, 296 F.3d 1203, 1209 (11th Cir. 2002) ("[T]he rule of the last antecedent [is] an
accepted canon of statutory construction which provides that when construing statutes,
qualifying words, phrases, and clauses are to be applied to the words or phrase
immediately preceding, and are not to be construed as extending to and including others
more remote.") (citations omitted).
246. Some authority suggests that it is not always necessary to follow this rule. Barnes,
295 F.3d at 1360 ("'[T]he Rule of the Last Antecedent is not an inflexible rule, and is not
applied where the context indicates otherwise."') (quoting Pritchett, 470 F.2d at 459) ; see
Witt v. United Co. Lending Corp., 113 F.3d 508, 511 (4th Cir. 1997) (following the Rule of
the Last Antecedent "is not compelled") (quoting Nobelman v. Am. Say. Bank, 508 U.S.
324, 330-31 (1993)).
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"the use or attempted use of physical force" (i.e., the use of force
requirement), rather than the word "offense" in subsection (i).247
Third, the defendant could cite the general savings clause, 1
U.S.C. § 1. The savings clause provides that words importing the
singular include and apply to several persons, parties or things, unless
context indicates otherwise. Relying on the savings clause, the
defendant could argue that the phrase "has, as an element," should
stretch to both the use of force requirement and the domestic
relationship requirement that follow this phrase, even though
Congress elected to use2 4the singular word "element" rather than the
plural word "elements. 1
Fourth, the defendant could invoke the rule of lenity. D.C.
Circuit Judge Frank Sentelle made this argument when he dissented
from the majority's holding in United States v. Barnes:
Fundamental to our fairness-centered criminal justice system is the
rule of lenity for the interpretation of ambiguous penal statutes.
Under the rule of lenity, a criminal defendant is, and should be,
afforded the benefit of the doubtful application of ambiguous
statutory language. It cannot be gainsaid that the language of this
statute [18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)] is ambiguous. The majority
opinion itself is rife with allusions to its ambiguity.2"9
Indeed, the very need for such detailed grammatical and syntactical
analysis suggests that the statute may be somewhat ambiguous and
should be construed under the rule of lenity.2 °
The foregoing arguments have a certain logical force, but they
have not yet prevailed in any federal appellate or district court. So
far every published opinion considering this issue has found that the
predicate offense need not include a domestic relationship
requirement as an element. '
247. The majority in Barnes ruled that the word "committed" in section
921(a)(33)(A)(ii) modified the word "offense" in section 921(a)(33)(A)(i), even though
neither of the parties advanced this argument. Barnes, 295 F.3d at 1362.
248. No published opinion has yet considered this theory. The government might
respond that the savings clause should only be invoked to stop a party from interpreting a
statute in a manner that is inconsistent with congressional intent. First Nat'l Bank v.
Missouri, 263 U.S. 640, 657 (1924); Toy Mfr. of Am. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n.
630 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1980). If the government could establish that congressional intent
was clear (as discussed in the foregoing legislative history, supra notes 120-150), then it
would be inappropriate to resort to the savings clause.
249. 295 F.3d at 1369 (internal citations omitted).
250. Id.
251. E.g., Barnes, 295 F.3d at 1358-66 (upholding conviction under section 922(g)(9)
where predicate offense was misdemeanor under D.C.'s general assault statute, which
does not include a relational element between the assailant and the victim); United States
v. Chavez, 204 F.3d 1305, 1313-14 (11th Cir. 2000) (concluding that requirements for
"misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A) were satisfied
by defendant's conviction under 18 U.S.C. § I 13(a)(4), the general assault statute for U.S.
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The government has a number of potent arguments to offer in
order to defeat a defendant's claim that the "domestic relationship"
requirement must be an element of the predicate offense. The most
obvious argument for the government
is that section
921(a)(33)(A)(ii) contains two separate elements: the "use of force"
element and the "domestic relationship" element.252 Because these
two requirements must be treated as separate elements, we must
impute significance to Congress's use of the singular word "element"
in the modifying phrase, "has as an element., 253 This modifier
territories): United States v. Meade, 175 F.3d 215, 218-20 (1st Cir. 1999) (predicate was
conviction under Massachusetts' general assault and battery statute, which has no
relational element); United States v. Smith, 171 F.3d 617, 619-20 (8th Cir. 1999) (predicate
was conviction under Iowa's general assault statute, which lacks relational element);
United States v. Thomson, 134 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1230 (D. Utah 2001); United States v.
Meade, 986 F. Supp. 66, 68 (D. Mass. 1997); United States v. Smith, 964 F. Supp. 286,29192 (N.D. Iowa 1997); United States v. Ball, No. 00-4582, 2001 WL 324624, at *3 (4th Cir.
Apr. 4, 2001) ("Section 921(a)(33)(A) requires the predicate offense to have only one
element-the use or attempted use of physical force: the relationship between perpetrator
and victim need not appear in the formal definition of the predicate offense."): United
States v. Blosser, No. 02-40079-01-JAR, 2002 WL 31261170, at *3 (D. Kan. Oct. 4, 2002).
252. The conclusion that the use of force requirement and the domestic relationship
requirement are separate elements under section 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) is buttressed by a
comparison of that statute with other statutes in which the nature of the act and the identity
of the victim are separate elements. For example, the jury instructions for the offense of
assaulting a federal officer indicate that the assaultive act and the identity of the victim are
separate elements. 2 EDWARD J. DEVun' & CHARLES B. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY
PRACTICE & INSTRUCTIONS § 23.03, (4th ed. 1990); see United States v. Bettelyoun, 16

F.3d 850, 852 (8th Cir. 1994) (victim's status as federal officer is a separate element). In
the jury instructions for the offense of robbing a federally insured bank, the act of robbery,
and the bank's FDIC status are separate elements. 2 DEVI-17 & BLACKMAR § 49.03. In
the jury instructions for the offense of depriving the civil rights of a Citizen of any state,
the act of depriving civil rights and the citizenship of the victim are separate elements. Id.
§ 27.03. In the jury instructions for the offense of incest, the sexual act and the defendant's
relationship to the victim are separate elements. United States v. Fiddler, 688 F.2d 45, 47
n.9 (8th Cir. 1982) ("[C]onsanguinity [is] an essential element of the offense of incest.").
Similarly, in the present context of 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii), the forceful act and the
relationship between the defendant and the victim must be considered separate elements.
253. See Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 148 (1995) (court should assume that
every word in a statute has significance, especially when the word describes an element of
a criminal offense). Because "element" is singular in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii), it is
reasonable to conclude that the modifier "as an element" applies only to the first element
that follows the modifier: the use of force element. If Congress had intended for the
modifier "as an element" to be stretched to the wholly separate element of the domestic
relationship, Congress would have chosen the plural term "elements" rather than the
singular term "element." See United States v. Green, 902 F.2d 1311, 1312 (8th Cir. 1990)
("Had Congress intended [for defendant's] view to obtain, the obvious choice of words
would been plural and not singular."), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 943 (1990); Hall v. United
States, 39 F.3d 102, 106 (6th Cir. 1994) (ascribing significance to Congress' choice of
singular rather than plural); United States v. Freisinger, 937 F.2d. 383, 390 (8th Cir. 1991);
United States v. Scott, 859 F.2d. 792, 796 (9th Cir. 1988); Indep. Meat Packers Ass'n v.
Butz, 526 F.2d 228, 237 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 966 (1976).
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suggests that only the element immediately following the modifier
(the "use of force" element) needs to be an element of the predicate
offense.
As a second argument, the government could cite the legislative

history of the Lautenberg Amendment to show that it was intended
to cover convictions under generic assault statutes, so long as the
victim and the assailant had the requisite relationship. In particular,
Senator Lautenberg stressed that his bill would apply to "convictions
for domestic violence-related crimes ... for crimes, such as assault,

'
that are not explicitly identified as related to domestic violence."254

He also stressed that the law should be applied uniformly despite

variation in states' definition of predicate offenses.25" Comments of a
bill's primary sponsors are authoritative indications of legislative
intent.25'

Third, the government can rely on the interpretation of the lead
agency assigned to enforce the Lautenberg Amendment-the Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms ("ATF"). 257

The courts have

consistently deferred to ATF's interpretation of federal firearms
statutes. 21' Here, the Director of the ATF has indicated unequivocally
that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) extends to any conviction for assault
against a person with whom the defendant

had a domestic

relationship, whether or not the statute of conviction required such a
254. 142 CONG. REC. S1 1,878 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996)(statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
255. See sources cited supra note 140.
256. See, e.g., N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 526-27 (1982) ("Senator
Bayh's remarks, as those of the sponsor of the language ultimately enacted, are an
authoritative guide to the statute's construction."); Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 63
(1980) ("Inasmuch as Senator Long was the sponsor and floor manager of the bill, his
comments are entitled to weight."); Fed. Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S.
548, 564 (1976) ("As a statement of one of the legislation's sponsors, this explanation
deserves to be accorded substantial weight in interpreting the statute.").
257. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)
("We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive
department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer."); Nat'l
Wildlife Fed'n v. Whistler, 27 F.3d 1341, 1344 (8th Cir. 1994) ("[S]ubstantial deference is
given to an agency's interpretation and application of governing statutes."); 2B NORMAN
J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 49.05 (5th ed. 1993) ("Since
an agency empowered to enforce a statute has a much greater expertise in its area than a
court, the court should defer to the agency's interpretation of the statute ... ").
258. E.g., Farmer v. Higgins, 907 F.2d 1041, 1045 (11th Cir. 1990) ("[W]e defer to the
Bureau's interpretation of Section 922(o)."), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1047 (1991); NRA v.
Brady, 914 F.2d 475, 479 (4th Cir. 1990) (noting ATF's expertise in construing firearms
statutes), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 959 (1991); Gun South, Inc. v. Brady, 877 F.2d 858, 864
(11th Cir. 1989) ("We must defer to the Bureau's interpretation of the Gun Control Act
and its regulations absent plain error in the Bureau's interpretation."); United States v.
Nevius, 792 F. Supp. 609, 616 (C.D. I11.1992) ("Absent compelling indications that the
[ATF]'s evaluation of the [sporting weapons exception] is wrong, the court will defer to
the [ATF]'s interpretation.").
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relationship. 25' ATF's open letter received wide publicity and was
discussed in fifty-seven major newspapers in the thirty-day period
following its release."" Since ATF issued its open letter, no senator or
representative has proposed any amendment that would override
ATF's interpretation and exempt simple assaults from the coverage
of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). The fact that Congress has not resisted
ATF's interpretation can be construed by the court as a tacit
acknowledgment by Congress that ATF has correctly construed the
statute.2 6
Fourth, the government may cite the well-settled doctrine of
"absurd results," under which a statute should not be construed in a
manner that would lead to absurd results. If the real-world
implications of a proposed interpretation would plainly contradict the
intent of Congress, then the court must reject that interpretation in
259. In an "open letter" sent to all state and local law enforcement officials, as well as
all federally licensed firearms dealers, ATF Director John Magaw interpreted section
921(a)(33)(A) as follows:
As defined in the GCA [Gun Control Act], a "misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence" means an offense that:
(1) is a misdemeanor under Federal or State law; and
(2)has, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force, or the
threatened use of a deadly weapon, committed by a current or former
spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim, by a person with whom the victim
shares a child in common, by a person who is cohabiting with or has
cohabited with the victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian, or by a person
similarly situated to a spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim.
This definition includes all misdemeanors that involve the use or attempted use of
physical force (e.g., simple assault, assault and battery), if the offense is committed
by one of the defined parties. This is true whether or not the State statute or local
ordinance specifically defines the offense as a domestic violence misdemeanor.
For example, a person convicted of misdemeanor assault against his or her spouse
would be prohibitedfrom receiving or possessingfirearms.
Open Letter from John Magaw, ATF Director, to all State and Local Law
Enforcement Officials (Nov. 2002) (emphasis added). The open letter sent to state
and local law enforcement officials included a section entitled, "Questions and
Answers Regarding Misdemeanor Crime of Domestic Violence."
Among the
questions and answers were the following:
Q: X was convicted of misdemeanor assault on October 10, 1996. The crime of
assault does not make specific mention of domestic violence but the criminal
complaint reflects that he assaulted his wife. May X still possess firearms of
ammunition'?
A: No. X may no longer possess firearms or ammunition.
Id.
260. This figure is based on a survey of the major newspapers in the Westlaw
ALLNEWS database. It is likely that the story was also picked up by many smaller
newspapers that do not appear in the Westlaw database.
261. Bell, 456 U.S. at 535 (Where an agency's statutory construction has been fully
brought to the attention of the public and the Congress, and no attempt has been made to
amend the statute in response to the agency's interpretation, then presumably the
legislative intent has been correctly discerned by the agency.).

March 2003]

DISARMING BATITERERS

favor of another interpretation that is consonant with congressional
262
intent. Construing the Lautenberg Amendment to exclude generic
assaults would mean that the statute would only apply in fewer than
half the states-clearly an absurd result that Congress did not intend.
In sum, the imprecise drafting of the relational requirement in 18
U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A) has caused the exclusion of elder abuse
convictions from the gun ban and has also engendered litigation as to
whether the relational requirement must be an element of the
predicate offense. Congress should clear up any ambiguity by
revising the relational requirement so that it better reflects the
legislative intent to deny firearms to all convicted domestic abusers.
(3) Requirement of Counsel (or Waiver) in Misdemeanor Proceeding

The Lautenberg Amendment provides that, "[a] person shall not
be considered to have been convicted of [a misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence] unless... (I) the person was represented by
counsel in the case, or knowingly and intelligently waived the right to
counsel in the case. '2 6' As will be seen below, this requirement is far

stricter than pre-existing law, and it creates practical problems that
hinder the enforcement of the gun ban.
The counsel requirement in the Lautenberg Amendment is
remarkable in several respects. First, it is incongruous with the
approach that Congress has taken in other subsections of 18 U.S.C. §
922(g). For example, a defendant charged under section 922(g)(1)
(the felon-in-possession law) cannot defeat this charge by showing a
violation of his right to counsel in the predicate felony case. The
Supreme Court rejected such an argument in Lewis v. United States.264
The Court noted that when the felon-in-possession law was first
enacted in 1968, Congress intended for the law to serve as a
"sweeping prophylaxis.""2 ' "There is no indication of any intent to
require the Government to prove the validity of the predicate
conviction." 2'6 Congress intended for the mere fact of conviction to
disqualify the defendant from possessing a firearm.2 7 If the predicate
262. Griffen v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982) ("[l]nterpretations
of a statute which would produce absurd results are to be avoided if alternative
interpretations consistent with the legislative purpose are available."); Rowley v. Yarnall,
22 F.3d 190, 192 (8th Cir. 1994).
263. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B). This requirement was not part of Senator Lautenberg's
original proposal. The requirement was inserted by the bill's critics as a condition for
permitting Senator Lautenberg to add his amendment to the anti-stalking bill in July 1996.
See supra note 120.
264. 445 U.S. 55 (1980).

265. Id. at 63.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 67.
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conviction was constitutionally invalid, the defendant could only

restore his firearms rights by moving to vacate the conviction,
161
appealing the conviction, or seeking a pardon from the governor.
Many federal courts have reached similar conclusions in more recent
cases.

261

Viewed against the backdrop of Lewis and its progeny, the

counsel requirement in the Lautenberg Amendment is anomalous
indeed: misdemeanants have a greater right to counsel than felons.27

The Lautenberg Amendment's counsel requirement is not only
out of step with the rest of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), but also with the
Constitution itself. The right to counsel established in the Sixth
Amendment does not extend to misdemeanor proceedings in which
there is no possibility of a prison sentence.27' Thus, if a prosecutor
files a misdemeanor assault charge and gives notice that she is not
seeking incarceration, the Sixth Amendment does not require
appointment of counsel for the defendant, and there is no need to
make a record that the defendant has knowingly and voluntarily
waived counsel. The Lautenberg Amendment ignores this timehonored principle and assumes that counsel is necessary in all
misdemeanor cases.272
The expansive counsel requirement in section 921(a)(33)(B)(i) is
all the more startling when contrasted with the less exacting jury trial
requirement in section 921(a)(33)(B)(ii). Congress decided not to
require a jury trial, or waiver of a jury trial, in the predicate
misdemeanor proceeding unless a jury trial was otherwise required by
268. Id. at 61-62. Until such relief was granted, the defendant would remain disabled
from possessing a firearm even though he was not provided with counsel in the
prosecution of the predicate felony, in violation of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963).
269. United States v. Paleo, 9 F.3d 988, 989 (1st Cir. 1992) (uncounseled conviction can
serve as predicate for section 922(g)(1) charge); see United States v. Steverson, 230 F.3d
221, 224 (6th Cir. 2000) ("[Plroof of a defendant's prior felony convictions is admissible for
purposes of proving a § 922(g)(1) violation, even if the prior convictions are
constitutionally deficient."); United States v. Baker, 197 F.3d 211, 217 (6th Cir. 1999)
(following Lewis and holding that a defendant charged under section 922(g)(8) cannot
attack the constitutionality of the proceeding that resulted in the restraining order);
United States v. Blevins, 802 F.2d 768, 770-71 (4th Cir. 1986) ("[l]n a prosecution under
the federal gun statutes, the validity of the underlying conviction is simply not a question
to be determined.").
270. It is also noteworthy that counsel is necessary for a predicate misdemeanor offense
to qualify for the gun ban under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), but not for a predicate restraining
order to qualify for the gun ban under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8).
271. Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 746 (1994) (no Sixth Amendment right to
appointed counsel for misdemeanor crime if defendant's sentence does not include
imprisonment); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979) (no right to counsel where
defendant faced possible jail time in misdemeanor prosecution, but was never actually
sentenced to incarceration); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (the right to
counsel applies to any offense for which a term of imprisonment is imposed).
272. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B) (2002).
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law. 273 The legislative history of the Lautenberg Amendment offers
no explanation why its jury trial requirement is co-extensive with
existing law, but its counsel requirement is far stricter than existing
law.
The awkward fit of the counsel requirement in the Lautenberg
Amendment may be attributable to its peculiar legislative history.
The counsel requirement was inserted by opponents of the
Lautenberg Amendment who insisted on this change as a condition of
their support. 274 The original version of the bill did not include any
counsel requirement. 275 The proponents of the counsel requirement
never explained on the record why it was necessary, nor did they
justify its inconsistency with other provisions of the gun laws.
Whatever the motives that led to the inclusion of the counsel
requirement,276 there can be no doubt that it has imposed significant
limitations on the enforcement of the gun ban for domestic abusers.
The counsel requirement renders the Lautenberg Amendment
useless in jurisdictions that do not appoint counsel, or secure waivers
of counsel, in misdemeanor proceedings with no possibility of jail
time. The irony is that uncounseled convictions generally result from
plea bargains and stipulated judgments-a context in which the pro se
defendant presumably has no objection to the finding of guilt. Thus,
the cases in which the abuser's guilt is most certain are the cases in
which the gun ban is least likely to apply.
Even when state courts recognize a right to counsel in the
predicate misdemeanor proceeding, they do not always make a clear
record that a pro se defendant has knowingly and intelligently
2,7
relinquished this right, as required by the Lautenberg Amendment.
The federal courts employ a strict standard in reviewing the adequacy
of a waiver. Any ambiguity in the record militates in favor of a
finding the waiver was not adequate.2 8 Unfortunately, the plea
273. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 325-28 (1996). As a matter of federal constitutional law, jury
trials are not required in misdemeanor cases when a sentence of incarceration is actually
imposed. Id.

274. 142 CONG. REC. S9458 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1996)(statement of Sen. Lautenberg); see
142 CONG. REC. S8922 (version of Lautenberg Amendment reflecting revisions requested
by Republicans in July 1996).
275. 142 CONG. REC. S2646 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1996) (originally proposed version of
Lautenberg Amendment).
276. Senator Lautenberg suggested that some of the Republicans who sought to amend
his bill were trying to "gut" or "emasculate" the gun ban for domestic abusers. 142 CONG.
REC. S11,226 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
277. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(i).
278. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (When courts scrutinize a plea
colloquy to determine the validity of a waiver, the courts should adopt "every reasonable
presumption against waiver."); accord United States v. Akins, 276 F.3d 1141, 1147 (9th
Cir. 2002) (citing Johnson in finding that waiver of counsel was inadequate for purposes of
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colloquies in misdemeanor cases are rarely as thorough as those in
felony cases. 79 The colloquies in misdemeanor cases may not always

comport with federal requirements that the defendant must be
informed of the nature of the charges and the possible penalties, as
well as the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.2" Once
again, the Lautenberg Amendment has confused the kite with the tail:
the plea colloquy for a misdemeanor assault case assumes a greater
significance when convictions are reviewed under the Lautenberg
Amendment than when they are imposed in the first instance.
Another recurring problem with the counsel requirement in
section 921(a)(33)(B)(i) is the lack of a transcript or verbatim
recording to assist the federal court's review of misdemeanor plea

hearings. " Even where judges conduct thorough plea colloquies in
misdemeanor cases, these may be of little or no use to federal
prosecutors unless they are documented by transcripts or otherwise
recorded. Many states do not require transcripts for misdemeanor
plea hearings

2

Where transcripts or recordings are made in

prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9)); United States v. Bethurum, 213 F. Supp. 2d 679,
687-88 (N.D.Tex. 2002).
279. See, e.g., State v. Maxey, 873 P.3d 150, 154 (Idaho 1994) ("We are not
convinced.., that the judgments that confront a defendant who pleads guilty in a
misdemeanor case are sufficiently difficult to warrant a requirement that the trial court
must advise the defendant of the problems inherent in entering a plea without counsel.");
In re Johnson, 398 P.2d 420, 427 (Cal. 1965) (opining that misdemeanor proceedings
should not be burdened by the same constitutional requirements as felony proceedings).
280. In Akins, 276 F.3d at 1147, the Ninth Circuit ruled that 18 U.S.C. §
921(a)(33)(B)(i) requires district courts to employ the same standards for evaluating the
adequacy of counsel waivers in predicate misdemeanors as the federal courts would use to
evaluate counsel waivers in felony cases.
281. For example, no transcript was available in any of the three published cases in
which federal appellate courts have assessed the adequacy of waiver under section
921(a)(33)(B)(i). See infra notes 286-88 and accompanying text.
282. Many states have lax requirements for the preparation of transcripts in
misdemeanor proceedings. E.g., State v. Nail, 963 S.W.2d 761, 764 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1997) (stating that generally in Tennessee, a court reporter is "not provided at state
expense for a misdemeanor."); 8 MINN. PRAC. SERIES § 19.7 (In Minnesota, "[a] verbatim
record must be made of a plea to an offense punishable by incarceration, except for
misdemeanors where the plea is by petition." (quoting MINN. R. CRIM. P. 15.09); 10 GA.
P. CRIM. § 34:52 ("The lack of a transcript does not result in a reversal of a misdemeanor
conviction ....
) (citing Gilbert v. Manchester, 419 S.E.2d 487, 488 (1992)); Grundset v.
Franzen, 675 F.2d 870, 876 (7th Cir. 1982) (Under Illinois state law, a verbatim transcript is
not necessary to show the voluntariness of a guilty plea in a misdemeanor proceeding.). In
California, transcripts may be supplanted by docket entries in misdemeanor plea hearings:
In felony cases, a reporter's transcript of the guilty plea proceedings usually
establishes the necessary record of the waiver of constitutional rights. In
misdemeanor cases, the practicalities of the crowded courts permit some
deviation from the strict felony procedure so long as the constitutional rights of
defendants are respected. Thus docket entries in misdemeanor cases may be
sufficient to show that an accused knew his constitutional rights and expressly
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misdemeanor assault cases, these records are sometimes destroyed
within a few years. 23 In the absence of a transcript, some federal
judges have proven reluctant to rely on "advice of rights" forms as
proof that a pro se defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his
right to counsel in a misdemeanor assault case.2"
Further, federal courts' judgments about the adequacy of counsel
waivers are highly subjective, and are unlikely to achieve the uniform
enforcement that Congress intended when it passed the Lautenberg

Amendment." 5 Three decisions, United States v. Akins, 2 6 United
States v. Bethurum, and United States v. Smith,2 m exemplify the

inconsistent application of 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(i) in the
evaluation of counsel waivers. In Akins, a defendant charged under
the Lautenberg Amendment moved to dismiss the indictment on the
ground that he had not knowingly and intelligently waived his right to
counsel in the predicate misdemeanor proceeding."' He had signed a
written waiver of his right to counsel, stating, "My plea of guilty is a
knowing and intelligent waiver of my right.., to an attorney, even at
public expense, unless I am already represented by one. ' '290 The form
also explained the consequences of a guilty plea.29 It did not,
however, focus on the specific advantages and disadvantages of
proceeding without counsel.292 There was no record of a colloquy
between the court and the defendant regarding these matters. 293 The
Ninth Circuit held that under these facts, there was inadequate proof
that the defendant knowingly and intentionally waived his right to
counsel, so the federal indictment under section 922(g)(9) must be
dismissed.294

waived them where such entries are prepared for the particular case before the
court.
20A CAL. JR. 3d, Criminal Law: Pretrial Proceedings § 755 (2002) (internal citations
omitted).
283. Memorandum from Representative Bill McCollum, Chairman, Subcommittee on
Crime, House Judiciary Committee, to other members of Subcommittee (March 4, 1997)
(on file with author) (announcing hearings on proposals to reform 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9)
and explaining reports of problems with enforcement of this law).
284. E.g., Akins, 276 F.3d at 1149 (executed waiver form reciting right to courtappointed counsel not sufficient to establish voluntariness of counsel waiver in
prosecution under section 922(g)(9)).
285. See supra notes 274-84 and accompanying text.
286. 276 F.3d 1141.
287. 213 F. Supp. 2d 679 (N.D. Tex. 2002).
288. 171 F.3d 617 (8th Cir. 1999).
289. Akins, 276 F.3d at 1144.
290. Id. at 1145.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 1149.
293. Id.
294. Id.
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In Bethurum, the defendant, a co-owner of a gun shop, was
charged with possessing firearms after a conviction for a
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. 5 'The defendant asserted
that his waiver of counsel in the predicate proceeding was not
knowing and intelligent because he was not aware that his conviction
could result in a firearms disability."
He made this claim even
though his plea hearing took place on June 9, 1997-nine months
after the Lautenberg Amendment took effect. 7 He signed a written
waiver of counsel with the following recitation:
I have been advised by the Court of my right to representation by
counsel in the trial of the charge pending against me ....
Understanding my right to have counsel appointed for free of
charge if I am not financially able to employ counsel, I wish to
waive that right and request the Court to proceed with my case
without an attorney being appointed for me."
Reviewing this record to determine the adequacy of the counsel
waiver under section 921(a)(33)(B)(i), the federal district court found
that the government had not met its burden of proving that the
waiver was knowing and intelligent. " In particular, the government
had not proven, as it must, that the defendant understood that his
misdemeanor conviction carried the consequence of forfeiting his gun
rights.""'
By contrast, in Smith, the Eighth Circuit found that 18 U.S.C. §
921(a)(33)(B)(i) was satisfied under circumstances that arguably cast
more doubt on the sufficiency of the counsel waiver than in the Akins
case.3 0 The defendant in Smith moved to dismiss his indictment
under section 922(g)(9) on the ground that he had not knowingly and
voluntarily waived counsel when he pled guilty to a misdemeanor
assault charge in state court.3 '2 He had been represented by counsel
in the assault case, but his counsel never showed up for the plea
hearing.3 ''3 The court waited for counsel to appear, and then

295. United States v. Bethurum, 213 F. Supp. 2d 679, 681-82 (N.D. Tex. 2002).
296. Id. at 684.
297. See id. at 682.
298. Id. at 682.
299. Id. at 687-88.
300. Id. Of course, the practical effect of this ruling is that the gun ban for
misdemeanants would never apply to any defendant whose predicate conviction predated
the enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) on September 30, 1996, because these defendants
could not possibly have known about the gun ban when they pleaded guilty to the
predicate offenses.
301. United States v. Smith, 171 F.3d 617 (8th Cir. 1999).
302. Id. at 619.
303. Id. at 621.
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presented the nineteen-year-old defendant"' with a wavier of counsel
form so the plea hearing could proceed pro se.3" 5 This boilerplate
form was actually for a different crime than the one with which the

defendant had been charged."' There was no evidence of a colloquy
in

which

the

court

explained

the

specific

advantages

and

disadvantages of proceeding pro se. The defendant could not have
possibly understood the ancillary consequence of a gun ban, because
the plea hearing occurred in 1994, two years before the Lautenberg
Amendment took effect. The Eighth Circuit found that these facts
were not so egregious as to require dismissal of the indictment under
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(i). 03 7 The Eighth Circuit's holding in Smith

is difficult to reconcile with the holdings in Akins and Bethurum, and
the comparison of these cases underscores the subjectivity inherent in
the federal courts' evaluations of counsel waivers in misdemeanor
cases.

Notwithstanding the above-listed problems with the counsel
requirement, there may be some hope for the future. States may
strengthen their requirements for appointment of counsel, their
requirements for plea colloquies, and their requirements for
transcripts in misdemeanor assault proceedings. These changes might

result from an interest to facilitate the federal gun ban, or simply
from an interest to ensure that misdemeanants fully understand that
their guilty plea could result in a federal firearms disability. 08 But any
such improvements will come too late to assist with the enforcement
of the Lautenberg Amendment in cases involving predicates
convicted before September 30, 1996."0 As to those convictions304. Pleadings filed with the district court showed that Smith was born on April 26,
1975. United States' Resistance to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at Exhibit 2, United
States v. Smith, (N.D. Iowa 1997) (No. CR 96-2140) (on file with author). The plea
hearing in the misdemeanor assault case occurred on November 28, 1994, when the
defendant was nineteen years old. Id. at 10. This information was included in the record
submitted to the Eighth Circuit on appeal.
305. Smith, 171 F.3d at 621-22.
306. Id. at 622 n.3.
307. Id. at 622.
308. On the other hand, some states might refuse to make such changes, perhaps
because of resource constraints or a desire to thwart the enforcement of the federal gun
ban.
309. If, in effect, convictions predating 1996 cannot be used as predicates because they
do not meet the counsel requirement in section 921(a)(33)(B)(i), then the critics of the
Lautenberg Amendment will have accomplished through the counsel requirement what
a ban on retroactive
they could not accomplish through a more explicit proposal:
enforcement of the gun ban for domestic abusers. H.R. 26, 105th Cong. (1996),
(introduced by Representative Bob Barr on January 7, 1997, would have prevented the
new gun ban from applying to any conviction that became final before September 30,
1996, the effective date of the Lautenberg Amendment). 143 CONG. REC. H66 (daily ed.
Jan. 7, 1997). Hearings were held on this bill. See Hearing on the Gun Ban for Persons
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which make up the vast majority of the convictions that could
possibly be subject to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) 3 '"-the counsel
requirement will remain a significant obstacle to enforcement.
(4) Requirement of Jury Trial (or Waiver) in Misdemeanor Proceeding

Under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(i) (2002),
A person shall not be considered to have been convicted of such an
offense for purposes of this chapter, unless...
(II) in the case of a prosecution for an offense described in this
paragraph for which a person was entitled to a jury trial in the
jurisdiction in which the case was tried, either
(aa) the case was tried by a jury, or
(bb) the person knowingly and intelligently waived the
right to have the case tried by a jury, by guilty plea or
otherwise.
In a statement on the Senate floor, Senator Lautenberg
explained that this provision was the result of a compromise.
Republican negotiators had sought to limit the application of the gun
ban to those cases in which the defendant actually had been entitled
to a jury trial. Senator Lautenberg had opposed this proposal,
recognizing it "would have rendered the ban close to meaningless, as
the vast majority of these cases are heard before a judge, in a bench
trial." 3 '
We agreed to include in the final agreement a provision that has no
real substantive effect, but that may help to assure some people
that nobody will lose their ability to possess a gun because of a
flawed trial. This provision, in essence, states that the ban will not
apply to someone who was wrongly denied the right to a jury trial.
More specifically, the language protects from the ban anyone who
has been entitled to a jury trial, but who did not receive such a jury
trial, or who did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to a
jury trial.

Convicted of Domestic Violence Misdemeanors Before the Subcommittee on Crime of the
House Committee on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of William McCollum,
Chairman, House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee On Crime). The bill was
never approved, however. Senator Lautenberg complained that a ban of retroactive
enforcement would exempt the majority of defendants who would otherwise be covered
by the law. "By allowing virtually all currently convicted spouse-beaters and child abusers

to possess guns, the [bills prohibiting retroactive enforcement] would put at risk the lives
of thousands of battered women and abused children." Fact Sheet: The Lautenberg
Amendment Prohibiting Wife-beaters from Owning Guns, and the Current, Ill-Advised
Bills that Would Gut it, (February 20, 1997) (on file with Office of Senator Lautenberg)

[hereinafter Fact Sheet].
310. Fact Sheet, supra note 309.
311. 142 CONG. REC. Si 1,872 (daily ed. Sept. 30,1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
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Of course, Mr. President, if an offender was wrongly denied the
right to a jury trial, he was not legally convicted. And so this
language really does not change anything. But, again, as it
provided needed reassurance for some, I agreed to it in order to
facilitate the final agreement.3 2

Unlike the counsel requirement, the jury trial requirement in the
Lautenberg Amendment is co-extensive with pre-existing law. The
jury requirement is of no substantive value to defendants, but rather
imposes a procedural safeguard that ensures their pre-existing rights
will be now protected by two courts instead of one. In this respect, as
noted previously, the Lautenberg Amendment is completely out of
step with other federal firearms laws such as the felon-in-possession
law.1 3

The illusory benefit of the jury trial requirement comes at the
cost of a cumbersome procedure that further hinders the enforcement
of the Lautenberg Amendment. Whether defendants had a right to a
jury trial in the predicate misdemeanor proceeding is not always easy
to determine. States employ varying tests, and these tests may
depend on in-court statements made by the prosecutor about the
amount of prison time she is seeking.314 Further, it may be difficult to
assess whether a defendant's waiver of his right to jury trial was
knowing and intelligent. Transcripts are not always available in
misdemeanor proceedings, and court records are routinely destroyed
in many jurisdictions.315 At least one federal court has permitted the
government to rely on a notation in a state court order to establish
the defendant's knowing and intelligent waiver of a jury trial, but
whether other federal courts will follow this same approach is
uncertain 3 6

312. Id.

313. See supra notes 231-36 and accompanying text.
314. Compare Deming v. City of Mobile, 677 So. 2d 1233, 1235 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995)

(in Alabama, every criminal defendant charged with a misdemeanor has a right to a jury
trial) with Marzen v. Klousia, 316 N.W.2d 688, 690 (Iowa 1982) (Under the Iowa
Constitution, "there is no constitutional right to a jury in the trial of criminal charges that
can be punished by fines not exceeding one hundred dollars or imprisonment for not
longer than thirty days.").
315. Memorandum from Representative Bill McCollum, Chairman, Subcommittee on
Crime, House Judiciary Committee, to other members of Subcommittee (March 4, 1997)
(on file with author) (announcing hearings on proposals to reform 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9)
and explaining reports of problems with enforcement of this law).
316. In United States v. Jackson, the court found a knowing and intelligent waiver of
jury trial based on notation in a state court order that defendant had been fully advised of

his constitutional rights. 213 F.3d 644 (9th Cir. 2000).
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(5) Exclusion of Indictments as Predicates

In its present form, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) does not create a
firearms disability for indictments, complaints, or informations-only
for final convictions. The original version of Senator Lautenberg's
bill applied to indictments, but he deleted this provision at the urging
of Republican senators when he needed their support to his
amendment to the stalking bill in July 1996.
The reasons for applying the gun ban to charging instruments are
similar to the rationale for applying the ban to TROs. Misdemeanor
crimes of domestic violence usually come to the attention of the
police because the victim files a report or complaint. Thus, the victim
is vulnerable to "separation assault" if she files charges against her
batterer and he is not incarcerated while awaiting trial. Indeed, the
lapse between arrest and trial on a misdemeanor charge is likely to be
much greater than the ten- to twenty-day lapse between issuance of a
TRO and the hearing on the petition for a permanent restraining
order. Victims deserve strong protection during this early period
when they are most likely to suffer reprisals for their courage in
reporting domestic violence.
Of course, the mere fact that charges have been filed is not
tantamount to proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is
a domestic abuser. Yet 18 U.S.C. § 922(n) has long prevented the
possession of firearms by any person indicted of a felony offense.317 It
is difficult to argue why a charge for a misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence (which necessarily involves the use of force) should
be cause for less concern than a felony charge (which may not
necessarily involve a violent felony). The fact that domestic violence
cases are often undercharged further erodes the distinction between
felonies and misdemeanors.
Not all misdemeanants are charged by indictment. Some
(probably most) are charged by complaint, information, or some
equivalent instrument. ' An effective gun ban in these circumstances
would need to define the charging instrument broadly, in order to
minimize inconsistency in the enforcement of the gun ban among the
several states.
317. See United States v. Napier, 233 F.3d 394, 398 (6th Cir. 2000) ("Indeed, a legally

relevant status under § 922(g) may arise in the absence of any formal proceeding. For
example, § 922(g)(3) prohibits an individual addicted to controlled substances from
possessing a firearm, yet an individual attains the status of a drug addict without a court
proceeding of any kind.") (quoting United States v. Baker, 197 F.3d 211, 217 (6th Cir.
1999)). Even under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), there is no finality requirement for predicate
convictions. Jackson, 213 F.3d at 644. (under section 922(g)(9), there is no finality
requirement).
318. Susan W. Brenner, The Voice of the Community:
Independence, 3 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 67, 101-03 (1995).

A Case for Grand Jury
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Insufficient Time Period for Background Checks Under Section 922(t)

Under the present version of 18 U.S.C. § 922(t), law enforcement
officers have three days in which to check the background of a
prospective gun purchaser. If the check is not completed within this
time frame, the applicant will be approved by default.
These strict time limitations do not allow a meaningful
background check. In particular, misdemeanor crimes of domestic
violence will be difficult to detect and investigate during the three-day
period.
Senator Lautenberg foresaw such problems when he
discussed the Lautenberg Amendment on the Senate floor:
Mr. President, the final agreement does not merely make it
against the law for someone convicted of a misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence from possessing firearms. It also incorporates
this new category of offenders into the Brady law, which provides
for a waiting period for handgun purchases. Under the Brady law,
local law enforcement authorities are required to make reasonable
efforts to ensure that those who are seeking to purchase a handgun
are not prohibited under Federal law from doing so.
Mr. President, convictions for domestic violence-related crimes
often are for crimes, such as assault, that are not explicitly
identified as related to domestic violence. Therefore, it will not
always be possible for law enforcement authorities to determine
from the face of someone's criminal record whether a particular
misdemeanor conviction involves domestic violence, as defined in
the new law.
Mr. President, I would strongly urge law enforcement authorities
to thoroughly investigate misdemeanor convictions on an
applicant's criminal record to ensure that none involves domestic
violence, before allowing the sale of a handgun. After all, for many
battered women and abused children, whether their abuser gets
access to a gun will be nothing short of a matter of life and death. I
am hopeful that law enforcement officials always will keep that in
mind as they implement this requirement.
Having said this, Mr. President, I recognize that there are limits
to the ability of many law enforcement agencies to conduct in depth
investigations of large numbers of applicants for handgun
purchases. The law requires that these agencies make a reasonable
effort to investigate applicants. What is a reasonable effort depends
upon the local law enforcement officials' available time, resources,
access to records, and their own law enforcement priorities.
In my view, the reasonable effort requirement should not be
interpreted so broadly that it would substantially interfere with the
ability of a law enforcement agency to carry out its central mission
of apprehending criminals and protecting the public from crime. At
the same time, it should not be interpreted so narrowly that it
would allow law enforcement agencies to routinely ignore
misdemeanor convictions for violent crimes, without further
exploration into whether these crimes involved domestic violence.
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So long as an agency makes a reasonable effort to do so, the
requirements of the law would be met. However, again, I would
strongly urge law enforcement officials to make this a top priority.3 9
The "reasonably thorough" checks urged by Senator Lautenberg
have proven even more difficult than he imagined. First, local
jurisdictions have adopted inconsistent policies for maintaining
computerized records of misdemeanor convictions. Second, the
actual court records of misdemeanor cases are routinely destroyed or
moved to storage archives in some jurisdictions. 2 Third, the time
frame for background checks has actually been reduced from the fiveday period in the original Brady Law to the three-day period in the
present law.
The consequence of harried background checks is that batterers
will obtain guns. In June 2002, the General Accounting Office
released a draft of a study indicating that between 1998 and 2001, at
least 3,000 persons subject to firearms disabilities arising from
domestic abuse were able to acquire new firearms despite
background checks under the Brady Law.3 2' These numbers-which
exceed by ten-fold the total number of defendants prosecuted under
the gun ban for domestic abusers-raise serious concerns about the
viability of the current time limits for background checks. The GAO
recommended that Congress allow a longer period in which police
may investigate the background of prospective gun purchasers.
D. Sentencing Disparity Under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1
To date, prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(8) and 922(g)(9)
have usually resulted in low sentences. The majority of defendants
sentenced under these statutes have received prison terms of less than
two years.323 By contrast, the average sentence in federal weapons
prosecutions as a whole is approximately eight years."'
The prospect of low sentences under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(8) and
922(g)(9) is one factor that contributes to the underutilization of
these statutes. As a general matter, federal prosecutors are directed
to choose carefully which charges they will file. They are encouraged
319. 142 CONG. REC. S11,878 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
320. Memorandum from Representative Bill McCollum, Chairman, Subcommittee on
Crime, House Judiciary Committee, to other members of Subcommittee (March 4, 1997)
(on file with author) (announcing hearings on proposals to reform 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9)
and explaining reports of problems with enforcement of this law).
321. Eggen, supra note 11.
322. Id.
323. These statistics are set forth in the report that EOUSA prepared in July 2002 at
the request of the author. See supra note 18.
324. CRIMINAL CASE PROCESSING, 2000. supra note 22. Table 6 of this report
indicates that in Fiscal Year 2000, the mean sentence in federal weapons prosecutions was
92.2 months.
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to prosecute cases in which they will achieve a sentence that is
substantially better than what state prosecutors could achieve.32
Given these considerations, it is no surprise that prosecutors utilize 18
U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(8) and 922(g)(9) less frequently than other statutes
yielding higher sentences.
Frustration has arisen over the disparity between the sentencing
guidelines for violations of the felon-in-possession law and the
guidelines for violations of the gun ban for domestic abusers. The
sentencing guideline for illegal possession of firearms, U.S.S.G. §
2K2.1, favors felon-in-possession cases by starting these cases at a
much higher base offense level than cases under the gun ban for
domestic abusers. The base offense level for a felon-in-possession
case is 20 if the predicate offense was a crime of violence,3 and 14 if
the predicate offense was non-violent."' By contrast, the base offense
level for violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(8) and 922(g)(9) is always
14,32 no matter what the character of the predicate. An argument
could be made that this base offense level is too low, because
predicates under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(8) and 922(g)(9) are virtually
always violent. When a defendant with a base offense level of 14
receives 329a hsofn
two-level reduction for pleading guilty in a timely
manner, his offense level of 12 virtually assures him that he will
avoid any substantial prison time, unless he has a lengthy criminal
history." '
Complicating the picture is the possibility of sentencing
reductions that are available to violent misdemeanants but not violent
felons. If a defendant demonstrates that he possessed firearms solely
for lawful sporting purposes, then his base offense level can be no
higher than 6.
This adjustment is not available to a felon in
possession whose predicate crime was violent,1 2 but it is available to a

325. Memorandum from Mark M. Richard, Acting Assistant Attorney General,
Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice, to all United States Attorneys 3 (Feb. 12,
1997) (on file with author) (setting forth charging considerations for cases under new
federal gun ban for domestic abusers).
326. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) (2002).
327. Id. § 2K2.1(a)(6).
328. Id.
329. Id. § 3E1.1.
330. Id. § 4AL.l and Ch. 5 part A (sentencing table).
331. Id. § 2K2.I(b)(2). The potential for abuse of this guideline in a section 922(g)(9)
prosecution is evident in United States v. Mojica. 214 F.3d 1169 (10th Cir. 2000) (vacating
district court's denial of sentencing reduction under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(2) for defendant
convicted under section 922(g)(9), where defendant claimed he had acquired a firearm for
his brother's sporting purposes, not his own; if on remand the district court found that
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(2) applied, then sentencing range would be zero to six months).
332. U.S.S.G. §§ 2K2.t(a)(4), 2K2.1(b)(2).
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domestic violence misdemeanant whose predicate crime was
violent."'
In sum, as a result of these various adjustments, a felon in
possession whose predicate crime was beating his ex-wife will begin
with a base offense level of 20 under the guidelines, whether or not he
shows that he possessed the firearm for a lawful sporting purpose. A
domestic violence misdemeanant whose predicate crime was beating
his ex-wife will begin with a base offense level of 6 under the
guidelines if he can show a lawful sporting purpose for his possession
of the firearm.334 The 300 percent difference between these base
offense levels is inappropriate and greatly reduces incentives for
prosecutors to file charges under the gun ban for domestic abusers.

IV. Proposals for Reform
The following proposed revisions to statutes and sentencing
guidelines would improve the enforcement of the gun ban for
domestic abusers and would provide defendants with clearer notice of
their rights and liabilities.
A. Broader Application of Section 922(g)(8)
The gun ban under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) should apply to any
person who is subject to a court order that
(A) was issued after a hearing, of which such person received actual
notice, and at which such person had an opportunity to participate
unless the parties have agreed to waive a hearing;and

(B) restrains such person from harassing, stalking, or threatening
an intimate partner of such person or child of such intimate partner
or person, or engaging in other conduct that would place an
intimate partner in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner
or child' and
(C)(i) includes a finding that such person represents a credible
threat to the physical safety of such intimate partner or child: or
(ii) by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against such intimate partner or
child that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury.
This revised language33 offers two principal advantages over
existing law. First, the notice and hearing requirement would no
333. Id. §§ 2K2.l(a)(6), 2K2.1(b)(2).
334. See United States v. Lewitzke, 176 F.3d 1022, 1029 n.7 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that
in a prosecution under section 922(g)(9), "by specifying a much lower base offense
level ....[U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(2)] does significantly reduce the amount of prison time the
defendant might serve for the possession.").
335. Newly inserted language has been italicized.
Deleted language has been
underlined.
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longer exclude ex parte orders and stipulated orders. These orders
make up a substantial portion of domestic violence restraining orders
today, and they are no less reliable as an indication of dangerousness
than are the felony indictments that presently create a firearms
disability under 18 U.S.C. § 922(n).
Second, the formalistic
requirements of current Subsection (C) would be deleted entirely.
These requirements have led to the exclusion of nonconforming
restraining orders in some states and have undermined the uniform
enforcement of the gun ban. The limitations of Subsection (C) are
unnecessary because any person who falls within the language of
Subsection (B) is surely dangerous enough that he should be denied
the right to possess firearms, whether or not the express findings
required by Subsection (C) have been made.
B.

Greater Flexibility in Section 922(g)(9) to Match Requirements of
State Law
The definition of the predicate offense under 18 U.S.C. §
921(a)(33)(A) should be revised to read as follows:
"misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" means an offense that
(i)is a misdemeanor under Federal or State law; and
(ii)is assault or battery, or is an offense that has, as an element, the
use or attempted use of physical force, the threatened use of physical
force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon, committed by a
current or former spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim, by a
person with whom the victim shares a child in common, by a person
who is cohabiting with or has cohabited with the victim as a spouse,
parent, or guardian, or by a person similarly situated to a spouse,
parent, or guardian of the victim: and
(iii)is committed by a current or former spouse, parent, guardian or
child of the victim, by a person with whom the victim shares a child
in common, by a person who is cohabiting with or has cohabited
with the victim as a spouse, parent, guardian or child, or by a
person similarly situated to a spouse, parent, guardian or child of
the victim.
This revised version would be preferable to existing law for
several reasons. First, by listing assault and battery as crimes that will
automatically satisfy the "use of force" requirement in every state,
irrespective of the precise language used in each state's statutes, the
new version reduces inconsistency in the enforcement of the gun ban
among states, simplifies background checks, and is more
understandable to defendants. Second, the new language includes the
threatened use of physical force within the "use of force"
requirement, bringing the definition into conformity with all the other
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"use of force" requirements in the federal gun laws.33 Third, the new
language makes clear that the "domestic relationship" requirement
includes a situation in which the assailant is the child of the victim.
Fourth, the additional substructure eliminates any possibility that
section 921(a)(33)(A) might be construed to require that the
"domestic relationship" requirement must be an element of the
predicate offense.
The best way to reform 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)-which sets
forth the counsel requirement and the jury trial requirement-would
be to simply delete this provision altogether. The provision is
inappropriate for 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) because it requires
unprecedented scrutiny of proceedings in the predicate casescrutiny that is not required for felony predicates under 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(1), and that far exceeds constitutional requirements.
The language establishing the offense in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9)
should be revised to read as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person... who has been convicted in
any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, or who has
been charged with a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence by
indictment, information, or any other written charging instrument...

to possess in or affecting commerce any firearm or ammunition ...
The italicized language would ensure that the law applies not
only to convicted defendants, but also to defendants who have been
charged and are awaiting trial. The felony gun ban already includes
both charged and convicted defendants, so the misdemeanor gun ban
should include both groups as well. This change would achieve more
uniform enforcement and would better protect victims at the time
when they are most vulnerable to gun-related violence.
C. Extension of Time Limits for Background Checks Under Section 922(t)
The Brady Law, 18 U.S.C. § 922(t), should be revised to allow
police up to ten days in which to complete a background check for a
prospective gun purchaser. This longer time period would improve
the likelihood that police could detect a misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence, which may not be as easy to recognize as a felony.
D. Revision of U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 to Eliminate Disparity in Sentencing
The sentencing guideline for illegal possession of firearms,
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, should be revised to establish a base offense level of
336. With this revision the statute will be true to Senator Lautenberg's intentions: he
said "anyone who attempts or threatens violence against a loved one has demonstrated that
he or she poses an unacceptable risk, and should be prohibited from possessing firearms."
142 CONG. REC. S1,877 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg)
(emphasis added).
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18 for violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(8) and 922(g)(9), as opposed
to the current base offense level of 14. This new base offense level
would be closer to the base offense level of 20 that applies in felon-inpossession cases involving violent predicates. Closing the gap is
appropriate because every violation of sections 922(g)(8) and
922(g)(9) involves a violent predicate.
Further, the "sporting
purposes" reduction under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(2) should be
unavailable in prosecutions under sections 922(g)(8) and 922(g)(9),
just as it is unavailable in felon-in-possession cases with violent
predicates.
Conclusion
When Congress debated the gun bans for domestic abusers in
1994 and 1996, the principal sponsors were wary that amendments
offered by their opponents would greatly limit the enforceability of
these measures. Senator Wellstone expressed his fear that critics
would "gut" his legislation. Senator Lautenberg complained that the
gun lobby was seeking amendments that would create 337
"loopholes
large enough to drive a truckload of wife beaters through.,
While Senator Wellstone and Senator Lautenberg did manage to
fend off some of the most worrisome revisions, the bills that became
18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(8) and 922(g)(9) were nonetheless burdened with
many limitations that have hindered their enforcement. Now that the
constitutionality of these measures has been settled, it is time to ask
whether they can be adequately enforced as they are written. The
answer is that they cannot. Major revisions in the statutory language
are necessary in order to realize Senator Lautenberg's dream that
' 3 "no
wife beater, no child abuser.., ought to be able to have a gun. 3

337. 142 CONG. REC. S11,227 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
338. 142 CONG. REC. S11,363 (daily ed. Sept. 26,1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).

